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1
Introduction
Over the last decade, the world has witnessed both a tremendous growth in the size
of the derivative instruments market1 and large losses associated with derivatives.
Some well known firms associated with these losses include JPMorgan Chase, Gibson
Greetings, Inc., Procter and Gamble Co., Orange County, and California (Rusinko and
Mattews 1998; Dan and Julie 2012). The tremendous growth in the use of derivative
instruments by a wide range of corporate and financial institutions, and reports of
major losses associated with derivative instruments, have resulted in a great deal of
concern about the complexity of these instruments and the lack of transparency with
respect to risk exposures and hedging activities.
One of the main concerns of market participants is that the accounting standards
for derivative instruments and hedging activities have not kept pace with the growth
in the use and complexity of derivative instruments. Therefore, they have expressed
their concern that the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging
activities does not provide adequate information about how it affects firm’s financial
position, operations, and cash flows (SFAS 133, paragraph 212 and 213). These
concerns have inspired standard setters and regulators to deal expeditiously with
reporting problems in derivative instruments and hedging activities. Because of the
need for improved information, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued a series of accounting standards
in the 1990s.
Despite the issuing of these standards, the accounting guidance for derivative in-
1According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the notional amounts outstanding
in over-the-counter derivatives accelerated by 135% to $516 trillion from June 2004 to June 2007.
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struments and hedging activities prior to the adoption of the Statement of Financial
Accounting Standard No. 133 (SFAS 133) in 2000 remained incomplete and inconsis-
tent (Zhang 2009). In response to the continuous call for improving the transparency
of derivative instruments and hedging activities, the FASB issued the Statement of
Financial Accounting Standard No. 133 (SFAS 133), Accounting for Derivative In-
struments and Hedging Activities, that became effective as of June 15, 2000. SFAS
133 is the first comprehensive accounting standard for all derivative instruments and
, arguably, it is also one of the most controversial standards ever issued by the FASB.
Despite the controversy surrounding SFAS 133, relatively little is known about its
costs and benefits.
Consequently, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine important questions
surrounding derivative instruments recognition and disclosure under SFAS 133 that
have not been addressed in the existing literature. The three studies of the disser-
tation provide new insights about the impact of derivative instruments recognition
and disclosure under SFAS 133 on individual firms by examining the cross-sectional
variation in the impact of SFAS 133 on information asymmetry among investors,
investors’ reactions to macro-economic news, and income smoothing. Chapters two
and three examine the impact of SFAS 133 from the investors’ perspective, while
chapter four investigates the impact of SFAS 133 from the perspective of managers.
More specifically, chapters two and three contain studies of the impact of derivative
instruments recognition and disclosure under SFAS 133 on information asymmetry
about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign exchange rates and investors’
reactions to macro-economic news, respectively. The study in chapter four examines
the impact of derivative instruments recognition and disclosure under SFAS 133 on
income smoothing. The following section presents accounting standards for derivative
instruments before and after SFAS 133 in more detail.
1.1 Background: Accounting for derivative instru-
ments
Accounting for Derivative Instruments Prior to SFAS 133
Prior to SFAS 133, the accounting treatment of derivative instruments was governed
by SFAS 52 and SFAS 80. SFAS 52, Foreign Currency Translation, specified the
accounting treatment of derivative instruments related to foreign currencies (e.g.,
forward exchange contracts and currency swaps). SFAS 80, Accounting for Future
Contracts, established the treatment of future contracts except foreign currency fu-
tures. Accounting for derivative instruments that were not specifically covered by
SFAS 52 and SFAS 80 developed largely through practice and by analogy to these
two standards. In general, if a derivative instrument was used for trading or spec-
ulative purposes, it was accounted for under speculative accounting, which requires
1.1. Background: Accounting for derivative instruments 3
the derivative instrument be recognized at fair value on the balance sheet and any
unrealized gains or losses be recognized in the income statement. On the other hand,
if a derivative instrument was used to hedge the risk of existing assets, liabilities or
forecasted transactions, the accounting treatment of the derivative instruments was
determined by the accounting treatment of the hedged item. Specifically, the deriva-
tive instrument was recognized at fair value (historical cost) on the balance sheet as
an asset or liability if the related asset or liability was also carried at fair value (his-
torical cost). Gains or losses were incorporated into the carrying value of the assets
or liabilities, or deferred and recorded at the same time earnings were recognized on
the assets or liabilities.
To improve the clarity of derivative instruments disclosures, the FASB issued SFAS
105, SFAS 107, and SFAS 119 in the 1990s. SFAS 105, Disclosure of Information
about Financial Instruments with Off-Balance-Sheet Risk and Financial Instruments
with Concentrations of Credit Risk, required all entities to disclose the following in-
formation: a) notional principal amounts of financial instruments, b) the nature and
terms of the instruments, c) the maximum accounting loss, d) the entity’s policy
for requiring collateral or other securities on financial instruments, and e) significant
concentrations of credit risk. SFAS 107, Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial
Instruments, extended the fair value disclosure practices for some instruments by re-
quiring all entities to disclose the fair value of financial instruments. However, the
statement failed to ensure adequate clarity in the presentation of fair values as it
did not mandate separate disclosures for derivatives and other instruments. SFAS
119, Disclosure about Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair Value of Financial
Instruments, extended SFAS 107 by requiring firms to clearly indicate whether the
aggregate fair value of the derivative portfolio represented a net asset or a net liability
position and to provide disaggregated information on carrying amounts, fair values,
and contractual amounts of derivatives.
Taken together, prior to SFAS 133, accounting for derivatives was governed by
SFAS 52 and SFAS 80, while disclosure was governed by SFAS 119.
Accounting for Derivative Instruments Under SFAS 133
Although the FASB issued SFAS 119, the accounting standards for derivatives re-
mained incomplete and inconsistent (Zhang 2009). To improve the quality of deriva-
tive instruments and hedging activities reporting, the FASB issued SFAS 133, which
became effective as of June 15, 2000. SFAS 133 requires firms to report all deriva-
tive instruments as either assets or liabilities on the balance sheet at fair value and
recognize changes in the fair value of the derivative instruments in the income state-
ment. For derivative instruments designated as hedging the exposure to changes in
the fair value of a recognized asset or liability (i.e., fair value hedge), the gains or
losses are recognized in earnings in the same accounting period as the offsetting gains
or losses on the hedged item. For a derivative designated as hedging the exposure to
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
variable cash flows of a forecasted transaction (i.e., cash flow hedge), the effective por-
tion of the derivative instrument’s gains or losses is initially reported as a component
of other comprehensive income (outside earnings) and subsequently reclassified into
earnings when the forecasted transaction affects earnings. The ineffective portion of
the gains or losses on the derivative instrument is reported in earnings immediately.
For a derivative not designated as a hedging instrument (i.e., speculative hedge), the
gains and losses are recognized in earnings in the period they occur. SFAS 133 allows
firms to use hedge accounting only if certain criteria are met.2 It also carried forward
from SFAS 119 the requirements to disclose a description of the objectives, context,
and strategies for holding or issuing derivatives. SFAS 133 also requires additional
disclosures, such as the exposure to be hedged, hedging strategies for managing the
associated risk, and any component of the derivatives’ results that is excluded from
the hedge effectiveness assessment.
In sum, SFAS 133 deals with controversial and critical issues, such as fair value
accounting, hedge accounting, hedge effectiveness testing and measurement, docu-
mentation, and disclosure. In the appendix of the dissertation, I provide a sample of
excerpts from SEC reports to illustrate derivative instruments recognition and dis-
closure under SFAS 133. The following sections provide a more detailed overview of
each of the studies in this dissertation.
1.2 Accounting for derivatives and investors’ uncer-
tainty: The role of competition
The second chapter of this dissertation examines whether the recognition and disclo-
sure of derivative instruments and hedging activities under SFAS 133 provides useful
information to investors and how the proprietary costs associated with derivative in-
struments and hedging activities affect the effectiveness of SFAS 133. It is based on
the theoretical argument that market participants receive a signal that contains im-
precise information about the firm’s uncertain future cash flows, and decide whether
to incur some cost to process the public information into private information. When
firms disclose less precise public information about their uncertain future cash flow,
the perceived benefits from costly information processing are likely to be higher. As
a result, the information asymmetry among investors about the cash flow implica-
tions of a signal is likely to be higher.3 Although SFAS 133 is a widely debated and
controversial accounting standard for derivative instruments and hedging activities,
it is likely to increase the transparency of the risks associated with derivative in-
2For example, the ratio of change in the value of hedged item and its hedging instruments should
fall between 80% and 125% (SFAS 133).
3In this dissertation, investors’ uncertainty refers to the information asymmetry among investors
about the cash flow implications of changes in macro-economic news, such as foreign currency ex-
change rates. Thus, I use investors’ uncertainty and information asymmetry among investors inter-
changeably.
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struments and hedging activities by requiring that all derivatives be reported on the
balance sheet at fair value. In addition, SFAS 133 reduces off-balance-sheet transac-
tions and gives a more detailed picture of the risk situation to investors. However,
firms that operate in competitive industries may strategically recognize and/or dis-
close information about their derivative instruments and hedging activities to protect
their proprietary information. This will lead to an increase in the perceived benefits
from costly information processing, and thus information asymmetry among investors
will increase. In the light of this argument, I predict investors’ uncertainty about the
cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency exchange rates to be lower after
the implementation of SFAS 133. Moreover, I predict that the higher the level of
product market competition, the weaker the decrease in investors’ uncertainty about
the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency exchange rates after the
implementation of SFAS 133.4
These predictions are tested using a sample of US firms in the period from 1990
to 2009. One important finding from this chapter is that investors’ uncertainty about
the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency exchange rates is lower af-
ter the implementation of SFAS 133, which implies that SFAS 133 has improved the
transparency of the risks associated with derivative instruments and hedging activ-
ities, and thus has reduced information asymmetry among investors. The second
major finding is that the higher the level of product market competition, the weaker
the decrease in investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in
foreign currency exchange rates after the implementation of SFAS 133. This indi-
cates that firms that operate in more competitive industries strategically recognize
and/or disclose information about their derivative instruments and hedging activities
to protect their proprietary information so the effectiveness of SFAS 133 in reducing
the information asymmetry among investors will be reduced. The results continue to
hold under various robustness checks.
1.3 Investor responses to macro-economic news: The
role of accounting recognition and disclosure
Chapter three addresses the question whether the quality of accounting recognition
and disclosure affects investors’ responses to macro-economic news. This chapter also
addresses the question whether the level of underlying earnings volatility affects the
impact of the quality of accounting recognition and disclosure on investors’ responses
to macro-economic news. More specifically, the chapter examines whether recogni-
tion and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities under SFAS 133
affects investors’ responses to good and bad interest rate news. Moreover, the chapter
4Although changes in market rates per se are not firm-specific signals, prior literature suggests
that it has firm-specific implications because it is associated with equity returns and earnings (e.g.,
Linsmeier et al. 2002; Ahmed et al. 2006).
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investigates whether the level of earnings volatility affects the impact of recognition
and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities under (SFAS 133) on
investors’ responses to good and bad interest rate news. This chapter is based on
the premise that recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging ac-
tivities under SFAS 133 affects investors’ reactions to good and bad macro-economic
news differently through its effect on quality of information. Because higher quality
accounting recognition and disclosure decreases uncertainty about the precision of in-
formation that investors receive, I expect that investors react less asymmetrically to
good and bad interest rates news after the implementation of SFAS 133 than before.
Furthermore, because earnings volatility increases uncertainty about the precision
of information, I expect that the asymmetry of responses to good and bad interest
rate news before the adoption of SFAS 133 is greater for firms with higher earnings
volatility than for firms with lower earnings volatility. Lastly, because higher quality
accounting information matters more for firms with higher earnings volatility than for
firms with lower earnings volatility, I expect that the asymmetric responses to good
and bad interest rates news after the adoption of SFAS 133 decreases more for firms
with higher earnings volatility than for firms with lower earnings volatility.
These expectations are tested using a sample of US firms in the period from 1990
to 2009. The findings in this chapter provide evidence that confirms the expectations
developed in this chapter, specifically, investors’ responses are asymmetric to good
and bad interest rate news. However, the asymmetry is less pronounced after the
implementation SFAS 133. The findings also show that the asymmetry of responses
to good and bad interest rate news before the adoption of SFAS 133 are greater
for firms with higher earnings volatility than for firms with lower earnings volatility.
Finally, the findings indicate that the decrease in the asymmetric responses to good
and bad interest rate news after the implementation SFAS 133 are higher for firms
with higher earnings volatility than for firms with lower earnings volatility. Overall,
therefore, these findings confirm the idea that higher quality of accounting recognition
and disclosure decreases uncertainty about the precision of information that investors
receive, and thus they react less asymmetrically to good and bad macro-economic
news. Moreover, information quality matters more when earnings volatility is higher.
Additional robustness tests reinforce the evidence obtained in the main analysis.
1.4 The impact of accounting for derivatives on in-
come smoothing
Chapter four of this dissertation investigates whether SFAS 133 affects corporate
managers’ income smoothing decisions. Prior to the adoption of SFAS 133, firms
could hide ineffective hedges on the balance sheet by deferring the effects on the
income statement. SFAS 133, however, exposes such hedges by requiring firms to
recognize all ineffective hedges in the income statement immediately, but gains and
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losses of the hedged item later. This mismatch may induce earnings volatility. Because
earnings volatility is not preferred by shareholders and managers, managers have
strong incentives to engage in income smoothing activities. Therefore, I predict firms’
income smoothing activities to be higher after the adoption of SFAS 133. Moreover,
because ineffective hedging and market instability will make it difficult for firms to
qualify for hedge accounting, I predict that ineffective hedgers are more likely to
engage in income smoothing than effective hedgers. I also predict that the higher the
market instability, the higher the income smoothing after the adoption of SFAS 133.
The predictions of this chapter are tested using a sample of US firms in the period
from 1992 to 2006. My sample begins in 1992 because this was the first year that
executive compensation data became available on Compustat, and ends in 2006 be-
cause it enhances comparability with prior studies.5 The findings confirm that firms
engage in more income smoothing activities after the implementation of SFAS 133 to
mitigate the undesirable consequences of earnings volatility imposed by SFAS 133.
The results also show that ineffective hedgers engage in more income smoothing ac-
tivities than effective hedgers. Finally, the results indicate that the higher the level
of market instability, the higher income smoothing after the adoption of SFAS 133.
These results continue to hold under various robustness checks.
1.5 Contribution
The findings of chapter two add to a growing body of literature on the impact of
product market competition on firms’ accounting recognition and disclosure deci-
sions. First, the study contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence
that the higher the level of product market competition, the weaker the impact of
recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities under SFAS
133 on investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign
currency exchange rates. This indicates that the proprietary costs associated with
firms’ derivative instruments and hedging activities vary across firms6 and that these
differential costs affect firms’ recognition and disclosure decisions. Second, this study
provides insights into whether the adoption of SFAS 133 is effective in reducing in-
formation asymmetry among equity investors. The findings indicate that SFAS 133
indeed decreases such information asymmetry, which implies that it has improved the
transparency about the risks associated with derivative instruments and hedging ac-
tivities. Third, this study helps standard setters and regulators to take market forces
into account before deciding whether recognition and/or disclosure of forward-looking
accounting information should be mandatory for all firms.
5In the sensitivity test, I extended the sample period from 2006 to 2009 and find results consistent
with my main findings.
6These proprietary costs may be hedging strategy and position, managers hedging skills, the
types of exposures, volume of derivative contracts, and anticipated cash flows.
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The findings of the second study make several contributions to the current liter-
ature. First, this study contributes to the existing literature by providing empirical
evidence that the asymmetric responses of investors to good and bad interest rate
news is less pronounced after the implementation of SFAS 133. Second, this study
contributes to the literature by documenting that the decreases in the asymmetric
responses to good and bad interest rate news after the implementation of SFAS 133
is higher for firms with higher earnings volatility than for firms with lower earnings
volatility, which implies that when earnings volatility is higher, information quality is
more of a concern to investors to better predict future cash flows. Third, this study
provides additional evidence with respect to whether recognition is a substitute for
disclosure. Consistent with Ahmed et al. (2006), the findings suggest that this is not
the case.
The third study contributes firstly to the general debate about whether SFAS
133 affects earnings volatility by providing empirical evidence that SFAS 133 induces
pre-managed earnings volatility. Secondly, this study contributes to the literature
by showing that the degree of hedge ineffectiveness and market instability affect the
impact of SFAS 133 on income smoothing. Thirdly, this study confirms previous find-
ings and presents additional evidence that managers use more discretionary accruals
to smooth earnings after the implementation of SFAS 133. Finally, this study en-
courages standard setters and regulators to consider the trade-off between increased
transparency and income smoothing.
1.6 Outline of the dissertation
Each of the following chapters presents one of the three aforementioned studies in
detail. Chapter two investigates the influence of product market competition on the
impact of SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of
changes in exchange rates. Chapter three considers the role of the quality of ac-
counting recognition and disclosure on investor reactions to macro-economic news.
Chapter four focuses on the impact of SFAS 133 on firms’ income smoothing activ-
ities. Chapter five summarizes the main findings of all three studies, discusses their
implications and limitations, and provides suggestions for future research. Figure 1
summarizes the studies in this dissertation. Specifically, it shows, first the impact
of SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in
exchange rates, and the influence of product market competition on the impact of
SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty (i.e., the first study). Second, it shows the role
of SFAS 133 on investors’ reactions to macro-economic news, the impact of earnings
volatility on investors’ reactions to macro-economic news, and the role of SFAS 133 on
investors’ reactions to macro-economic news (i.e., the second study). Third, it shows
the impact of SFAS 133 on firms’ income smoothing activities, and the influence of
hedge ineffectiveness and market volatility on the impact of SFAS 133 on firms’ in-
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come smoothing activities (i.e., the third study). Finally, it shows the predicted signs
of the hypothesized relationships.
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Accounting for derivatives
and investors’ uncertainty:
The role of competition
2.1 Introduction
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (SFAS 133), Accounting for
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, requires firms to report all derivative
instruments on the balance sheet at fair value and recognize unrealized gains and
losses due to changes in fair value in the income statement and/or as a component
of other comprehensive income. One of the main purposes of SFAS 133 is to improve
the transparency of the risks (e.g., foreign currency exchange rates risk exposure) as-
sociated with derivative instruments and hedging activities. In SFAS 133 (paragraph
238), the FASB states:
Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 133 increases the
visibility, comparability, and understandability of the risks associated with
derivative instruments by requiring that all derivative instruments be re-
ported as assets or liabilities and measured at fair value.
In addition to pressure from the regulatory bodies, market mechanisms such as
product market competition also play a role in shaping firms’ accounting recogni-
tion and disclosure decisions. Although prior studies have documented the benefits
11
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of expanded voluntary disclosure, there is limited empirical research on the effec-
tiveness of accounting recognition and disclosure regulation (e.g., Healy and Palepu
2001). Moreover, the existing literature on the effect of product market competi-
tion on firms’ accounting recognition and disclosure decisions has mainly focused on
voluntary disclosure and mandatory segment reporting settings (e.g., Harris 1998;
Verrecchia and Weber 2006; Li 2010). Thus, the purposes of this study are first,
to investigate whether changes to the accounting recognition and disclosure require-
ments for derivative instruments and hedging activities mandated by SFAS 133 are
effective in providing useful information to investors. Second, it examines whether
product market competition affects the effectiveness of the recognition and disclosure
of derivative instruments and hedging activities under SFAS 133. More specifically,
it investigates whether the adoption of SFAS 133 has an impact on investors’ un-
certainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency exchange
rates. This study also examines whether product market competition plays a role in
the impact of SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of
changes in foreign currency exchange rates.
The empirical evidence of this study is important for the following reasons. First,
the introduction of recognition and disclosure for derivatives and hedging activities
under SFAS 133 has generated intense controversy over its potential benefits and
costs. In particular, proponents of SFAS 133 argue that the standard provides use-
ful information to investors by requiring firms to report all derivative instruments
on the balance sheet at fair value and to report changes in fair value in the income
statement and/or as a component of other comprehensive income (e.g., Ahmed et al.
2011). In contrast, opponents of SFAS 133 argue that the standard will not provide
useful information to investors because firms may not properly report the fair value
of derivatives, especially for items not traded on public exchanges (Penman 2011).
Moreover, they claim, SFAS 133 will unintentionally lead some firms to strategically
recognize and/or disclose their derivatives instruments and hedging activities to pro-
tect their proprietary information (Kawaller 2004). Thus, detailed analysis of the
costs and benefits of SFAS 133 is necessary.
Second, although previous studies provide useful insights into the relevance of risk
disclosure (Venkatachalam 1996; Barth et al. 1996; Schrand 1997), there are few
studies that examine the effectiveness of SFAS 133 (e.g., Ahmed et al. 2011). These
studies, however, did not examine the existence of variation in the propriety costs
associated with derivative instruments and hedging activities, or the impact of SFAS
133 on information asymmetry among equity investors. This study thus takes a first
step to fill the evident gaps in the literature on the effectiveness of SFAS 133, and the
impact of product market competition on the effectiveness of SFAS 133.
Theoretical studies on firms’ accounting recognition and disclosure decisions sug-
gest that when the proprietary costs associated with information recognition and
disclosure is higher, firms are less likely to disclose information voluntarily, even if it
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increases costs to raise additional capital (Healy and Palepu 2001; Verrecchia 1983).
From a mandatory disclosure perspective, Dye (1985) argues that when proprietary
costs exist in mandatory accounting recognition and disclosure, firms will strategically
recognize and/or disclose their forward-looking information.
Managers are concerned about SFAS 133 because it forces firms to reveal propri-
etary information that competitors may exploit. There is anecdotal evidence that this
concern is relevant to managers. For instance, Kawaller (2004) argues that firm man-
agers may be hesitant to be fully transparent about their exposure and how hedges
are managed for fear that it could be used by the competitors. As Wolfe, the chairman
and CEO of Hershey Foods, phrases it:
Derivative instruments recognition and disclosure, as required by SFAS
133, could indeed force Hershey to reveal proprietary information about its
hedging strategies to its competitors, which would be extremely harmful to
Hersheys ability to conduct its business.1
This view supports the claim that there are proprietary costs associated with
the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities under
SFAS 133. These costs are likely to be higher for firms that operate in competitive
industries, who may therefore strategically recognize and/or disclose their derivative
instruments and hedging activities after the implementation of SFAS 133.2
Following Kim and Verrecchia’s (1994) theoretical model that some market partic-
ipants decide to incur some costs to process imprecise public information into private
information and diverge the implication of the common observed signal, I argue that
the strategic recognition and/or disclosure of derivative instruments and related ac-
tivities after the adoption of SFAS 133 increases the perceived benefits from costly
information processing for any given level of change in foreign currency exchange
rates. Thus, some market participants can obtain information advantage by engaging
in costly information processing.
In this study, I assume that the recognition and disclosure of derivative instru-
ments and hedging activities under SFAS 133 provides useful information to investors
because SFAS 133 gives greater uniformity in accounting for derivative instruments
and hedging activities and standardizes the requirements to qualify for hedge account-
ing. Thus, I expect investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes
in foreign currency exchange rates to be lower after the implementation of SFAS 133.
I also expect that the higher the level of product market competition, the weaker
the effectiveness of SFAS 133 in reducing investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow
implications of changes in foreign currency exchange rates.
1http://banking.senet.gov/97-10hrg/100997/witness/wolfe.htm.
2For instance, SFAS 133 does not require firms to disclose the location of their derivative gains or
losses on the income statement. This gives discretion to managers to classify them in any of several
line items.
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To test my hypotheses, I measure investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow impli-
cations of changes in foreign currency exchange rates by using the estimated coefficient
from a regression of the bid-ask spreads on the absolute value of the percentage change
in the Federal Reserve Board trade-weighted U.S. dollar index. Consistent with prior
studies, I employ bid-ask spreads as a proxy for information asymmetry, which is
measured as the difference between the bid and ask price (i.e., bid-ask spread) di-
vided by the midpoint (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Daske et al., 2008; Cuijpers and
Peek 2010). To capture the impact of SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty about the
cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency exchange rates, I create an indi-
cator variable that takes the value of one for fiscal years ending after the adoption of
SFAS 133 and zero otherwise. Like prior studies (e.g., Karuna 2007), I use different
measures to capture different dimensions of product market competition: product
substitutability, market size, and entry costs. Greater product substitutability, larger
market size, and lower entry costs indicate more intense product market competition,
given the level of concentration.
Analyzing a sample of 92,393 firm-year observations from 1990 to 2009, I find that
investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency
exchange rates is lower after the adoption of SFAS 133. This indicates that the recog-
nition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities under SFAS
133, on average, decreases the perceived benefits from engaging in costly informa-
tion processing, and thus informed traders lose some of their information advantage.
This is consistent with Amhed et al. (2011), who find that SFAS 133 has improved
the transparency and monitoring of the risk implications of derivative instruments
to bond investors. I also find that the higher the level of product market competi-
tion, the weaker the impact of SFAS 133 on information asymmetry among investors
about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency exchange rates. This
indicates that SFAS 133 indeed unintentionally forces firms that operate in competi-
tive industries to strategically recognize and/or disclose their derivative instruments
and hedging activities to protect their proprietary information. This creates an op-
portunity for some investors to incur some costs to process public information into
private information and divert the implication of the common observed signal. It also
supports the existence of variation in the propriety costs associated with SFAS 133
reporting. My results remain robust with an alternative measure of product market
competition, an alternative specification and with the inclusion of transition period
observations.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, prior studies on
the effectiveness of SFAS 133 implicitly assume that the propriety costs associated
with SFAS 133 reporting is the same across firms, and thus that derivative instru-
ments and hedging activities recognition and disclosure decisions do not vary across
firms or industries (e.g., Ahmed et al. 2011). The findings of this study, however,
show that there is variation in the propriety costs associated with the recognition and
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disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities under SFAS 133. Thus,
it extends prior studies by providing empirical evidence that the higher the level of
product market competition, the weaker the impact of the recognition and disclosure
of derivative instruments and related activities under SFAS 133 on investors’ uncer-
tainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency exchange rates.
Second, prior studies focus on the association between product market competition
and firms’ segment reporting decisions (e.g., Harris 1998). This study extends these
prior segment reporting studies by focusing on the impact of product market compe-
tition on firms’ derivative instruments and related activities reporting decisions. The
results suggest that the higher the level of product market competition, the higher the
proprietary costs associated with the recognition and disclosure of derivative instru-
ments and hedging activities. Thus firms that operate in more competitive industries
are more likely to strategically recognize and/or disclose their derivative instruments
and hedging activities than firms that operate in less competitive industries. Third,
this study helps standard setters and regulators to take market forces (e.g., product
market competition) into account before deciding whether forward-looking accounting
information recognition and/or disclosure should be mandatory for all firms. Fourth,
this study provides insights into whether the adoption of SFAS 133 is effective in
reducing investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign
currency exchange rates. Despite the controversy over the usefulness of SFAS 133,
only a few studies have examined its relevance to investors. Thus, this study improves
our understanding of the implications of SFAS 133 adoption. Finally, this study con-
tributes to the limited empirical research on the effect of accounting recognition and
disclosure regulations (Healy and Palepu 2001).
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. In the next section, I re-
view previous studies. Section 2.3 describes the theory and develops the hypotheses.
Section 2.4 presents the research design. Section 2.5 discusses sample selection pro-
cedures and descriptive statistics. The results of my analyses are presented in section
2.6, while section 2.7 provides a brief summary and conclusion.
2.2 Literature review
There are two streams of literature that pertain to this study. The first stream of
literature investigates the association between product market competition and firms’
segment reporting decisions. The second stream of literature concerns the relevance of
the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments to equity and bond investors.
Prior studies on the association between product market competition and firms’
segment reporting decisions indicate that firms operating in less competitive indus-
tries are less willing to disclose detailed information about their segments. Harris
(1998) undertakes an empirical investigation of the association between the level of
product market competition and managers’ choices of which operations to report as
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business segments. She hypothesizes that firms operating in less competitive indus-
tries will disclose less information to protect proprietary information from potential
competitors. Using a sample of 929 multi-segment firms, she find that companies are
indeed less likely to disclose segments separately in less competitive industries. Her
result suggest that the proprietary costs associated with segment reporting discourage
detailed segment reporting.
In line with Harris (1998), Botosan and Stanford (2005) examine managers’ in-
centives for withholding segment information for a sample of 615 U.S. companies.
They find that, when reporting under SFAS 14, U.S. companies hide profitable seg-
ments operating in less competitive industries. Their results thus suggest that firms
operating in less competitive industries may withhold segment information to protect
profits, thereby mitigating the proprietary costs of disclosure.
Tsakumis et al. (2006) undertake an empirical investigation of why some firms
provide more detailed geographical area information under SFAS 131 than others.
Employing a sample of 115 Fortune 500 firms, they tested whether firms operating in
competitive industries provide less detail in their geographic area disclosures. Con-
sistent with Harris (1998) and Botosan and Stanford (2005), they find that firms
expecting greater proprietary costs associated with geographical area information
provide a lower level of detailed geographic disclosure.
Similarly, Nichols and Street (2007) extended prior studies to non-U.S. companies
and examined the association between product market competition and business seg-
ment disclosures under the International Accounting Standard (IAS) 14. For a sample
of 160 non-U.S. companies that report financial statements according to the Inter-
national Accounting Standards, they find a significant negative association between
disclosure and company returns in excess of the industry average. Their findings
suggest that flexibility in segment determination persists as IAS 14’s management
approach continues to allow managers to aggregate industry segments to protect pro-
prietary information in less competitive industries.
Other studies, however, indicate that firms provide less information disclosure
in the presence of rivals (Verrecchia 1983; Verrecchia 1990; Verrecchia and Weber
2006). For example, Verrecchia and Weber (2006) investigated firms’ decisions to
report proprietary information from their material contracts filings, and find that firms
operating in competitive industries are less likely to disclose information they deem
proprietary. Thus, firms respond to the higher level of product market competition
by providing less information.
Taken together, these findings suggest that the expected relationship between
firms’ voluntary disclosure decisions and the level of product market competition
depends on whether the information being disclosed provides profitability information
that would attract new competitors to a currently non-competitive market or provides
strategic information to current competitors in a currently competitive market.
The second stream of literature examines the sensitivity of stock prices to for-
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eign currency exchange rates and the relevance of the recognition and disclosure of
derivative instruments to equity and bond investors. Empirical work by Jorion (1990)
examines the association between changes in the value of the U.S dollar and changes
in value of the firms as measured by stock prices for U.S. multinationals. He finds a
positive association between stock returns and changes in foreign currency exchange
rates. The results imply that changes in foreign currency exchange rates are priced
so that firms can manage their exposures to foreign currency exchange rates. Bar-
tov and Gordon (1994) reexamine the relation between contemporaneous and lagged
changes in the value of the U.S. dollar and abnormal stock performance. Employing
a sample of U.S firms with sufficiently large foreign currency adjustments reported
on their past annual financial statements over the period of 1978 to 1989, they find
no correlation between abnormal returns and contemporaneous changes in the dol-
lar (i.e., contemporaneous dollar fluctuation have little power in explaining abnormal
stock returns). However, they find that a lagged change in the value of the dollar is
a significant variable in explaining abnormal returns. This suggests that a complete
market response to the impact of past changes in the dollar value is delayed until
information about the past performance of the firm is disseminated.
In related empirical work, Wong (2000) examines whether there is an association
between foreign currency exposure and quantitative disclosures about the notional
amount and fair value of foreign currency exchange derivatives under SFAS 119. Using
a sample of 145 Fortune 500 manufacturing firms during 1994 to 1996, he finds a weak
association between currency exposure and derivatives disclosures, which implies that
derivatives disclosure under SFAS 119 does not help to predict future foreign currency
exchange exposure.
Two studies that are particularly related to this study are Ahmed et al. (2011)
and Linsmeier et al. (2002). Ahmed et al. (2011) examine the relevance of the
recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments under SFAS 133 to bond investors.
For the largest 25 banks, they find that interest rate derivatives classified as hedging
are more negatively associated with fixed-rate bond spreads after the adoption of
SFAS 133. This result implies that derivative instruments recognition and disclosure
is beneficial to bond investors. Linsmeier et al. (2002) investigate the effects of
market risk disclosures under Financial Reporting Release 48 (FRR 48) on trading
volume sensitivity to market rates or prices using a sample of nonfinancial firms.
They posit that firms’ market risk disclosure mandated by the SEC reduces investors’
uncertainty and diversity of opinion about changes in market rates or prices. The
reduction in investors’ uncertainty and diversity of opinion should dampen trading
volume sensitivity to changes in underlying market rates or prices. Consistent with
their expectations, they find that after the disclosure of FRR 48 information, trading
volume sensitivity to changes in market rates or prices declines.
Although prior studies provide useful insights, there are very few studies that
examine the usefulness of risk disclosure in general and the recognition and disclosure
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of derivative instruments and hedging activities under SFAS 133 in particular. This
study fills the evident gap in the literature by examining the impact of SFAS 133 on
investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency
exchange rates, and by investigating the impact of product market competition on
this influence.
2.3 Theory and hypotheses
2.3.1 SFAS 133 and investors’ uncertainty
Voluntary disclosure theory suggests that higher quality financial reporting and better
disclosures should reduce adverse selection problems in the capital market and miti-
gate the information asymmetry problem by leveling the playing field for all investors
(Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Verrecchia 2001; Lambert
et al., 2007). These studies show that public disclosures reduce the information asym-
metry that prevailed in the pre-disclosure period between informed and uninformed
investors. However, some studies argue that public information disclosure may also
create a new information asymmetry in the market since some investors have better
information-processing abilities (Indjejikian 1991; Kim and Verrecchias 1994). In this
study, I use Kim and Verrecchia’s (1994) theoretical model to develop my conceptual
framework.
Kim and Verrecchia’s (1994) theoretical model relaxes investors’ homogeneity by
allowing differential information-processing abilities. The model shows how market
participants receive a signal that contains imprecise information about its uncertain
future cash flows, and decide whether to incur some cost to process the public in-
formation into private information. Some market participants may engage in costly
information processing because the future cash flow implications of the signal are sub-
ject to interpretation. This gives an opportunity for certain market participants to
make decisions that are superior to the decisions of other market participants. Conse-
quently, there may be more information asymmetry after information disclosure than
before. However, if the perceived benefits from information processing is lower than
the processing costs, then market participants will not engage in costly information
processing. Linsmeier et al. (2002) argue that when firms disclose less precise public
information about uncertain future cash flows, the perceived benefits from informa-
tion processing are likely to increase. As a result, the number of investors willing
to engage in costly information processing is likely to increase. This will lead to an
increase in information asymmetry among investors about the cash flow implications
of a signal.
Following the above line of argument, when market participants learn of underlying
changes in foreign currency exchange rates, they will engage in costly information
processing to determine the firm-specific cash flow implications of changes in these
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rates if the benefit from information processing is higher than the processing costs.
Proponents of the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedg-
ing activities under SFAS 133 argue that the standard increases the visibility and
comparability of the risks associated with derivatives by requiring that all derivative
instruments be reported on the balance sheet at fair value. It also reduces off-balance-
sheet transactions and gives a more detailed picture of the risk situation. Moreover,
SFAS 133 reduces the inconsistency and incompleteness of applying previous account-
ing standards by providing comprehensive guidance for all derivatives and hedging
activities (e.g., Ahmed et al. 2011)
However, critics of SFAS 133 claim that the standard provides little or no use-
ful additional information to investors, for the following reasons. First, companies
may not accurately report fair value on derivative instruments, especially for items
not traded on public exchanges. This introduces additional uncertainty regarding
the true market value of derivatives because mark to market accounting gives man-
agement discretion to potentially manipulate the books (Penman, 2011). Second,
SFAS 133 could introduce additional volatility in earnings and owners equity (Sapra
2002). Finally, SFAS 133 could reveal proprietary information that could be used by
competitors and market participants, putting the disclosing entity at a competitive
disadvantage (Kawaller 2004). According to these arguments, derivative instruments
and hedging activities reporting under SFAS 133 may not provide additional useful
information for investors.
In sum, the direction of the effect of the recognition and disclosure of derivative
instruments and hedging activities under SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty about
the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency exchange rates is unclear.
To empirically assess this effect, I analyze the impact of the recognition and disclo-
sure of derivative instruments and hedging activities under SFAS 133 on investors’
uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency exchange
rates. Although SFAS 133 is a widely debated and controversial accounting standard,
I assume that, prior to SFAS 133 adoption, the firm-specific cash flow implications
of changes in the underlying foreign currency exchange rates tended to be imprecise,
for the following reasons. First, prior to the adoption of SFAS 133, the accounting
treatment for derivative instruments and hedging activities was incomplete and incon-
sistent (e.g., Zhang 2009). Second, most derivative contracts were off-balance-sheet
items, lacking transparency. Third, as Wong (2000) finds there is only a weak associ-
ation between SFAS 119 disclosure and foreign currency exposure, which implies that
SFAS 119 disclosure does not help to predict future foreign currency exposure.3
Following Kim and Verrecchia’s (1994) model, I expect that the number of in-
vestors who decide to incur additional processing costs to convert public infirmation
into private information decreases after the implementation of SFAS 133. I specifi-
3SFAS 119 is the most recent accounting standard for derivatives instruments and hedging ac-
tivities prior to the adoption of SFAS 133.
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cally predict that investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of foreign
currency exchange rates is lower after the implementation of the recognition and dis-
closure of derivative instruments and hedging activities under SFAS 133. Hence, I
formulate the following hypothesis:
H1: Investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign
currency exchange rates is lower after the implementation of SFAS 133.
2.3.2 SFAS 133, investors’ uncertainty, and competition
A large stream of literature that examines the benefits of higher quality financial
reporting and better disclosure suggests that full voluntary disclosure arises as long
as it is costless to do so (Healy and Palepu 2001). However, in deciding how much
information to disclose, firms face a trade-off between the benefits and costs of re-
vealing proprietary information. Proprietary costs theory suggests that proprietary
costs associated with information disclosure limits full voluntary disclosure decisions
(Verrecchia 1983; Darrough 1993; Healy and Palepu 2001).4 The theory is based on
the assumption that, in the absence of these costs, firms have incentives to voluntar-
ily disclose relevant information to the market in order to reduce adverse selection
problems and, consequently, the cost of capital (Verrecchia 1983; Diamond 1985; Dar-
rough 1993). Verrecchia (1983) predicts that the higher the propriety costs associated
with information disclosure, the less information firms will voluntarily disclose, even
if it makes it more costly to raise additional capital. According to Verrecchia (1983),
firms should protect their competitive advantage by hiding proprietary information.
When proprietary costs exist in mandatory disclosure requirements, firms will strate-
gically recognize and/or disclose their forward-looking information (Dye 1985) and/or
decrease voluntary risk disclosures (Bagnoli and Watts 2007).
One of concerns of managers’ about the recognition and disclosure of derivative
instruments and hedging activities under SFAS 133 is that the standard forces firms to
reveal proprietary information that competitors may exploit. For instance, Kawaller
(2004) shows that firm managers may be hesitant to be more transparent about
revealing their risk exposure (e.g., exchange rates risk exposure), how much of this
exposure is covered and how hedges are managed, for fear that it could be used by
the firm’s competitors. This fear may also serve as the rationale for why firms oppose
regulation that increases transparency about their hedging strategy.
Similar to the concerns of the CEO of Hershey Foods (quoted in the introduction),
General Motors described its concern as follows:
If GM disclosed the volume of its derivative contracts and their antic-
ipated cash flows, a competitor could calculate the purchase price of GMs
4Other costs, such as costs of preparing and disseminating information, may also limit firm’s full
voluntary disclosure decisions.
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components.
Consequently, the anecdotal evidence supports the claim that there are proprietary
costs associated with the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and
hedging activities under SFAS 133, and that these differential costs affect managers’
derivative instruments and hedging activities recognition and/or disclosure decisions.
Given the anecdotal evidence, I expect that the proprietary costs associated with
derivative instruments and hedging activities reporting under SFAS 133 increase with
the level of product market competition. That is, firms operating in competitive
industries are more likely to strategically recognize and/or disclose their derivative
instruments and hedging activities, and SFAS 133 may also crowd out voluntary risk
disclosure. This creates an opportunity for some investors to engage in costly infor-
mation processing and divert the common signal into private information because it
will increase the perceived benefits from costly information processing. Applying the
Kim and Verrecchia (1994) model, I specifically predict that the higher the level of
product market competition, the weaker the negative association between investors’
uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency exchange
rates and the post-SFAS 133 period indicator variable. Hence, I formulate the follow-
ing hypothesis:
H2: The higher the level of product market competition, the weaker the impact of
SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in
foreign currency exchange rates.
2.4 Research design
2.4.1 Variable measurement
Dependent variable: Investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow
implications of changes in foreign currency exchange rates
I measure investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign
currency exchange rates (hereafter IU) as the estimated coefficient of a regression of
the bid-ask spreads on the absolute value of the percentage change in the value of
the Federal Reserve Board trade-weighted U.S. dollar index.5 Investors’ uncertainty
about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency exchange rates is
estimated over a nine-month period, starting three months after the year end, when
the derivative instruments information is disclosed.6 I estimate firm-year specific
5I examine the absolute value of foreign currency rate change because I expect both positive
and negative movements of a given magnitude to generate similar perceived information-processing
opportunities.
6I specified a nine-month post-disclosure observation window for two reasons. First, my objective
is to detect possible long-term effects of the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments
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investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency
exchange rates using weekly data. The model is specified as follows7:
Spread = α0 +α1absDXR+α2absDIR+α3logret+α4volume+α5logprice+ 
(2.1)
Spread is my information asymmetry proxy, measured as the weekly closing bid-
ask price differences (i.e., bid-ask spreads), expressed as a percentage of the weekly
closing bid-ask price average; absDXR is the absolute value of the weekly percentage
change in the Federal Reserve Board trade-weighted U.S. dollar index; absDIR is
the absolute value of the weekly percentage change in the value of the short-term
(three-month Treasury bill) interest rate. Following prior studies (e.g., Linsmeier et
al. 2002), I control for return volatility (logret) measured as the natural logarithm of
the standard deviation of weekly returns. I also control for trading volume (volume)
measured as the weekly shares traded scaled by shares outstanding, and I control for
closing stock prices (logprice) measured as the natural logarithm of the weekly closing
stock price.
The value of the estimated coefficient on absDXR (i.e., α1) captures investors’
uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency exchange
rates (∆ Spread /∆ absDXR). I use α1 as a dependent variable (i.e., IU) in my
regression analyses.
Explanatory variables
My primary explanatory variables are an indicator variable that captures whether
the fiscal year is in the post-SFAS 133 adoption period, and interaction variables be-
tween the indicator variable and product market competition measures. The indicator
variable takes the value one for fiscal years ending after the adoption of SFAS 133,
and zero otherwise.
Measures of product market competition
Prior studies have employed different measures to capture product market com-
petition (e.g., Karuna 2007). Conventionally, industry concentration ratios such as
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) or the four-firm concentration ratio have been
and hedging activities under SFAS 133 on bid-ask spreads in order to provide insights into the
consequences of SFAS 133. Second, prior research (e.g., Wong 2000) has used a nine-month window
and thus my use of it enhances comparability with prior studies.
7To estimate this equation, I use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) with the het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors (Newey-West standard errors)
option to correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Wooldridge 2002). The PROC MODEL
procedure with the GMM estimation in the FIT statement and KERNEL option in the SAS statistical
software package provides this flexibility.
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used as measures of product market competition (e.g., Harris 1998). However, re-
cent studies suggest that product market competition is multidimensional and cannot
be captured only by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index or the four-firm concentration
ratio (e.g., Karuna 2007). These studies suggest that market size, product substi-
tutability, and entry costs better capture the different dimensions of product market
competition, given the concentration ratio. These studies further suggest that con-
centration is a poor proxy for product market competition, as the association between
concentration and competition is unclear (e.g., Karuna 2007).
Therefore, in line with Karuna (2007), I measure product market competition
along three dimensions: market size, entry costs, and product substitutability. Like
Karuna (2007), I obtain industry-level data at the primary four-digit SIC code level
to construct the product market competition measures. I measure market size (MK-
TSIZE) as the natural logarithm of industry sales (at the four-digit SIC code level).
It reflects market demand and the density of consumers in an industry. MKTSIZE
is likely to be positively associated with product market competition, as large mar-
ket demand attracts new entrants. I measure entry costs (ENTCOST) as the natural
logarithm of the weighted average gross value of the cost of property, plant and equip-
ment for firms for which this is the primary industry (at the four-digit SIC code level),
weighted by each firm’s market share in this industry.8 It captures the average level of
investment that must be incurred by each entrant firm to a particular industry. The
higher the amount of investment required, the higher the barrier to enter an industry.
Thus, ENTCOST is likely to be negatively associated with product market competi-
tion. I measure product substitutability (DIFF) as the price-cost margin estimated
by the natural logarithm of industry sales divided by industry operating costs (at the
four-digit SIC code level). It measures the extent of product substitutability in an
industry. The higher the value of DIFF (i.e., the lower the level of product substi-
tutability), the lower the level of product market competition. Finally, I measure the
concentration ratio (CONC) by using the industry sales concentration ratio of the
four largest firms in the particular industry. I calculate the four-firm concentration
ratio as follows:
Four-firm concentration ratio =
4∑
i=1
(sij/Sj)
where sij is firm i’s sales in industry j. Sj is the sum of sales si for all firms in
industry j, and si/Sj is firm i’s market share in industry j.
Control variables
Following prior research (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Karuna 2007; Daske et
al., 2008 ), I include several control variables that are expected to influence bid-ask
8I obtain market share by dividing the segment sales figure for the primary industry segment of
a firm by the sum of the segment sales of all firms that have this primary industry as their primary
sale.
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spreads and/or product market competition. I control for firm size (FIRM-SIZE) be-
cause disclosure level (costs of disclosure) increases (decreases) with firm size (Welker
1995). I measure FIRM-SIZE as the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. I
control for growth opportunities (BTM) because firms with higher growth opportuni-
ties disclose more information than firms with lower growth opportunities. I measure
BTM as a ratio of firms’ book value to market value of equity. I control for firm
profitability (ROA) because prior studies show that capital market incentives induce
more profitable firms to disclose more information (Hayes and Lundholm 1996; Healy
et al., 1999). I measure ROA as the ratio of net income to total assets. I control for
stock price synchronicity (SYNCH) because an increase in stock price synchronicity
will decrease adverse selection risk, resulting in a decline in information asymmetry.
Following prior studies (e.g., Morck et al., 2000), I measure SYNCH as the natural
logarithm of [R2/(1-R2)] where R2 is the coefficient of determination estimated by re-
gressing company’s returns on the market returns. I control for time trend (TIMEY),
measured as the rank of the financial reporting dates. I control for leverage (LEV)
because prior studies show leverage and bid-ask spreads are negatively associated. I
measure LEV as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. I control for the average
spreads (AS) in the market using the value of the intercept estimated in model 2.1.
Following prior studies (e.g., Bryan and Stanley 2009), I expect a positive association
between investors’ uncertainty and average spread. Because I expect positive (neg-
ative) associations between spreads and changes in foreign currency exchange rates
to be more positive (more negative) when AS increases, I use two AS variables (ASP
and ASN). I define ASP as the value of the intercept estimated in model 2.1 if the
association is positive and zero otherwise. I define ASN as the value of the intercept
(α0) estimated in model 2.1 if the association is negative and zero otherwise. Finally,
I include foreign currency exchange rates risk exposure estimates to control for foreign
currency exchange rates risk exposure. I estimate firm-year specific firms’ foreign cur-
rency exchange rates risk exposure using weekly data. Following prior studies (e.g.,
Choi and Elyasiani 1997), I use the next model to estimate foreign currency exchange
rates risk exposure9:
logret = β0 + β1XR + β2IR + β3logiret +  (2.2)
where logret is the natural logarithm of weekly returns; XR is the weekly per-
centage change in the Federal Reserve Board trade-weighted U.S. dollar index; IR is
the weekly percentage change in short-term (three-month Treasury bill) interest rate,
and logiret is the natural logarithm of weekly market return. The coefficient on XR
9To estimate this equation, I use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) with the het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors (Newey-West standard errors)
option to correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Wooldridge 2002). The PROC MODEL
procedure with the GMM estimation in the FIT statement and KERNEL option in the SAS statistical
software package provides this flexibility.
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(i.e, β1) captures the foreign currency exchange rates risk exposure (XREX). Because
I expect positive (negative) associations between spreads and changes in foreign cur-
rency exchange rates to be more positive (more negative) when XREX increases, I
use two control variables (XREXP and XREXN) in my regression analyses. I define
XREXP as the value of foreign currency exchange rates risk exposure coefficient (i.e,
β1) estimated in model 2.2 if the association is positive and zero otherwise. I define
XREXN as the value of foreign currency exchange rates exposure coefficient (i.e, β1)
estimated in model 2.2 if the association is negative and zero otherwise.
2.4.2 Hypotheses test
SFAS 133 and investors’ uncertainty
To test whether investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in
foreign currency exchange rates changes significantly from the pre-SFAS 133 period
to the post-SFAS 133 period (i.e., to test hypotheses 1 ), I use the following regression
equation:
IU = γ0 + γ1POST + γ2SIZE + γ3BTM + γ4ROA+ γ5LEV + γ6SY NCH
+ γ7TIMEY + γ8ASP + γ9ASN + γ10XREXP + γ11XREXN + ω (2.3)
All variables are defined as before (see also Appendix 2).
The coefficient of interest in equation (2.3) is γ1. This essentially measures the
shift in investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign
currency exchange rates from the pre-SFAS 133 to the post-SFAS 133 period. Given
my assumption that the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and
hedging activities under SFAS 133 increases the precision of investors’ assessments of
the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency exchange rates and decreases
the diversity of opinion in information processors assessments, I expect γ1 to be
negative and significant.
SFAS 133, investors’ uncertainty and competition
In the second part of the study, I examine the influence of the level of product
market competition on the effect of SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty about the cash
flow implications of changes in exchange rates (i.e., hypothesis 2). To test hypothesis
2, I estimate the following regression equation:
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IU = Θ0 + Θ1POST + Θ2MKTSIZE + Θ3POST ∗MKTSIZE + Θ4DIFF
+ Θ5POST ∗DIFF + Θ6ENTCOST + Θ7POST ∗ ENTCOST
+ Θ8CONC + Θ9POST ∗ CON + Θ10SIZE + Θ11BTM + Θ12ROA
+ Θ13LEV + Θ14SY NCH + Θ15TIMEY + Θ16ASP
+ Θ17ASN + Θ18XREXP + Θ19XREXN + λ (2.4)
All variables are defined as before (see also Appendix 2).
The coefficients of interest in equation (2.4) are Θ3, Θ5, and Θ7. Because I posit
that the higher the level of product market competition, the weaker the impact of
SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in
foreign currency exchange rates, I expect Θ3, Θ5, and Θ7 to be positive, negative and
negative, respectively.
I employ two different regression models to test equation 2.3 and 2.4. The first is
an OLS regression. I also use a second regression model. This second model is fixed-
effects model, where I include firm dummies in the regressions. This allows me to
control for unobserved firm effects (fixed effects) on investors’ uncertainty about the
cash flow implications of changes in exchange rates that are assumed to be constant
through time but vary across firms (Wooldridge 2002).
2.5 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
2.5.1 Sample selection and data sources
The sample used in this study covers firms in the U.S with fiscal years ending on
or after January 15, 1990 through December 31, 2009. Following prior studies (e.g.,
Ahmed et al., 2006), I designate fiscal years ending prior to 15 December 2000 as
the pre-SFAS 133 period, periods ending after 15 December 2001 as the post-SFAS
133 period, and between December 15, 2000 and December 15, 2001 as the transition
period. I start in 1990 and end in 2009 to ensure that the sample period before and
after SFAS 133 is sufficiently long. I exclude the transition period from the analysis
to avoid any temporary changes caused by SFAS 133 adoption.
Data required to estimate my equations come from different sources. I obtained
data on share prices, shares outstanding, and stock returns from the Center for Re-
search in Security Prices (CRSP) database. I acquired data on sales, net income
(loss), gross value of the cost of property, plant and equipment, total assets, and total
stockholders’ equity from the Compustat North America database. I obtained data
about underlying market rates from the U.S. Federal Reserve database.
To mitigate the influence of outliers, all variables were winsorized at the 0.5 and
99.5 percentiles. I deleted observations with missing values. The final sample con-
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sists of 92,392 firm-year observations in 48 industries over the period 1990 to 2009.
Table 2.1 shows the composition of the sample by industry.
Table 2.1: Composition of Sample by Industry*
Industry-type No. of firm-year Percent Industry-type No. of firm-year Percent
BusSv 9152 12.04 Books 690 0.91
Rtail 3889 5.12 ElcEq 803 1.06
Chips 4914 6.47 Cnstr 879 1.16
Enrgy 3171 4.177 Txtls 398 0.52
Drugs 4259 5.60 Fun 1252 1.65
Mach 2681 3.53 PerSv 744 0.98
Insur 2305 3.03 Misc 658 0.87
Comps 3610 4.75 Toys 774 1.02
Chems 1446 1.90 Aero 311 0.41
Whlsl 3155 4.15 Rubber 689 0.91
Trans 2099 2.76 Banks 849 1.12
Steel 1116 1.47 Gold 550 0.72
Paper 1133 1.49 Boxes 214 0.28
MedEq 2687 3.54 Beer 298 0.39
Food 1228 1.62 Mines 298 0.39
BldMt 1398 1.84 Soda 195 0.26
Meals 1504 1.98 FabPr 301 0.40
Hshld 1336 1.76 Guns 94 0.16
Autos 1080 1.42 Agriculture 246 0.32
Telcm 2590 3.41 Smoke 125 0.15
Util 4643 3.84 Ships 157 0.21
LabEq 1780 2.34 Coal 112 0.13
Fin 2619 3.45 RlEst 640 0.84
Clths 1154 1.52 Total 92,392 100.00
Hlth 1489 1.96
*I use the Fama and French 48 industry classification.
2.5.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study, which show
that investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in exchange
rates is positive on average. The means and medians of MKTSIZE, ENTCOST, DIFF,
and CONC are generally comparable to statistics documented in prior studies (e.g.,
Karuna 2007). The small difference between the means and the medians indicates
that the variables used in this study are not highly skewed.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Regression Analyses
Variables N Minimum Mean Median Std Maximum
IU 92,393 -2.451 0.017 0.004 0.450 2.539
POST 92,393 0.000 0.391 0.000 0.488 1.000
MKTSIZE 92,393 3.830 9.876 9.984 1.932 13.763
DIFF 92,393 -0.392 0.135 0.107 0.140 0.861
ENTCOST 92,393 0.009 6.438 6.624 2.295 11.346
CONC 92,393 0.006 0.197 0.124 0.205 1,000
SIZE 92,393 0.060 5.205 5.047 2.195 13.139
BTM 92,393 -1.531 0.636 0.481 0.682 4.895
ROA 92,393 -2.075 -0.052 0.028 0.293 0.417
LEV 92,393 0.000 0.225 0.179 0.222 1.137
SYNCH 92,393 -12.134 -3.115 -2.679 2.237 0.590
TIMEY 92,393 1.000 9.852 9.000 5.252 20.000
ASP 92,393 -0.212 0.035 0.000 0.080 0.562
ASN 92,393 -0.188 0.033 0.000 0.080 0.574
XREXP 92,393 0.000 0.580 0.092 1.014 6.784
XREXN 92,393 0.000 0.511 0.000 1.001 6.830
The table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the
regression analyses. All variables are defined as before (see also Ap-
pendix 2).
Table 2.3 reports correlations of the key variables used in the regression analyses.
Pearson correlations are presented above the diagonal and Spearman rank correlations
are presented below the diagonal. IU and POST are negatively correlated, as reflected
by both Spearman and Pearson correlations, as expected. I find a moderately high
positive correlation between MKTSIZE and ENTCOST, which indicates that firms in
greater demand industries also invest more heavily in plant, machinery, and buildings.
I also find a moderately high negative correlation between MKTSIZE and CONC,
which suggests that higher demand in an industry or market attracts new firms to
the industry or market, which leads to a decrease in concentration in that industry.
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2.6 Main results
In this section, I present my empirical findings. First, I report results on the effect of
the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities under
SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in
foreign currency exchange rates. Then, I discuss my findings about the influence of
the level of product market competition on the effect of the recognition and disclo-
sure of derivative instruments and hedging activities under SFAS 133 on investors’
uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency exchange
rates.
2.6.1 SFAS 133 and investors’ uncertainty
Table 2.4 presents the regression results for equation (2.3), investigating the changes
in investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign cur-
rency exchange rates after the adoption of SFAS 133. The results indicate that this
affects investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign
currency exchange rates. Column I of Table 2.4 provides the results conducted based
on equation (2.3). The estimated coefficient on POST is negative and significant (γ1 =
-0.0506; t = -10.03). After including firm dummies in the regression (firm-fixed-effects
regression), the results reported in Column II of Table 2.4 show that the estimated
coefficient on POST is still negative and significant (γ1 = -0.0307; t = -6.07). The
results indicate that investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes
in exchange rates is lower after the implementation of the recognition and disclosure
of derivative instruments and hedging activities under SFAS 133.
The coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with my pre-
dictions. For example, the negative coefficients on ROA and SYNCH suggest that
investors’ uncertainty about changes in exchange rate decreases as the firm’s perfor-
mance and the quality of information environment increases. Moreover, the positive
coefficient on TIMEY indicates that investors’ uncertainty about changes in exchange
rates increases over time. This suggests that the significant decline in investors’ un-
certainty about changes in exchange rate after the implementation of SFAS 133 is not
due to a trend but to the adoption of SFAS 133.
Overall, the results in Table 2.4 provide evidence supporting my first hypothesis
that investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign
currency rates is lower in the post-SFAS 133 period than the pre-SFAS 133 period,
which indicates that SFAS 133 indeed increases the visibility, comparability, and
understandability of the risks associated with derivative instruments and hedging
activities.
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Table 2.4: SFAS 133 and Investors’ Uncertainty
Variables Predicted sign I II
POST - -0.0506*** -0.0307***
(-10.03) (-6.07)
SIZE - 0.0052*** -0.0047**
(-7.21) (-2.41)
BTM - -0.0023 -0.0047*
(-1.23) (-1.74)
ROA - -0.0068 -0.0065
(-1.54) (-1.03)
LEV - -0.0144*** 0.0081
(-2.67) (0.84)
SYNCH - -0.0014** -0.0009
(-2.24) (-1.39)
TIMEY ± 0.0038*** 0.0019***
(8.15) (3.54)
ASP + 1.1436*** 1.1644***
(67.74) (60.14)
ASN - -1.4376*** -1.5101***
(-83.86) (-76.21)
XREXP + 0.0949*** 0.0707***
(71.88) (46.88)
XREXN - -0.0984*** -0.0781***
(-72.95) (-50.51)
INTERCEPT ± 0.0213***
(3.39)
Firm-fixed-effects Yes
Observations 92,392 92,392
R2 35% 49%
The table reports the regression coefficient estimates and
(in parentheses) t-statistics. Firm-fixed-effects are included
in the regression reported in column II of the table. All
variables are as defined before (see also Appendix 2). ***,
**, and * denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
2.6.2 SFAS 133, investors’ uncertainty, and competition
Table 2.5 reports the regression results for equation (2.4), examining the influence
of product market competition on the effect of SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty
about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency exchange rates. The
results presented in Column I of Table 2.5 show that the estimated coefficient on
MKTSIZE*POST is positive and significant (Θ3 = 0.0058; t = 2.59), which indicates
that the larger the market size, the weaker the impact of SFAS 133 on investors’
uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in exchange rates. The es-
timated coefficient on DIFF*POST is negative and significant (Θ5 = -0.0266; t =
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-1.84), which implies that the greater the product substitutability, the weaker the
impact of SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of
changes in exchange rates. The estimated coefficient on ENTCOST*POST is nega-
tive and significant (Θ7 = -0.0038; t = -2.59), which implies that the lower the entry
cost, the weaker the impact of SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty about the cash
flow implications of changes in exchange rates. After including firm dummies in the
regression (firm-fixed-effects regression), the results reported in Column II of Table
2.5 show that the estimated coefficient on POST*MKTSIZE is positive and signifi-
cant (Θ3 = 0.0064; t = 2.31), POST*DIFF is negative and significant (Θ5 = -0.0380;
t = -1.68) and POST*ENTCOST is negative and significant (Θ7 = -0.0032; t = -
1.66). These results continue to suggest that the higher the level of product market
competition, the weaker the impact of SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty about the
cash flow implications of changes in exchange rates. Although I made no prediction
regarding the main effects of MKTSIZE, DIFF, and ENTCOST, the results show that
MKTSIZE, DIFF, and ENTCOST have a significant negative, positive, and positive
association with investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in
exchange rates, respectively, suggesting that the association between product market
competition and investors’ uncertainty is negative before the implementation of SFAS
133.
To provide further evidence on the impact of SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty
for different levels of product market competition, I next compute the coefficient on
POST for different levels of competition (i.e., competition at the lowest, median, and
highest levels). To compute the coefficient, I use the following equation:
∂IU
∂POST
= −0.0813+0.0064∗MKTSIZE−0.038∗DIFF−0.0032∗ENTCOST
(2.5)
Using the results of the fixed effects model reported in table 2.5, an analysis of
equation 2.5 at the lowest competition values for the variables MKTSIZE, DIFF, and
ENTCOST gives:
∂IU
∂POST
= −0.0813+0.0064∗3.83−0.038∗0.861−0.0032∗11.346 = −0.126(t = −4.44).
An analysis of equation 2.5 at the median competition values for the variables
MKTSIZE, DIFF, and ENTCOST gives:
∂IU
∂POST
= −0.0813+0.0064∗9.984−0.038∗0.107−0.0032∗6.624 = −0.043(t = −2.23).
And an analysis of equation 2.5 at the highest competition values for the variables
MKTSIZE, DIFF, and ENTCOST gives:
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∂IU
∂POST
= −0.0813+0.0064∗13.763−0.038∗−0.392−0.0032∗0.009 = 0.022(t = 0.46).
The findings suggest that product market competition decreases the impact of
derivative and hedging activities recognition and disclosure under SFAS 133 on in-
vestor’s uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in exchange rates.
More specifically, the significant coefficient on POST at the lowest competition values
for the variables MKTSIZE, DIFF, and ENTCOST (i.e., -0.126; t =-4.44) indicates
that SFAS 133 indeed has an impact on investors’ uncertainty for firms in low com-
petitive industries. The significant coefficient on POST at the median competition
values for the variables MKTSIZE, DIFF, and ENTCOST (i.e., -0.043; t =-2.23) also
shows that for the median firms the SFAS 133 has an impact on investors’ uncertainty.
However, the insignificant coefficient on POST at the highest competition values for
the variables MKTSIZE, DIFF, and ENTCOST (i.e., 0.022; t = 0.46) indicates that
SFAS 133 has no impact on investors’ uncertainty for firms in highly competitive
industries. The results imply that regulators need to be a aware of the impact of
competition when designing regulations.
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Table 2.5: SFAS 133, Product Market Competition, and Investors’ Uncertainty
Variables Predicted sign I II
POST - -0.0819*** -0.0813***
(-3.96) (-3.28)
MKTSIZE ± -0.0059*** -0.0096***
(-3.96) (-4.25)
POST*MKTSIZE + 0.0058*** 0.0064**
(2.59) (2.31)
DIFF ± 0.0027* 0.0342*
(1.73) (1.81)
POST*DIFF - -0.0266* -0.0380*
(-1.84) (-1.68)
ENTCOST ± 0.0033*** 0.0035**
(3.46) (2.41)
POST*ENTCOST - -0.0038*** -0.0032*
(-2.591) (-1.66)
CONC ± -0.0085 -0.0303**
(-0.89) (-2.13)
POST*CONC ± -0.0005 0.0107
(-0.03) (0.57)
SIZE - -0.0005*** -0.0057***
(-6.66) (-2.87)
BTM - -0.0023 0.0011
(-1.23) (0.48)
ROA - -0.0071 -0.0133**
(-1.59) (-2.15)
LEV - 0.0133** 0.0060
(2.46) (0.61)
SYNCH - -0.0014** -0.0009
(-2.17) (-1.34)
TIMEY ± 0.0042*** 0.0026***
(8.59) (4.57)
ASP + 1.1429*** 1.0853***
(67.64) (59.22)
ASN - -1.4382*** -1.4633***
(-83.83) (-77.73)
XREXP + 0.0950*** 0.0891***
(71.59) (61.74)
(This table is continued on the next page)
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Table 2.5 (Continued)
Variables Predicted sign I II
XREXN - -0.0983*** -0.0957***
(-72.88) (-65.35)
INTERCEPT ± 0.0567***
(4.62)
Firm-fixed-effects Yes
Observations 92,392 92,392
R2 35% 50%
The table reports regression coefficient estimates and (in
parentheses) t-statistics. Firm-fixed-effects are included in
the regression reported in column II of the table. All vari-
ables are defined as before (see also Appendix 2). ***, **,
and * denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
In sum, the results presented in Table 2.5 support my second hypothesis, that the
higher the level of product market competition, the weaker the impact of SFAS 133 on
investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency
exchange rates, which implies that the proprietary costs associated with derivative
instruments and hedging activities increase as the level of competition increases, and
thus firms that strategically recognize and/or disclose these information to protect
their proprietary information.
2.6.3 Sensitivity tests
I conducted a number of additional analyses to test the robustness of my findings.
First, I investigated whether taking into account the observations from the transition
period affects my results. I find similar results after including observations from the
transition period in my analyses (untabulated).
Secondly, I examined whether my results are sensitive for changes in the transition
period. Using a fiscal year between 1999 and 2001 as a new transition period, I find
consistent results with my main findings. Specifically, the results reported in Column
I of Table 2.6 show that the coefficient on POST is negative and significant (γ1 = -
0.0384; t = -7.48). After including firm dummies in the regression, the results reported
in Column II of Table 2.6 show that the estimated coefficient on POST is still negative
and significant (γ1 = -0.0293; t = -5.42).
The results reported in Column III of Table 2.6 show that the estimated coefficient
on POST*MKTSIZE is positive and significant (Θ3 = 0.0060; t = 2.65), POST*DIFF
is negative and significant (Θ5 = -0.0282; t = -1.58) and POST*ENTCOST is negative
and significant (Θ7 = -0.0038; t = -2.42). After including firm dummies in the regres-
sion, the results reported in Column IV of Table 2.6 show that the estimated coefficient
on POST*MKTSIZE is positive and significant (Θ3 = 0.0069; t = 2.50), POST*DIFF
is negative and significant (Θ5 = -0.0433; t = -1.91) and POST*ENTCOST is neg-
ative and significant (Θ7 = -0.0036; t = -1.85). Overall, the results shown in Table
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2.6 are similar to those shown in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5.
Table 2.6: SFAS 133, Product Market Competition, and Investors’ Uncertainty : 1999
to 2001 as a transition period
Variables Predicted sign I II III IV
POST - -0.0384*** -0,0293*** -0.0723*** -0.0742***
(-7.48) (-5.42) (-3.51) (-2.99)
MKTSIZE ± -0.0061*** -0.0097***
(-4.46) (-4.27)
POST*MKTSIZE + 0.0060*** 0.0069**
(2.65) (2.50)
DIFF ± 0.0109 0.0471**
(0.92) (2.47)
POST*DIFF - -0.0282* -0.0433*
(-1.58) (-1.91)
ENTCOST ± 0.0033*** 0.0037**
(3.43) (2.55)
POST*ENTCOST - -0.0038** -0.0036*
(-2.42) (-1.85)
CONC ± -0.0125 -0.0357**
(-1.29) (-2.50)
POST*CONC ± 0.0055 0.0197
(0.36) (1.04)
SIZE - -0.0046*** -0.0056*** -0.0044*** -0.0054***
(-6.38) (-2.83) (0.36) (-2.75)
BTM - -0.004388** -0.0057** -0.0043** -0.0050**
(-2.30) (-2.09) (-2.30) (-2.07)
ROA - -0.0068 -0.0086 -0.0072* -0.0092
(-1.56) (-1.35) (-1.61) (-1.44)
LEV - 0.0127** -0.0004 0.0116** 0.0001
(2.36) (-0.04) (2.16) (0.08)
SYNCH - -0.0014** -0.0009 -0.0014** -0.0001
(-2.27) (-1.35) (-2.23) (-1.33)
TIMEY ± 0.0028*** 0.0015 0.0031*** 0.0021***
(5.85) (2.78) (6.33) (3.43)
ASP + 1.1548*** 1.0967*** 1.1542*** 1.0964***
(68.14) (59.41) (68.05) (59.40)
ASN - -1.4306*** -1.4545*** -1.4313*** -1.4556***
(-83.50) (-77.23) (-83.47) (-77.20)
XREXP + 0.0938*** 0.0938*** 0.0939*** 0.0882***
(70.41) (70.41) (70.43) (60.49)
(This table is continued on the next page)
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Table 2.5 (Continued)
Variables Predicted sign I II III IV
XREXN - -0.0954*** -0.0954*** -0.0976*** -0.0953***
(-64.97) (-64.97) (-72.24) (-64.38)
INTERCEPT ± 0.0237*** 0.0604***
(3.67) (4.92)
Firm-fixed-effects Yes Yes
Observations 91,226 91,226 91,226 91,226
R2 35% 50% 35% 50%
The table reports regression coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics.
Between 1999 and 2001 is used as a transition period. Firm-fixed-effects are included
in the regression reported in columns II and IV of the table. All variables are de-
fined as before (see also Appendix 2). ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Thirdly, to ascertain the sensitivity of the results to the product market com-
petition measure, I used an alternative measure of product market competition. In
equation 2.4, I employed the original product market competition variables. In this
section, however, I create one overall variable using principal component analysis.
Principal component analysis reveals one factor with an eigenvalue greater than one
that explains approximately 50 percent of the total variance. The factor has also
large loadings on the MKTSIZE, DIFF, and ENTCOST variables. As a result, I
use the first principal component (denoted COMP) as a measure of product market
competition to test my second hypothesis using the following regression equation:
IU = Υ0 + Υ1POST + Υ2COMP + Υ3POST ∗ COMP + Υ4SIZE + Υ5BTM
+ Υ6ROA+ Υ7LEV + Υ8SY NCH + Υ9TIMEY + Υ10ASP + Υ11ASN+
Υ12XREXP + Υ13XREXN + Ω (2.6)
where COMP is the product market competition proxy, which is the first principal
component obtained from the principal component analysis. A higher value of COMP
indicates a lower level of product market competition. All other variables are defined
as before (see also Appendix 2).
Table 2.6 reports the regression results for equation (2.6). The coefficient on
POST*COMP is positive and significant (Υ3 = 0.0007; t = 5.02), which implies
that the higher the level of product market competition, the weaker the impact of
SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in
exchange rates. After including firm dummies in the regression (firm-fixed-effects
regression), the results presented in Column II of Table 2.6, the estimated coefficient
on POST*COMP, is also positive and significant (Υ3 = 0.0003; t = 1.68). This finding
is consistent with my main findings.
Fouthly, as an alternative test, I re-estimated equations (2.3) and (2.4) by replac-
ing all variables with their annual changes. Differencing the observations left me with
a sample of 67,713 firm-year observations. The result (untabulated) of the regression
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analysis shows that the coefficient on POST is negative and significant (γ1 = - 0.2425;
t = -4.72). After including firm dummies in the regression (firm-fixed-effects regres-
sion), the estimated coefficient on POST is also negative and significant (γ1 = - 0.1302;
t = -2.48), which indicates that investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implica-
tions of changes in foreign currency exchange rates is lower after the adoption of SFAS
133. This confirms the previous findings. I also find that the estimated coefficient on
POST*MKTSIZE is positive and significant (Θ3 = 0.4327; t = 6.79), POST*DIFF is
negative and significant (Θ5 = -2.1930; t = -6.02) and POST*ENTCOST is negative
and significant (Θ7 = -0.1909; t = -4.16). After including firm dummies in the re-
gression (firm-fixed-effects regression), the estimated coefficient on POST*MKTSIZE
is still positive and significant (Θ3 = 0.4066; t = 6.18), POST*DIFF is still negative
and significant (Θ5 = -1.9266; t = -5.30) and POST*ENTCOST is also negative and
significant (Θ7 = -0.0249; t = -5.04), which continue to indicate that the larger the
market size, the greater product substitutability, and the lower entry costs to an in-
dustry, the weaker the impact of SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty about the cash
flow implications of changes in exchange rates.
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Table 2.7: SFAS 133, Product Market Competition, and Investors’ Uncertainty
Variables Predicted sign I II
POST - -0.0056*** -0.0459***
(-12.24) (-6.87)
COMP ± -0.0009*** -0.0004*
(-7.24) (-1.66)
POST*COMP + 0.0007*** 0.0003*
(5.02) (1.68)
SIZE - 0.0001 -0.0059***
(1.62) (-3.01)
BTM - -0.0004*** -0.0025
(-2.94) (-0.93)
ROA - -0.0022*** (-0.0082)
(-4.29) (-1.28)
LEV - -0.0001 -0.0007
(-0.20) (-0.07)
SYNCH - -0.0002** -0.0007
(-3.30) (-0.99)
TIMEY ± 0.0004*** 0.0025***
(12.97) (4.52)
ASP + 0.0141*** 1.0825***
(11.40) (58.99)
ASN - -0.0250*** -1.4657***
(-16.18) (-77.80)
XREXP + 0.0065*** 0.0889
(52.29) (61.58)
XREXN - -0.0091*** -0.0959***
(-63.82) (-65.46)
Intercept ± 0.0003***
(0.003)
Firm-fixed-effects Yes
Observations 92,392 92,392
R2 13% 50%
The table reports regression coefficient estimates and (in
parentheses) t-statistics. COMP product market competi-
tion proxy, which is the first principal component retained
from the principal component analysis. All variables are
defined as before (see also Appendix 2). Firm-fixed-effects
are included in the regression reported in column II of the
table. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Finally, prior studies (e.g., Petersen 2009) suggest that in regression analyses with
panel data, the residuals may be correlated across firms and across time, and OLS
standard errors can be biased. To adjust the standard errors for residual correlation
(both within firms over time, and across firms each time period), Petersen (2009)
suggests to estimate the standard errors with clustering along multiple dimensions
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(firm and year). As my sample comprises panel data, I test whether my results are
sensitive for residual correlation. Using the approach discussed by Petersen 2009,
I estimate the standard errors with clustering along multiple dimensions (firm and
year). Untabulated results show that the findings of this study are robust.
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2.7 Summary and conclusion
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133, Accounting for Derivatives
Instruments and Hedging Activities, is a comprehensive accounting standard for all
derivative instruments. SFAS 133 requires firms to report all derivative instruments
on the balance sheet at fair value, and the gains or losses resulting from the changes in
fair value must be recorded in earnings and/or as a component of other comprehensive
income. SFAS 133 is arguably one of the most controversial accounting standards
ever issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). In this study, I
examined whether SFAS 133 helps investors to better predict the future cash flow
implications of changes in foreign currency exchange rates. Moreover, I investigated
whether the level of product market competition affects the impact of SFAS 133 on
investors’ uncertainty about the future cash flow implications of changes in foreign
currency exchange rates.
Following Kim and Verrecchia (1994), I developed two hypotheses: (1) investors’
uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign exchange rates is
lower in the post-SFAS 133 period than in the pre-SFAS 133 period, and (2) the
higher the level of product market competition, the weaker the effect of SFAS 133 on
investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency
exchange rates. To capture different dimensions of product market competition, I
used market size, product substitutability, entry costs, and concentration ratio. Con-
sistent with my predictions, I find a significant decrease in investors’ uncertainty
about changes in exchange rates in the post-SFAS 133 period, which indicates that
SFAS 133 indeed increases transparency about the risks associated with derivative
instruments and hedging activities, and thus it helps investors to better predict firm-
specific cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency exchange rates. Second,
I find that the higher the level of product market competition, the weaker the impact
of SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes
in foreign currency exchange rates. This supports anecdotal evidence that there are
proprietary costs associated with the recognition and disclosure of derivative instru-
ments and hedging activities under SFAS 133, and that these costs increase with the
level of product market competition. As a result, firms operating in high competitive
industries will strategically recognize and/or disclose their derivative instruments and
hedging activities to protect their proprietary information.
My findings contribute not only to the accounting literature, but also to the general
debate about whether the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and
hedging activities under SFAS 133 provides useful information to investors. Overall,
my findings indicate that derivative instruments and hedging activities recognition
and disclosure under SFAS 133 provides additional useful information to investors
to better predict the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency exchange
rates. However, the proprietary costs associated with derivative instruments and
hedging activities affect firms’ accounting recognition and disclosure decisions, which
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reduces the effectiveness of SFAS 133 in providing useful information to investors.
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Appendix 2 Variable Definitions
Variable name and description
IU is investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in exchange
rates which is measured as the estimated coefficient (i.e.,α1) in model 2.1.
POST is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for fiscal years ending
after the adoption of SFAS 133 and equals zero otherwise.
MKTSIZE is the natural logarithm of industry sales (at the four-digit SIC code
level).
DIFF is the natural logarithm of industry sales divided by industry operating costs
(at the four-digit SIC code level).
ENTCOST is the natural logarithm of the weighted average gross value of the cost
of property, plant and equipment for firms for which this is the primary industry (at
the four-digit SIC code level), weighted by each firm’s market share in this industry.
CONC is the industry sales concentration ratio of the four largest firms in the
particular industry.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of shareholders’ equity.
BTM is the ratio of net income to total assets.
ROA is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.
LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.
SYNCH is the natural logarithm of [R2/(1-R2)] where R2 is the coefficient of
determination estimated by regressing company’s returns on the market returns.
TIMEY is the rank of the financial reporting dates.
ASP is the value of the intercept (i.e.,α0) estimated in model 2.1 if the association
between spreads and changes in foreign exchange rate is positive and equals zero
otherwise.
ASN is the value of the intercept (i.e.,α0) estimated in model 2.1 if the association
between spreads and changes in foreign exchange rate is negative and equals zero
otherwise.
XREXP is the value of foreign exchange rate risk exposure (i.e.,β1) estimated in
model 2.2 if the association between spreads and changes in foreign exchange rate is
positive and equals zero otherwise.
XREXN is the value of foreign exchange rate risk exposure (i.e.,β1) estimated in
model 2.2 if the association between spreads and changes in foreign exchange rate is
negative and equals zero otherwise.

3
Investors’ responses to
macro-economic news: The
role of accounting recognition
and disclosure
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I examine whether the quality of accounting recognition and disclo-
sures affects investor responses to macro-economic news. I also examine the variation
in the effect of the quality of accounting recognition and disclosures on investors’
responses to macro-economic news across firms. Specifically, I address the question
whether investors respond more asymmetrically to good and bad interest rate news
when the information that they receive is more ambiguous with respect to the implica-
tions of changes in interest rates for a firm’s value.1 Moreover, I address the question
whether the asymmetric responses to good and bad interest news varies between firms
with higher earnings volatility and firms with lower earnings volatility. Several stud-
ies have shown that investors respond asymmetrically to good and bad news (e.g.,
Rogers and Stocken 2005; Kothari et al., 2009). Some of the explanations offered for
such asymmetric responses are differences in the credibility of good and bad news
1In this study, the term ambiguity implies that signals have a range of possible levels of precision
(quality), i.e., from precise (informative) to imprecise (uninformative).
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(Rogers and Stocken 2005) and managers’ withholding bad news and accelerating the
disclosure of good news (Kothari et al., 2009). Recent theoretical literature suggests
that if ambiguity-averse investors do not know the true precision of the information
they receive, they respond asymmetrically, i.e., weakly to good news, and strongly to
bad news (Epstein and Schneider 2008). Furthermore, they show that information
quality is more relevant for firms with higher underlying fundamental volatility than
for firms with lower underlying fundamental volatility. Consequently, when informa-
tion quality is low, investors respond more asymmetrically to good and bad interest
rate news for firms with higher underlying fundamental volatility than for firms with
lower underlying fundamental volatility. Empirical evidence on these issues, however,
is limited.
Financial theory suggests that the issue of changes in interest rate is important
to individual investors and firms. This is because changes in interest rate influence
firm value by changing the discount rate and by affecting expectations about future
cash flows (Lobo 2002). Prior studies that examine investor responses to interest
rate news assume, at least implicitly, that responses to good and bad interest rate
news are symmetric. Studies by Chance and Lane (1980) and Gultekin and Rogalski
(1979) show that stock returns exhibit little sensitivity to changes in interest rates.
On the other hand, studies by Booth and Officer (1985), Scott and Peterson (1986),
Bae (1990), Elyasiani and Mansur (2004), and Zhu et al. (2007) show that changes
in interest rates tend to be significantly negatively related to changes in stock prices.
This suggests that an increase in interest rates will lead the stock price to decline
whereas a decrease in interest rates will lead the stock price to rise. Although pre-
vious studies document the relevance of accounting recognition and disclosures (e.g.,
Verrecchia 2001), the question whether the quality of accounting recognition and dis-
closure affects investor responses to good and bad interest rate news has not yet been
examined. This study aims to fill these gaps in the literature outlined above.
Analytical work by Epstein and Schneider (2003; 2008) shows that while investors
do not know the true (unique) precision of information signals, they do know that
the true precision is contained with in a range of possible precisions. This range of
possible precisions represents the ambiguity faced by investors. Epstein and Schneider
also show that an ambiguity-averse agent behaves as if maximizing expected utility
under a worse-case belief. When an ambiguity-averse agent observes a bad (good)
signal, the worse-case scenario is that the signal is precise (imprecise). Consequently,
if the range of the set of possible precisions expected by ambiguity-averse investors
is large (i.e., there is high uncertainty about the precision of the signal), they will
react more asymmetrically to good and bad news, whereas if the range of the set of
possible precisions expected by ambiguity-averse investors is small they will react less
asymmetrically to good and bad news. Following Epstein and Schneider (2008), I
expect that when the quality of accounting recognition and disclosures is higher, the
range of the set of possible precisions goes down. As a result, I posit that responses to
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good and bad interest rate news are less asymmetrical when the quality of accounting
recognition and disclosures is higher. I also posit that responses to good and bad
interest rate news before the adoption of SFAS 133 are more asymmetrical for firms
with higher earnings volatility than for firms with lower earnings volatility. Because
the quality of derivative instruments and hedging activities recognition and disclosure
matters more for firms with higher earnings volatility than for firms with lower earn-
ings volatility, I posit that the asymmetric responses to good and bad interest rate
news after the adoption of SFAS 133 decreases more for firms with higher earnings
volatility than for firms with lower earnings volatility.
To test my hypotheses, I define good (bad) news as information that increases
(decreases) firm value. Consequently, in my empirical tests, I classify changes in
interest rates as good (bad) news when the changes in firm value due to changes in
the daily interest rate are positive (negative). Like prior studies (e.g., Zhang 2009), I
measure earnings volatility by the standard deviation of quarterly net income deflated
by total assets. Because derivative instruments and hedging activities recognition and
disclosure under SFAS 133 has improved transparency about the risks associated with
derivatives and hedging activities and helps investors to better predict future cash
flows, I assume that the quality of derivatives recognition and disclosure is higher
after the implementation of SFAS 133. I measure the magnitude of the asymmetric
responses to good and bad interest rate news based on the differences between the
coefficients on good and bad interest rate news.
Analyzing a sample of 771,445 firm-day observations in the period from 1990 to
2009, I find that investors respond asymmetrically to good and bad interest rate news.
Specifically, investors react more strongly to bad interest rate news than to good in-
terest rate news. Moreover, I find that, following the adoption of SFAS 133, the
asymmetric responses to good and bad interest rate news is less pronounced. More
specifically, investors discount good interest rate news less heavily in the post-SFAS
133 period than in the pre-SFAS 133 period. This finding indicates that investors dis-
count good interest rate news less heavily following a decrease in the range of possible
levels of precision due to higher quality of accounting recognition and disclosure. I also
find that the asymmetric responses to good and bad interest rate news in the pre-SFAS
133 period is more pronounced for firms with higher earnings volatility than for firms
with lower earnings volatility. Importantly, I find that after the adoption of SFAS
133, the asymmetric responses to good and bad interest rates news decreases more
for firms with higher earnings volatility than for firms with lower earnings volatility.
Interestingly, I find that SFAS 133 has no effect on the asymmetric responses to good
and bad interest rate new for firms with low earnings volatility. This suggests that
the quality of accounting recognition and disclosures is more important for firms with
higher earnings volatility than for firms with lower earnings volatility. The empirical
results are robust across several tests.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, to my knowledge,
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this is the first study that examines the effect of the quality of accounting recognition
and disclosures on investor responses to good and bad interest rate news. Specifi-
cally, this paper contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence that
investors respond more asymmetrically to good and bad interest rate news at times
when the quality of accounting recognition and disclosures is lower. Second, this study
contributes to the literature by documenting that investors respond more asymmet-
rically to good and bad interest rate news for firms with higher earnings volatility
than for firms with lower earnings volatility. Third, this paper provides empirical
evidence on the cross-sectional variation in the importance of information quality.
Specifically, the asymmetric responses to good and bad interest rates news after the
adoption of SFAS 133 decreases more for firms with higher earnings volatility than
for firms with lower earnings volatility. Fourth, this study contributes to the general
debate on the relevance of SFAS 133 by documenting that investor responses to good
and bad interest rate news is less asymmetric after SFAS 133 adoption than before.
This confirms my assumption that derivative instruments recognition and disclosure
under SFAS 133 has increased the quality of accounting recognition and disclosure
and benefited investors by reducing information ambiguity. Fifth, this study is also
of interest to accounting standard setters when they evaluate whether SFAS 133 has
been effective in reducing ambiguity in the market. Finally, this study contributes to
the general debate about whether recognition is an appropriate substitute for disclo-
sure. Consistent with Ahmed et al. (2006), my findings show that recognition and
disclosure are not substitutes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews prior
related studies. Section 3.3 develops the hypotheses. Section 3.4 details the research
design. The sample selection procedures and descriptive statistics are provided in
section 3.5. Section 3.6 describes the empirical findings. Section 3.7 provides a brief
summary and conclusion.
3.2 Literature review
In this section, I briefly summarize the literature on stock price reaction to good and
bad news and stock price reaction to changes in interest rates. Studies in the first
category have documented that stock price reaction to voluntary bad news disclosures
is larger than stock price reaction to voluntary good news disclosures (Skinner 1994;
Basu 1997; Rogers and Stocken 2005; Kothari et al. 2009).
Skinner (1994) interprets the asymmetric stock price responses to bad and good
news as evidence that managers disclose bad news more quickly than good news, and
argues that litigation risk is a major motivating factor. That is a rapid announcement
of bad news can mitigate litigation costs by reducing the number of potential plaintiffs
who could claim they bought shares while managers were withholding bad news.
Consistent with this argument, Skinner (1994) also finds that managers are likely to
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voluntarily disclose bad news more quickly than good news. Furthermore, he finds
that stock price responses to bad news disclosures are larger than stock price responses
to good news disclosures.
In another empirical study, Rogers and Stocken (2005) argue that investors often
interpret bad news as being more credible than good news.2 Consequently, stock
price responses to bad news are larger than stock price responses to good news. Using
positive and negative management forecast errors as a proxy for bad news and good
news, respectively, they find that investors are more responsive to bad news than to
good news.
From an accounting rule perspective, Basu (1997) investigates the conservatism
principle of reported financial statements by regressing annual earnings on annual
stock returns.3 Basu predicts that conservatism results in a more timely recognition
in earnings of bad news than good news, and therefore the sensitivity of earnings
to negative returns is greater than the sensitivity of earnings to positive returns.
Consistent with this prediction, he finds that the sensitivity of earnings to negative
returns is two to six times that of earnings to positive returns.
In contrast to the above studies, Kothari et al. (2009) argue that managers with-
hold bad news and disclose good news quickly due to career concerns.4 Based on the
assumption that managers act strategically by gathering and withholding bad news
while leaking good news quickly to the market, they find that the negative stock price
reaction to bad news is larger than the positive stock price reaction to good news.
They interpret this as evidence that management, on average, delays the release of
bad news to investors.
Studies in the second category examine stock price sensitivity to changes in interest
rates. Studies in this category include Gultekin and Rogalski (1979), Chance and Lane
(1980), Booth and Officer (1985), Bae (1990), and Elyasiani and Mansur (2004).
The findings of these studies have generally been inconsistent. Early studies by
Chance and Lane (1980) and Gultekin and Rogalski (1979) show that changes in
interest rates have little impact on returns. Chance and Lane (1980) test the effect
of changes in interest rates on the returns of commercial banks, using data from 1972
to 1976 to test interest rate sensitivity in a multi-index market model. They find
that less than two percent of the examined banks exhibit significant interest rate
sensitivity. The findings suggest that commercial bank stocks are less affected by
changes in interest rates.
The above findings, however, were challenged by Booth and Officer (1985), Bae
(1990), and Elyasiani and Mansur (2004), all of whom document significant negative
2Because management has an incentive to embellish news, investors view voluntary good news
disclosure with more skepticism than voluntary bad news disclosure.
3Negative annual returns, which are proxy for bad news; and positive annual returns, which are
proxy for good news.
4Examples include compensation, promotion, employment opportunities within and outside the
firm, potential termination, bonus payments, and a reduction in the quantity of stock options.
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interest rate sensitivity. Booth and Officer (1985) examine the interest rate sensitivity
of commercial banks relative to nonfinancial firms using a pooled cross-sectional time-
series model. Using data from 1966 to 1980, they find that bank stocks show extra-
market sensitivity to changes in short-term interest rates. Similarly, Bae (1990) re-
examined the interest rate sensitivity of common stock returns of financial firms by
incorporating nondepository firms. He applies current, anticipated, and unanticipated
changes in interest rates for a period from 1974 to 1985 and finds that both current
and unanticipated changes in interest rates significantly affect stocks of financial firms.
A more recent study by Elyasiani and Mansur (2004) extends prior studies by an-
alyzing bank stock sensitivity to changes in long-term and short-term interest rates as
alternative proxies for market interest rate variables within a multivariate generalized
autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic (MGARCH) framework. They used data
from 1988 to 2000 and find evidence of significant negative interest rate sensitivity.
Although these prior studies provide insights into the asymmetry of investor re-
sponses to good and bad news, the role of the quality of accounting recognition and
disclosures on investor responses to good and bad interest rate news has not yet been
examined. In this study, I therefore examine the effect of the quality of accounting
recognition and disclosures on investor responses to good and bad interest rate news.
Moreover, I examine the variation in the effect of the quality of accounting recognition
and disclosures on investor responses to good and bad interest rate news across firms.
3.3 Theory and hypotheses
3.3.1 SFAS 133 and investors’ responses to good and bad in-
terest rate news
The traditional market model assumes that the majority of investors are rational and
wealth-maximizing individuals. Thus, new information is priced by market partici-
pants immediately in an unbiased fashion (Fama, 1991). However, there is evidence
from financial and psychological literature that suggests that individuals’ decisions
actually depart from standard Bayesian rationality (e.g., Hirshleifer 2001).
Analytical work by Epstein and Schneider (2008) shows that under greater infor-
mation ambiguity, investors weight bad news more heavily than good news. In their
model, market participants know that the true precision of future information signals
is contained in a set of possible precisions, but they cannot assess priors over this set.
To be concrete, let θ be a parameter that an investor wants to learn, while investors
observe the noisy signal s which can be expressed as follows:
s = θ + ,  ∼ N(0, σ2s), σ2s ∈ [σ2s , σ2s ] (3.1)
where  is the noise in the signal s, and the precision of information is measured
by the inverse of the standard deviation of the noise (i.e., 1/σ2s). In the model,
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information quality is captured by the range of possible information signal precisions
[1/σ2s ,1/σ
2
s ]. Because the true precision of the signal is unknown, the agent forms a
set of possible precisions that reflects that the signal is precise (1/σ2s) or imprecise
(1/σ2s). The degree of ambiguity of the signal can be measured by 1/σ
2
s - 1/σ
2
s , and
the wider the interval, the more ambiguous the signal.
Epstein and Schneider (2003) show that an ambiguity-averse agent behaves as if
he maximizes expected utility under the worst-case belief that is chosen from the set
of possible conditional probabilities. Thus, following their model, when an ambiguous
signal conveys bad (good) news, the worst case scenario is that the signal is reliable
(unreliable). As a result, if the range of the set of possible precisions expected by
ambiguity-averse investors is large (i.e., high uncertainty about the precision of the
signal) then they will react more asymmetrically to good and bad news, and if the
range of the set of possible precisions expected by ambiguity-averse investors is small
then they will react less asymmetrically to good and bad news.
Prior anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that higher quality accounting in-
formation recognition and disclosure reduces ambiguity by reducing uncertainty about
future cash flows and earnings predictions. As Neel Foster (2003), a former member of
the Financial Accounting Standards Board, puts it, high quality information always
equates to less uncertainty. Consistent with this view, Lambert et al. (2007) show
that high quality accounting information reduces ambiguity by reducing the assessed
variance of a firm’s future cash flows. Similarly, Yae (2012) indicates that when there
is high ambiguity about the cash flow implications of a signal, but investors receive
high quality information, the potential influence of the information on ambiguity is
high as well.
In short, higher quality accounting information recognition and disclosure prac-
tices decrease the ambiguity about the precision of information that investors receive,
and thus investors react less asymmetrically to good and bad news.
Ambiguity with respect to the precision of interest rate news can potentially result
when the quality of accounting information recognition and disclosure creates a lack
of confidence by investors resulting in a reduction of confidence in interpreting the
precise firm-specific cash flow implications of changes in interest rates for firm value.5
In chapter two, I showed that derivative instruments and hedging activities recog-
nition and disclosure under SFAS 133 improves transparency and comparability about
the risks associated with derivative instruments and hedging activities by requiring
that all derivative instruments be reported on the balance sheet at fair value, by re-
ducing off-balance-sheet transactions, and by requiring firms to give a more detailed
picture of their risk situation. As a result, SFAS 133 reduces investors’ uncertainty
about the cash flow implications of changes in market rates, which should indeed
5Changes in interest rates per se are not a firm-specific signal. However, prior studies suggest
that it has firm-specific implications because it is associated with equity returns and earnings (e.g.,
Linsmeier et al. 2002). I assume that the cash flow implications of changes in interest rates for firm
value varies over time.
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result in a reduction in ambiguity about the precision of the cash flow implications of
changes in market rates.
Following the above discussion, I expect that the firm-specific cash flow implica-
tions of changes in interest rates are less ambiguous after the implementation of deriva-
tive instruments and hedging activities recognition and disclosure under SFAS 133.
More specifically, the range of the set of possible precisions expected by ambiguity-
averse investors is narrower after the adoption of SFAS 133 because the transparency
due to SFAS 133 decreases the imprecision of information (i.e., σ2s decreases). Thus,
before the adoption of SFAS 133, when investors receive good and bad interest rate
news they react more asymmetrically to good and bad interest rate news than after
the adoption of SFAS 133.
Given the above arguments, I specifically predict that investors react more asym-
metrically to good and bad interest rate news before the implementation of SFAS 133
than after the implementation of SFAS 133. Thus, I formulate the following hypoth-
esis:
H1: Investors respond more asymmetrically to good and bad interest rate news
before SFAS 133 adoption than after SFAS 133 adoption.
3.3.2 SFAS 133, investors’ responses to good and bad interest
rate news, and earnings volatility
Prior studies show that more earnings volatility is likely to be noisier and perceived
as lower quality, and thus it creates a demand for additional information to help in-
vestors better predict future cash flow and earnings (e.g., DeFond and Hung 2003;
Dichev and Tang 2009). Consistent with this view, Zhang (2006) argues that not only
information quality, but also underlying fundamental volatility plays a role in uncer-
tainty about future cash flow predictions. Similarly, Epstein and Schneider (2008)
indicate that the importance of information quality varies across firms according to
their level of underlying fundamental volatility. Specifically, market participants do
not demand high information quality if the underlying fundamental volatility is lower.
Consequently, the asymmetric responses to good and bad news should be small, even
if information is highly ambiguous. In contrast, when the underlying fundamental
volatility is higher, investors demand high information quality and, therefore, the
asymmetric responses to good and bad interest rate news is larger when information
is highly ambiguous. Thus, I expect that cross-sectional differences in underlying
earnings volatility affect the impact of the quality of accounting recognition and dis-
closure on investors’ responses to good and bad interest rate news.
Following the above discussion, I predict that the asymmetry in responses to good
and bad interest rate news before the adoption of SFAS 133 is greater for firms with
higher underlying earnings volatility than for firms with lower underlying earnings
volatility. Moreover, I expect that the reduction in ambiguity due to SFAS 133 mat-
3.4. Research design 53
ters more for firms with higher underlying earnings volatility than for firms with lower
underlying earnings volatility. Thus, I predict that the decrease in asymmetric re-
sponses to good and bad interest rate news after the adoption of SFAS 133 is higher
for firms with higher earnings volatility than for firms with lower earnings volatility.
Consequently, I formulate the following two hypotheses:
H2: The asymmetric responses to good and bad interest rate news before the adop-
tion of SFAS 133 is greater for firms with higher earnings volatility than for firms
with lower earnings volatility.
H3: The asymmetric responses to good and bad interest rate news after the adop-
tion of SFAS 133 decreases more for firms with higher earnings volatility than for
firms with lower earnings volatility.
3.4 Research design
3.4.1 Variable measurement
Measuring good and bad interest rates news
Changes in interest rates can affect a firm’s value in several ways. One way changes
in interest rates could affect firm value is through the valuation of stocks. Stocks are
commonly valued at the present value of their future cash flows. A rise in interest
rates reduces the present value of future cash flows which should depress stock prices.
Conversely, lower interest rates result in a lower opportunity cost of borrowing. This
stimulates investment and economic activities, which would cause stock prices to rise.
While this argument suggests that there is a negative relationship between interest
rates and stock prices, understanding the causes of changes in interest rates is impor-
tant. If the goal of rising interest rates is to limit inflation pressure, then it should
have a positive impact on the stock market, and vice versa. Moreover, conventional
assumptions suggest that a rise in the interest rate attracts foreign capital, leading to
a rise in exchange rates, and vice versa. Consequently, exporting (importing) firms
may benefit (lose) from a depreciation of the local currency. Even firms that are not
engaged in international business activity directly could also be affected by exchange
rates through competition with foreign firms (Dominguez and Tesar 2006). Thus, an
increase or a decrease in interest rates can be good news for some firms and bad news
for others.
In this study, I classify interest rate change signals as good (bad) interest rate news
when firm value changes due to daily interest rate changes are positive (negative). To
construct good and bad interest rate news, I proceed in two steps. First, I estimate
firm-year specific interest rate risk exposure for the whole sample period using weekly
data. Following the approach in prior studies (Guay 1999; Wong 2000; Zhang 2009),
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I use the following three-factor model to estimate interest rate exposure for every
firm-year6:
LOGRET = α0 + α1IR + α2XR + α3LOGIRET + µ (3.2)
where LOGRET is the natural logarithm of weekly returns, IR is the weekly
percentage change in the value of the short-term (three-month Treasury bill) inter-
est rates, XR is the weekly percentage change in the Federal Reserve Board trade-
weighted US dollar index, and LOGIRET is the natural logarithm of the weakly
market return. I measure the firm-year specific interest rate risk exposure (i.e., the
sensitivity of returns to interest rate movements) using the estimated coefficient on
IR (i.e.,α1) from the above regression equation.
In the next step, I merge the firm-year specific interest rate risk exposure coeffi-
cients estimated in equation (3.2) with the daily returns data. Using the new (merged)
dataset, I define interest rate news as good news (GNEWS) if the interest rate expo-
sure estimated is significantly positive at the 5% level and the daily percentage change
in the value of interest rates is positive, or if the interest rate exposure estimated is
significantly negative at the 5% level and the daily percentage change in the value of
interest rates is negative. I define interest rate news as bad news (BNEWS) if the
interest rate exposure estimated is significantly positive at the 5% level and the daily
percentage change in the value of interest rates is negative, or if the interest rate
exposure estimated is significantly negative at the 5% level and the daily percentage
change in the value of interest rates is positive. To account for the magnitude of
changes in interest rates, I interacted GNEWS and BNEWS variables with the daily
percentage change in the value of the short-term (three-month Treasury bill) interest
rates in my regression analyses.
SFAS 133 as a proxy for the quality of accounting recognition
and disclosure
Prior to SFAS 133, the accounting treatment for derivative instruments was in-
complete and inconsistent (SFAS 133, paragraphs 235 and 236). SFAS 133 (paragraph
235) notes that ”before the issuance of this statement, accounting standards specifi-
cally addressed only a few types of derivatives” and that many derivative instruments
were carried ”off-balance-sheet” regardless of whether they were formally part of a
hedging strategy. Moreover, prior to the issuance of SFAS 133 ”the accounting stan-
dards were inconsistent on whether qualification for hedge accounting was based on
6To estimate this equation, I use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) with the het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors (Newey-West standard errors)
option to correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Wooldridge 2002). The PROC MODEL
procedure with the GMM estimation in the FIT statement and KERNEL option in the SAS statistical
software package provides this flexibility.
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risk assessment at an entity-wide or an individual level” (SFAS 133, paragraph 236).
In contrast to the prior accounting standards, prior studies indicate that SFAS 133 re-
duces the inconsistency, incompleteness, and difficulty of applying previous guidance
and practice by providing comprehensive guidance for all derivatives and hedging ac-
tivities. For example, Ahmed et al. (2011) and chapter two of this dissertation have
shown that the transparency and monitoring of the risk implications of derivative
instruments and hedging activities have increased following the adoption of SFAS
133. Thus, I assume that the firm-specific cash flow implications of changes in in-
terest rates for firm value are clearer (less ambiguous) after the adoption of SFAS 133.
Control variables
Following prior research (e.g., Fama and French 1992; Daske et al. 2008; Bhabra
et al. 2011), I include several control variables that are expected to influence stock
prices. I control for firm size (SIZE) because larger firms have greater access to both
internal and external capital than smaller firms and thus the stock price reaction is
larger for larger firms than for smaller firms. I measure SIZE as the natural logarithm
of the market value of equity. I control for book to market ratio (BTM) because firms
with more growth opportunity should have lower dividend yields than firms with low
growth opportunity and thus their stock price reaction differs. I measure BTM as the
ratio of a firm’s book value to market value of equity. I control for leverage (LEV)
because a firm with higher leverage may not invest in profitable projects. Such a
firm can also indicate corporate manager efficiency by servicing higher levels of debt.
Thus, the association between leverage ratio and stock price is not clear. I measure
LEV as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. I also control for market volatility
because stock prices and the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) volatility
index (VIX) are negatively correlated. VIX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange
(CBOE) volatility index measured at the end of the fiscal year.
3.4.2 Hypotheses test
SFAS 133 and investors’ responses to good and bad interest
rate news
To test whether investors respond more asymmetrically to bad and good interest rate
news before than after the adoption of SFAS 133 (i.e., to test hypothesis 1), I use the
following regression equation:
RET = γ0 + γ1GNEWS + γ2BNEWS + γ3POST + γ4GNEWS ∗ POST+
γ5BNEWS ∗ POST + γ6SIZE + γ7BTM + γ8LEV + γ9V IX + ω (3.3)
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where RET is market-adjusted returns, which is calculated as the natural loga-
rithm of the daily firm-level returns minus the natural logarithm of the daily market
returns. All other variables are defined as before.
Following my prediction in hypothesis 1, I expect that (|γ2| - γ1) to be higher than
(|γ2 + γ5| - [γ1 + γ4]).
SFAS 133, investors’ responses to good and bad interest rate
news, and earnings volatility
To test my second and third hypotheses, I use the following regression equation:
RET = Θ0+Θ1GNEWS+Θ2BNEWS+Θ3POST+Θ4V OLT+Θ5GNEWS∗POST
+ Θ6BNEWS ∗ POST + Θ7GNEWS ∗ V OLT + Θ8BNEWS ∗ V OLT
+Θ9V OLT ∗POST+Θ10GNEWS∗V OLT ∗POST+Θ11BNEWS∗V OLT ∗POST
+ Θ12SIZE + Θ13BTM + Θ14LEV + Θ15V IX + λ (3.4)
where VOLT is an indicator variable which is equal to one if the value of the
earnings volatility is greater than or equal to the median value of earnings volatility
of all firms and is equal to zero otherwise.7 All other variables are defined as before.
I employ two different regression models to test equation 3.3 and 3.4. The first
is an OLS regression. I also use a second regression model. This second model is
fixed-effects model, where I include firm dummies in the regressions. This allows me
to control for unobserved firm effects (fixed effects) on investors’ response to inter-
est rates news that are assumed to be constant through time but vary across firms
(Wooldridge 2002).
3.5 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
3.5.1 Sample selection and data sources
The sample used in this study covers firms in the U.S. with fiscal years ending on or
after January 15, 1990 through December 31, 2009. To ensure that the sample period
before and after the adoption of SFAS 133 is sufficiently long, I start in 1990 and end
in 2009. I exclude the transition period (between 2000 and 2001) from the analyses
to avoid any temporary changes caused by SFAS 133 adoption.
I collected market security data from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) database. Financial accounting data along with the reporting dates were
collected from the Compustat North America database. I obtained market interest
7Using an indicator variable makes the interpretation easier.
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rates and foreign currency exchange rate data from the U.S. Federal Reserve database.
VIX data were collected from the CBOE website. All other macroeconomic data were
collected from the U.S. Department of Labor and Commerce website.
To mitigate the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 0.5 and 99.5
percentiles. I deleted observations with insignificant interest rate exposure coefficients
at 5% level. I also deleted observations with missing values and observations that are
from the transition period. The final sample consists of 771,445 firm-day observations
over the period of 1990 to 2009. Table 3.1 reports the sample composition by industry.
Table 3.1: Composition of Sample by Industry*
Industry-type No. of firm-years Percent Industry-type No. of firm-years Percent
Agriculture 2641 0.34 Insur 18724 2.43
Autos 10766 1.40 LabEq 13646 1.77
Banks 9474 1.23 Mach 26474 3.43
Beer 3235 0.42 Meals 15286 1.98
BldMt 11509 1.49 MedEq 28448 3.69
Books 5867 0.76 Mines 6037 0.78
Boxes 1717 0.22 Misc 7147 0.93
BusSv 86769 11.25 Paper 10560 1.37
Chems 15450 2.00 PerSv 6608 0.86
Chips 49543 6.42 RlEst 7010 0.91
Clths 10367 1.34 Rtail 38448 4.98
Cnstr 9408 1.22 Rubber 5124 0.66
Coal 1888 0.24 Ships 2263 0.29
Comps 34994 4.54 Smoke 949 0.12
Drugs 41053 5.32 Soda 1134 0.15
ElcEq 8120 1.05 Steel 11498 1.49
Enrgy 46520 6.03 Telcm 24192 3.14
FabPr 2643 0.34 Toys 8450 1.10
Fin 30413 3.94 Trans 22724 2.95
Food 12042 1.56 Txtls 3420 0.44
Fun 12807 1.66 Util 29907 3.88
Gold 12257 1.59 Whlsl 33161 4.30
Guns 937 0.12 Hlth 16210 2.10
Hshld 11149 1.45 Total 771,446 100.00
Aero 2457 0.32
*I use the Fama and French 48 industry classification.
3.5.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in my regression analyses
for the whole sample. Out of the total 771,446 observations, 54.6% of my sample
(421,567 firm-day observations) is from the post-SFAS 133 period, while the remaining
45.4% (349,881 firm-day observations) is from the pre-SFAS 133 period. The mean
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(median) value of the dependent variable (i.e., market adjusted returns) is -0.001
(-0.001). The difference between the mean and median values of the independent
variables is very small, indicating that the variables are not highly skewed.
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Regression Analyses
Variables N Minimum Mean Median Std Maximum
RET 771,446 -1.690 -0.001 -0.001 0.049 1.836
GNEWS 771,446 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.007 0.530
BNEWS 771,446 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.007 0.567
POST 771,446 0.000 0.454 0.000 0.498 1.000
VOLT 771,446 0.000 0.140 0.000 0.347 1.000
SIZE 771,446 0.920 5.607 5.476 2.265 11.434
BTM 771,446 -0.941 0.593 0.460 0.571 43.883
LEV 771,446 0.000 0.220 0.181 0.211 1.080
VIX 771,446 11.250 18.849 19.310 5.884 28.620
The table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the
regression analyses. All variables are defined as before.
Table 3.3 reports correlations of the key variables used in the regression analyses.
Pearson correlations are presented above the diagonal and Spearman rank correlations
are presented below the diagonal. The statistics are calculated from the whole sample.
There is a positive (negative) relation between GNEWS (BNEWS) and RET, which
implies that stock prices on average react positively (negatively) to good (bad) interest
rate news.
Table 3.3: Correlations between Variables Used in Regression Analyses
VAR RET GNEWS BNEWS POST VOLT SIZE BTM LEV VIX
RET 0.032 -0.038*** 0.014*** -0.015*** 0.017*** 0.006** 0.004*** -0.008***
GNEWS 0.039*** -0.646*** -0.044*** 0.028*** -0.069*** -0.000 -0.013*** 0.017***
BNEWS -0.057*** -0.147*** -0.060*** 0.027*** -0.072*** -0.004*** -0.007 0.012***
POST 0.005*** -0.075*** -0.084*** -0.068*** 0.349*** -0.059*** -0.023*** -0.134***
VOLT -0.008*** 0.070*** 0.070*** -0.069*** -0.219*** -0.172*** 0.072*** 0.018***
SIZE -0.005*** -0.148 -0.150*** 0.346*** -0.218*** -0.300 0.075*** -0.045
BTM 0.004** 0.031*** 0.033*** -0.085*** -0.100*** -0.341*** 0.065 0.0652***
LEV -0.000 -0.008*** -0.002** -0.019*** 0.127*** 0.029*** -0.017*** 0.005***
VIX -0.004*** 0.024*** 0.023** -0.042*** 0.019*** -0.013*** 0.078*** 0.003***
The table reports the values of the correlations between each of the independent variables. Spearman (Pear-
son) correlations are above (below) the diagonal. All variables are defined as before. ***, **, and * denote
two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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3.6 Main results
In this section of the study, I first report the results for investors’ responses to good
and bad interest rate news before and after the adoption of SFAS 133 (i.e., hypothesis
1). Then, I present the results for investors’ responses to good and bad interest rate
news before the adoption of SFAS 133 for firms with higher earnings volatility and for
firms with lower earnings volatility (i.e., hypothesis 2). Finally, I present the results
on the variation in investors’ responses to good and bad interest rate news before and
after the adoption of SFAS 133 across firms with higher earnings volatility and firms
with lower earnings volatility (i.e., hypothesis 3).
3.6.1 Investors’ responses to good and bad interest rate news
before and after SFAS 133
To examine the impact of the quality of accounting recognition and disclosures (i.e.,
SFAS 133) on the asymmetry responses to good and bad interest rate news (i.e.,
hypothesis 1), I test the difference in the asymmetry between the pre-SFAS 133 and
post-SFAS 133 periods. Panels A and B of Table 3.4 provide the results for the
regression based on equation (3.3), examining the impact of SFAS 133 on investors’
responses to good and bad interest rate news. The results indicate that SFAS 133
indeed affects investors’ responses. The results reported in Panel B of Table 3.4 show
that the 0.1520 (0.0894) difference between the estimated coefficients on GNEWS and
BNEWS for the pre-SFAS 133 period (post-SFAS 133 period) is significantly different
from zero, which indicates that investors respond asymmetrically to good and bad
interest rate news in both the pre-SFAS 133 and post-SFAS 133 periods.
The results presented in Panel B of Table 3.4 further show that the decline in
the asymmetric responses to good and bad interest rate news from 0.1520 to 0.0894
is significant (F = 24.04). This indicates that asymmetric responses to good and
bad interest rate news are more pronounced in the pre-SFAS 133 than in the post-
SFAS 133 period. This is consistent with the idea that with the implementation
of SFAS 133, the future cash flow implications of changes in interest rates for firm
value have become less ambiguous than before the adoption of SFAS 133. The fixed-
effects regression results reported in Column II of Table 3.4 generally show consistent
results with this findings. Consequently, investors discount good interest rate news
less heavily after the adoption of SFAS 133.
Taken together, consistent with my prediction (i.e., H1), the results suggest that
investors respond asymmetrically to good and bad interest rate news in both the pre-
SFAS 133 period and the post-SFAS 133 period; however, this asymmetry decreases
significantly following the adoption of SFAS 133.
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3.6.2 SFAS 133, investors’ responses to good and bad interest
rate news, and earnings volatility
To test whether the asymmetric responses to good and bad interest rate news before
the adoption of SFAS 133 is greater for firms with higher earnings volatility and
for firm with lower earnings volatility (i.e., hypothesis 2), I compare the asymmetric
responses before the adoption of SFAS 133 for these firms. Panels A and B of Table 3.5
report the results for the regression based on equation (3.4). The results presented in
Panel B reveal that responses to good and bad interest rate news before the adoption of
SFAS 133 have greater asymmetry for firms with higher underlying earnings volatility
than firms with lower underlying earnings volatility. More specifically, the asymmetric
responses to good and bad interest rate news before the adoption of SFAS 133 for
firms with higher underlying earnings volatility and for firms with lower underlying
earnings volatility is 0.3075 and 0.0834, respectively. This 0.2241 difference between
the asymmetric responses to good and bad interest rate news before the adoption of
SFAS 133 for firms with higher or lower underlying earnings volatility is significantly
different from zero. This implies that uncertainty about the precision of information
for firms with higher earnings volatility is higher than for firms with lower earnings
volatility. After including firm dummies in the regression, the results reported in
Column II of Table 3.5 generally show consistent results with this findings. Thus,
consistent with my second hypothesis (i.e, H2), the results show that asymmetric
responses to good and bad interest rate news before the adoption of SFAS 133 are
greater for firms with higher earnings volatility than for firms with lower earnings
volatility.8
To test my third hypothesis, to examine the effect of earnings volatility on the
impact of SFAS 133 on asymmetric responses to good and bad interest rate news,
I test the difference in asymmetry between the pre-SFAS 133 and post-SFAS 133
period for firms with higher and lower earnings volatility. As the results reported
in Panel B of Table 3.5 show, the asymmetry of responses to good and bad interest
rate news for firms with higher earnings volatility decreased from 0.3075 in the pre-
SFAS 133 period to 0.1091 in the post-SFAS 133 period. This decline of 0.1984 is
statistically significant. In contrast, the asymmetry of responses for firms with lower
earnings volatility decreased from 0.0834 in the pre-SFAS 133 period to 0.0818 in
the post-SFAS 133 period, which is not statistically different from zero (F = 0.04).
After including firm dummies in the regression, the results reported in Column II of
Table 3.5 generally show consistent results with this findings. The results imply that
the level of earnings volatility contributes to the relevance of the quality of accounting
information. Thus, consistent with my third prediction (i.e., H3), the results suggest
that the adoption of SFAS 133 has a significant impact on asymmetric responses to
8The asymmetric responses to good and bad interest rate news after the adoption of SFAS 133
is also greater for firms with higher earnings volatility than for firms with lower earnings volatility,
but it is clear that higher earnings volatility firms move to lower earnings volatility firms.
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good and bad interest rate news for firms with higher earnings volatility, but little
(no) impact for firms with lower earnings volatility.
Table 3.4: Investors’ Responses to Good and Bad Interest Rate News and SFAS 133
Panel A: Coefficient Estimates
Variables Predicted sign I II
GNEWS + 0.2093*** 0.2383***
(21.93) (23.64)
BNEWS - -0.3613*** -0.3360***
(-38.87) (-34.25)
POST + 0.0001 0.0001***
(0.34) (2.93)
GNEWS*POST + 0.0439** 0.0502***
(2.54) (2.75)
BNEWS*POST ± 0.0187 0.0245
(1.05) (1.30)
SIZE ± 0.0001** -0.0013***
(2.45) (-6.84)
BTM ± 0.0005*** -0.0001
(4.91) (0.38)
LEV ± -0.0001 -0.0017*
(-0.17) (-1.68)
VIX ± -0.0000*** -0.0000*
(-3.56) (-2.08)
INTERCEPT ± -0.0005*
(-1.96)
Firm-fixed-effects Yes
Observations 771,446 771,446
R2 0.40% 0.75%
Panel A of the table reports the coefficient estimates for in-
vestors’ responses to good and bad interest rate news be-
fore and after the SFAS 133 period. Firm-fixed-effects are
included in the regression reported in column II of the ta-
ble. All variables are defined as before. ***, **, and ** de-
note two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Panel B: Investors’ Responses to Good and Bad Interest Rate News Before and After SFAS 133
Variables Before After Difference
(POST= 0) (POST= 1) (After-Before)
GNEWS 0.2093 0.2532 0.0439
BNEWS -0.3613 -0.3426 0.0187
Difference (|BNEWS| – GNEWS) 0.1520*** 0.0894*** -0.0626**
Panel B of the table reports the coefficient estimates for investors’ responses
to good and bad interest rate news before and after the SFAS 133 period. All
variables are defined as before. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.5: Investors’ Responses to Good and Bad Interest Rate News, SFAS 133, and
Earnings Volatility
Panel A: Coefficient Estimates
Variables Predicted sign I II
GNEWS + 0.2309*** 0.2624***
(20.52) (22.04)
BNEWS - -0.3143*** -0.2876***
(-28.54) (-24.71)
POST + 0.0002 0.0011***
(1.04) (3.22)
VOLT - -0.0001
(-0.45)
GNEWS*POST + 0.0180 0.0225
(0.90) (1.07)
BNEWS*POST ± -0.0164 -0.0103
(-0.79) (-0.47)
POST*VOLT ± -0.0003 -0.0007
(-0.63) (-0.69)
GNEWS*VOLT ± -0.0682*** -0.0838***
(-3.21) (-3.74)
BNEWS*VOLT ± -0.1560*** -0.1671***
(-7.59) (-7.71)
GNEWS*POST*VOLT + 0.0888** 0.0991**
(2.23) (2.37)
BNEWS*POST*VOLT ± 0.1081*** 0.1092**
(2.60) (2.55)
SIZE ± 0.0000 -0.0013
(1.55) (-6.82)
BTM ± 0.0004*** -0.0015
(3.90) (-0.43)
LEV ± 0.0002 -0.0017*
(0.57) (-1.69)
VIX ± -0.0000*** -0.0000**
(-3.46) (-2.09)
INTERCEPT ± -0.0004
(-1.62)
Firm-fixed-effects Yes
No. of Observations 771,445 771,445
R2 0.44% 0.75%
Panel A of the table reports the coefficient estimates for investors’
responses to good and bad interest rate news before and after the
SFAS 133 period. Firm-fixed-effects are included in the regres-
sion reported in column II of the table. All variables are defined
as before. ***, **, and ** denote two-tailed significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Panel B: Investors’ Responses to Good and Bad Interest Rate News, SFAS 133, and Earnings
Volatility
Variables L VOLT H VOLT Difference
(VOLT= 0) (VOLT= 1) (High–Low)
Before (POST=0) GNEWS 0.2309 0.1627 -0.0682
BNEWS -0.3143 -0.4702 -0.1559
Difference(|BNEWS| – GNEWS) 0.0834*** 0.3075*** 0.2241***
After (POST=1) GNEWS 0.2489 0.2695 0.0206***
BNEWS -0.3307 -0.3786 -0.0479
Difference (|BNEWS| – GNEWS) 0.0818*** 0.1091*** 0.0273***
Difference (after) - Difference (before) -0.0016 -0.1984***
After - Before GNEWS 0.0180 0.1068***
BNEWS -0.0164 0.0916***
Panel B of the table reports the coefficient estimates for investors’ responses to good and bad in-
terest rate news before and after the SFAS 133 period. All variables are defined as before. ***, **,
and * denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
3.6.3 Sensitivity tests
I performed additional tests to examine the robustness of my results. First, I investi-
gated whether taking into account the observations from the transition period affects
my results. I find similar results after including observations from the transition
period in the analyses (untabulated).
Secondly, I examined whether my results are sensitive for changes in the transition
period. Using a fiscal year between 1999 and 2001 as a new transition period, I find
consistent results with my main findings. Specifically, the results reported in Column
I of Table 3.6 show that the asymmetric responses to good and bad interest rate
news decreased from 0.1435 in the pre-SFAS 133 period to 0.0875 in the post-SFAS
133 period. After including firm dummies in the regression, the results reported in
Column II of Table 3.6 show that the asymmetric responses to good and bad interest
rate news still decreases from 0.0866 in the pre-SFAS 133 period to 0.0233 in the
post-SFAS 133 period. These results are similar to those reported in Table 3.4.
The results reported in Column III of Table 3.6 show that the asymmetric re-
sponses to good and bad interest rate news before the adoption of SFAS 133 for firms
with higher underlying earnings volatility and for firms with lower underlying earn-
ings volatility is 0.4790 and 0.0064, respectively. This 0.3159 difference is significant.
After including firm dummies in the regression, the results reported in Column IV of
Table 3.6 continue to support the results presented in Table 3.5.
The results reported in Column IV of Table 3.6 show, the asymmetry of responses
to good and bad interest rate news for firms with higher earnings volatility decreased
from 0.3159 in the pre-SFAS 133 period to 0.2076 in the post-SFAS 133 period. This
decline of 0.2076 is statistically significant. In contrast, the asymmetry of responses
for firms with lower earnings volatility decreased from 0.1631 in the pre-SFAS 133
period to 0.0828 in the post-SFAS 133 period, which is not statistically different from
zero. After including firm dummies in the regression, the results reported in Column
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IV of Table 3.6 generally show consistent results with this findings.
Table 3.6: Investors’ Responses to Good and Bad Interest Rate News, SFAS 133, and
Earnings Volatility: 1999 to 2001 as a transition period
Coefficient Estimates
Predicted sign I II III IV
GNEWS + 0.2114*** 0.2413*** 0.2337*** 0.2674***
(21.95) (23.70) (20.58) (22.23)
BNEWS - -0.3549*** -0.3279*** -0.3001*** -0.2699***
(-37.30) (-32.60) (-26.48) (-22.49)
POST + 0.0001 0.0010*** 0.0002 0.0012***
(0.46) (3.17) (1.33) (3.46)
VOLT - -0.0001
(-0.32)
GNEWS*POST + 0.0430** 0.0470*** 0.0159 0.0174
(2.46) (2.58) (0.79) (0.82)
BNEWS*POST ± 0.0130 0.0163 -0.0298 -0.0280
(0.73) (0.86) (-1.44) (-1.28)
POST*VOLT ± -0.0003 -0.0006
(-0.91) (-0.64)
GNEWS*VOLT ± -0.0706*** -0.0894***
(-3.29) (-3.96)
BNEWS*VOLT ± -0.1789*** -0.1946***
(-8.56) (-8.84)
GNEWS*POST*VOLT ± 0.0909** 0.1043**
(2.28) (2.49)
BNEWS*POST*VOLT ± 0.1306*** 0.1362***
(3.14) (3.11)
SIZE ± 0.0001*** -0.0013*** 0.0001* -0.0012***
(2.75) (-6.72) (1.92) (-6.66)
BTM ± 0.0005*** -0.0001 0.0004*** -0.0001
(4.71) (-0.32) (3.74) (-0.35)
LEV ± -0.0001 -0.0017* 0.0001 -0.0017*
(-0.28) (-1.66) (0.47) (-1.65)
VIX ± -0.0000** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000**
(-2.26) (-3.66) (-3.58) (-2.26)
INTERCEPT ± -0.0006** -0.0005*
(-2.11) (-1.91)
Firm-fixed-effects Yes
No. of Observations 763,675 763,675 763,675 763,675
R2 0.40% 0.74% 0.40% 0.75%
The table reports regression coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics. Be-
tween 1999 and 2001 is used as a transition period. Firm-fixed-effects are included in the
regression reported in columns II and IV of the table, respectively. All variables are de-
fined as before. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
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Thirdly, I partitioned the overall sample into two periods: between 1990 and 2000
(pre-SFAS 133 period) and between 2002 and 2009 (post-SFAS 133). I estimated
the coefficients for equation (3.4) and equation (3.5) for the pre-SFAS 133 period
subsample and the post-SFAS 133 period subsample separately. The results reported
in Panel B of Table 3.7 show that the asymmetric responses to good and bad interest
rate news decreased from 0.1525 in the pre-SFAS 133 period to 0.0876 in the post-
SFAS 133 period. This decline is statistically significant. The results presented in
Panel B of Table 3.8 show that the asymmetry of responses to good and bad news
has decreased more for firms with higher earnings volatility that for firms with lower
earnings volatility. Specifically, the asymmetric responses to good and bad interest
rate news decreased from 0.3077 in the pre-SFAS 133 period to 0.1086 in the post-
SFAS 133 period and from 0.0848 in the pre-SFAS 133 period to 0.0786 in the post-
SFAS 133 period for firms with high earnings volatility and firms with lower earnings
volatility, respectively. Consequently, consistent with my predications, the results
show that investors’ asymmetric response to good and bad interest rate news is more
pronounced in the pre-SFAS 133 period than in the post-SFAS 133 period. Moreover,
the asymmetric responses to good and bad interest rate news after the adoption of
SFAS 133 decreases more for firms with higher earnings volatility than for firms with
lower earnings volatility.
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Table 3.7: Investors’ Responses to Good and Bad Interest Rate News and SFAS 133
Panel A: Coefficient Estimates
Variables Pre-SFAS 133 Post-SFAS 133
Predicted sign I II III IV
GNEWS + 0.2090*** 0.2382*** 0.2541*** 0.2915***
(19.08) (20.67) (21.69) (23.89)
BNEWS - -0.3615*** -0.3360*** -0.3417*** -0.3088***
(-33.91) (-29.97) (-27.62) (-23.97)
SIZE ± 0.0001 -0.0021*** 0.0000 -0.0020***
(1.25) (-5.44) (0.41) (-6.15)
BTM ± 0.0005*** 0.0003 0.0004*** -0.0015***
(3.60) (0.42) (2.94) (-2.59)
LEV ± -0.0005 -0.0025 0.0005 -0.0044***
(-1.20) (-1.14) (1.53) (-2.60)
VIX ± -0.0001*** -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000***
(-3.86) (-0.54) (0.62) (-2.91)
INTERCEPT ± 0.0001 -0.0012***
(0.33) (-3.61)
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 421,558 421,558 349,880 349,880
R2 0.40% 0.75% 0.40% 0.80%
Panel A of the table reports the coefficient estimates for investors’ responses to good and bad
interest rate news before and after the SFAS 133 period. Firm-fixed-effects are included in
the regression reported in columns II and IV of the table. All variables are defined as before.
***, ***, and * denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Investors’ Responses to Good and Bad Interest Rate News Before and After SFAS 133
Variables Before After Difference
(POST= 0) (POST= 1) (After – Before)
GNEWS 0.2090 0.2541 0.0451
BNEWS -0.3615 -0.3417 0.0198
Difference (|BNEWS| – GNEWS) 0.1525*** 0.0876*** -0.0651**
Panel B of the table reports the coefficient estimates for investors’ responses to
good and bad interest rate news before and after the SFAS 133 period. All vari-
ables are defined as before. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.8: Investors’ Responses to Good and Bad Interest Rate News, SFAS 133, and
Earnings Volatility
Panel A: Coefficient Estimates
Variables Pre-SFAS 133 Post-SFAS 133
Predicted sign I II III IV
GNEWS + 0.2301*** 0.2632*** 0.2504*** 0.2880***
(17.84) (19.99) (18.56) (20.51)
BNEWS - -0.3149*** -0.2874*** -0.3290*** -0.2959***
(-24.94) (-21.60) (-23.28) (-20.11)
VOLT - -0.0001 -0.0003
(-0.35) (-1.4)
GNEWS*VOLT ± -0.0677*** -0.0853*** 0.0192 0.0140
(-3.21) (-3.35) (0.71) (0.49)
BNEWS*VOLT ± -0.1560*** -0.1672*** -0.0492 -0.0555*
(-2.79) (-6.77) (-1.70) (-1.82)
SIZE ± 0.0000 -0.0021*** 0.0001** 0.0020
(0.56) (-5.39) (2.22) (-6.15)
BTM ± 0.0004*** 0.0003 0.0003** -0.0015***
(2.76) (0.44) (2.47) (-2.60)
LEV ± -0.0002 -0.0026 0.0006* -0.0044***
(0.51) (-1.18) (1.80) (-2.61)
VIX ± -0.0001*** -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001***
(-3.76) (-0.59) (-0.59) (-2.90)
INTERCEPT ± 0.0002*** -0.0011***
(0.52) (-3.07)
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes
No. of Observations 421,564 421,564 349,881 349,881
R2 0.44% 0.75% 0.43% 0.80%
Panel A of the table reports the coefficient estimates for investors’ responses to good and bad
interest rate news before and after the SFAS 133 period. Firm-fixed-effects are included in the
regression reported in columns II and IV of the table. All variables are defined as before. ***,
**, and * denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Panel B: Investors’ Responses to Good and Bad Interest Rate News, SFAS 133, and Earnings
Volatility
Variables L VOLT H VOLT Difference
(VOLT= 0) (VOLT= 1) (High-Low)
Before (POST=0) GNEWS 0.2301 0.1632 -0.0674
BNEWS -0.3149 -0.4709 -0.1560
Difference (|BNEWS| – GNEWS) 0.0848*** 0.3077*** 0.2229***
After (POST=1) GNEWS 0.2504 0.2696 0.0192
BNEWS -0.3290 -0.3782 -0.0492
Difference(|BNEWS| – GNEWS) 0.0786*** 0.1086*** 0.0273***
Difference (after) - Difference (before) -0.0062 -0.1991***
After - Before GNEWS 0.0203 0.1064***
BNEWS -0.0141 0.0927***
Panel B of the table reports the coefficient estimates for investors’ responses to good and bad in-
terest rate news before and after the SFAS 133 period. All variables are defined as before. ***, **,
and * denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Finally, prior studies (e.g., Petersen 2009) suggest that in regression analyses with
panel data, the residuals may be correlated across firms and across time, and OLS
standard errors can be biased. To adjust the standard errors for residual correlation
(both within firms over time, and across firms each time period), Petersen (2009)
suggests to estimate the standard errors with clustering along multiple dimensions
(firm and year). As my sample comprises panel data, I test whether my results are
sensitive for residual correlation. Using the approach discussed by Petersen 2009,
I estimate the standard errors with clustering along multiple dimensions (firm and
year). Untabulated results reinforces the evidence obtained in the main analysis.
3.7 Summary and conclusion
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the quality of accounting recogni-
tion and disclosures affects investors’ responses to good and bad interest rate news.
In addition, I analyze the variation in the effect of the quality of accounting recog-
nition and disclosures on investors’ responses to good and bad interest rate news
between firms with higher or lower earnings volatility. I develop three hypotheses:
(1) investors respond more asymmetrically to good and bad interest rate news before
SFAS 133 adoption than after SFAS 133 adoption, (2) the asymmetry of responses
to good and bad interest rate news before the adoption of SFAS 133 is greater for
firms with higher earnings volatility than for firms with lower earnings volatility, (3)
the asymmetry of responses to good and bad interest rate news after the adoption
of SFAS 133 decreases more for firms with higher earnings volatility than for firms
with lower earnings volatility. Consistent with my predictions, I find a significant
decrease in the asymmetry of responses to good and bad interest rate news following
the adoption of SFAS 133. Following Epstein and Schneider (2008), I interpret this
finding as an indication that higher quality of accounting recognition and disclosures
indeed decreases uncertainty about the precision of information that investors receive.
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As a result, investors discount good interest rate news less heavily after the adoption
of SFAS 133. I also find that the asymmetry of responses to good and bad interest
rate news before the adoption of SFAS 133 is greater for firms with higher earnings
volatility than for firms with lower earnings volatility. This implies that uncertainty
about the precision of information for firms with higher earnings volatility is higher
than for firms with lower earnings volatility. Lastly, I find that the asymmetry of
responses to good and bad interest rate news significantly decreases for firms with
higher earnings volatility in the post-SFAS 133 period. In contrast, the adoption of
SFAS 133 has no impact on the asymmetry of responses to good and bad interest rate
news for firms with lower earnings volatility. This is consistent with the idea that
investors demand more accounting information when underlying earnings volatility is
higher.
These findings contribute to the literature by showing that the quality of account-
ing recognition and disclosure affects investors’ responses to good and bad interest
rate news. Moreover, the study contributes to the literature by showing that the
cross-sectional variation in earnings volatility affects the impact of SFAS 133 on in-
vestors’ responses to good and bad interest rate news. Finally, the findings contribute
to the general debate about the effectiveness of SFAS 133 by showing that SFAS 133
indeed decreases information ambiguity.
4
The impact of accounting for
derivatives on income
smoothing
4.1 Introduction
One of the major criticisms of SFAS 133 is that the restrictive nature of the standard
induces higher earnings volatility and thus may encourage more earnings smoothing
(e.g., Ostenand 2000; Sapra 2002). While prior studies document that SFAS 133 has
increased the transparency and visibility of derivative instruments (e.g., Ahmed et al.
2011; Chapter 2 of this dissertation), there are few studies that examine the question
whether SFAS 133 affects earnings volatility and earnings smoothing. Thus, the main
purpose of this study is to provide empirical evidence with regard to this question.
Specifically, I examine whether the adoption of SFAS 133 influences firms’ income
smoothing via discretionary accruals decisions. Moreover, I investigate whether the
degree of hedge ineffectiveness and market instability affect the impact of SFAS 133
on firms’ income smoothing via discretionary accruals decisions. This study differs
from prior studies by examining directly the impact of the adoption of SFAS 133 on
income smoothing via discretionary accruals. Most importantly, this study differs
from prior studies by examining the influence of the degree of hedge ineffectiveness
and market instability on the impact of SFAS 133 on firms’ income smoothing via
discretionary accruals decisions.
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Empirical evidence on the impact of SFAS 133 on earnings volatility and thus
earnings smoothing is important because of the controversy surrounding SFAS 133.
Proponents of SFAS 133 argue that it provides shareholders with better information
and reduces opportunities for managers to smooth earnings (Alkon 2006). Critics,
however, argue that SFAS 133 induces higher earnings volatility and thus more in-
come smoothing (e.g., Osterland 2000). This volatility arises because SFAS 133 re-
quires firms to report the ineffective portion of derivatives gains and losses in the
income statement immediately, but gains and losses of the hedged items later. This
hedge mismatch will cause higher earnings volatility in the short term. Although
SFAS 133 allows firms to apply hedge accounting if the hedge qualifies for hedge
accounting1, it cannot completely mitigate the accounting mismatch. Because the
volatility in earnings is costly for managers and shareholders in various ways, man-
agers face huge pressures to smooth earnings (Trueman and Titman 1988; Longstaff
and Piazzesi 2004). For example, Trueman and Titman (1988) point out that high
earnings volatility increases the perceived risk of bankruptcy of a firm and thus its
cost of capital. Similarly, smooth earnings leads to more analysts following (Schip-
per 1997), meeting analyst forecasts more often (Myers et al. 2007), meeting bonus
targets (Fudenberg and Tirole 1995), lower firm risk perceived by investors (Graham
et al. 2005), lower taxes and agency costs and higher management wealth (Carlson
and Bathala 1997; Barton 2001), and higher firm value (Longstaff and Piazzesi 2004).
Hence, earnings smoothing can be viewed as a tool to avoid the undesirable conse-
quences of earnings volatility. Previous studies document that managers make use of
discretionary accruals and/or derivative instruments to smooth earnings (e.g., Watts
and Zimmerman 1986; Myers and Skinner 1999; Barton 2001). Barton (2001) sug-
gests that managers view earnings smoothing via discretionary accruals and derivative
instruments as substitutes. Because gains and losses on derivative instruments recog-
nition under SFAS 133 increases earnings volatility and such volatility in earnings is
costly for managers and shareholders, managers may engage in income smoothing via
discretionary accruals. Thus, I expect income smoothing via discretionary accruals
to increase significantly after the adoption of SFAS 133.
Following prior studies, I use the correlation between the changes in managed
earnings and the changes in unmanaged earnings as a measure of income smoothing
via discretionary accruals (e.g., Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Grant et al. 2009). A higher
negative correlation (hereafter SMOOTH) indicates more income smoothing. Like
Grant et al. (2009), I use the inverted sign of the SMOOTH for ease of interpretation,
so that larger coefficients indicate higher income smoothing.
Analyzing a sample of 215,874 firm-year observations in the period from 1992 to
2006, I find a significant increase in income smoothing via discretionary accruals after
the adoption of SFAS 133. The significant increase in income smoothing via discre-
1Formal documentation of the hedging relationship and hedging effectiveness tests (e.g., prospec-
tive and retrospective tests) are required (SFAS 133).
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tionary accruals activity after the adoption of SFAS 133 is a potential explanation
for why prior empirical studies did not find the largely expected increase in earnings
volatility after the implementation of SFAS 133 (e.g., Zhang 2009). I also examine
whether ineffective hedgers engage in more income smoothing via discretionary ac-
cruals than effective hedgers because the degree of the earnings volatility depends on
the effectiveness of the hedge (Bies 2005). I designate a firm as an ineffective hedger
if it reports gains or losses due to hedge ineffectiveness after the adoption of SFAS
133. I find that income smoothing via discretionary accruals is significantly higher
for ineffective hedgers than effective hedgers after the implementation of SFAS 133.
This result indicates that ineffective hedgers are more affected by SFAS 133 than
effective hedgers. Finally, I examine whether market volatility affects the impact of
SFAS 133 on income smoothing via discretionary accruals. Greater market volatility
will make the documentation of the hedging relationship and hedging effectiveness
tests (e.g., prospective test) more difficult for firms to qualify for hedge accounting
because they cannot easily anticipate changes in fair value of derivatives and changes
in fair value of hedged items. Thus, I expect that the higher the level of market
instability, the stronger income smoothing via discretionary accruals after the adop-
tion of SFAS 133. Consistent with my prediction, I find that the higher the market
volatility, the stronger income smoothing via discretionary accruals after the imple-
mentation of SFASS 133, which implies that higher market instability indeed makes
it more difficult for firms to meet hedge accounting requirements which therefore in-
creases unmanaged earning volatility and income smoothing. The results are robust
to controlling for industry differences, an alternative measure of income smoothing,
and to the inclusion of additional control variables (e.g., corporate governance and
macro-economic factors).
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, by providing em-
pirical evidence that SFAS 133 induces higher unmanaged earnings volatility and
consequently income smoothing via discretionary accruals, this paper contributes to
the general debate about whether SFAS 133 affects earnings volatility and income
smoothing. Prior studies on the impact of SFAS 133 on earnings volatility show that
SFAS 133 does not affect earnings volatility (e.g., Zhang 2009). However, prior studies
do not take managers’ earnings smoothing behavior into account. Second, this study
extends Barton’s (2001) study by providing empirical evidence on the impact of SFAS
133 on income smoothing via discretionary accruals. The findings of this study sup-
port Barton’s (2001) assumption that managers use discretionary accruals to smooth
earnings after the implementation of SFAS 133. Third, this study helps standard
setters and regulators to consider the trade-off between increased transparency and
income smoothing. Finally, by showing the unintended consequences of the account-
ing treatment for derivative instruments and hedging activities under SFAS 133, this
study contributes to empirical studies on the effect of accounting recognition and
disclosure regulation (Healy and Palepu 2001).
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The remainder of this study is structured as follows. The next section reviews pre-
vious studies. Section 4.3 describes the theory and develops the hypotheses. Section
4.4 presents the research design. Section 4.5 presents sample selection and descrip-
tive statistics. Section 4.6 discusses the main results. Section 4.7 provides a brief
summary and conclusion.
4.2 Literature review
There are two strands of literature related to this paper: the first attempts to provide
reasons for income smoothing, and the second concerns the impact of SFAS 133 on
earnings volatility.
Income smoothing refers to managers’ actions to use their reporting discretion
to reduce the fluctuations in their reported net earnings towards an expected level
(Tucker and Zarowin, 2006). With respect to income smoothing activities, previous
studies indicate that firms can use artificial smoothing and real smoothing. Artifi-
cial smoothing specifically refers to accounting manipulation (i.e., using accounting
procedures to shift expenses and/or revenues over time without direct cash flow conse-
quences) to smooth earnings. On the other hand, real smoothing involves the deliber-
ate choice and timing of transactions that can affect cash flows and control underlying
economic events (e.g., alerting a firm’s production and/or investment decisions at year
end based on knowledge of how the firm has performed up to that time in the year).
Since managers use artificial smoothing and real smoothing as substitutes to smooth
earnings (Barton 2001), I investigate income smoothing via accounting manipulation
(i.e., artificial smoothing).
Previous studies have suggested various motivations for income smoothing. One
of the early studies on income smoothing suggested that it enhances investors’ and
creditors’ confidence of management, enhances the relation between managers and
workers, and reduces corporate tax liability (Hepworth 1953). In addition to the
reasons above, Gordon (1964) suggested that stable earnings increase stockholders’
satisfaction because stable earnings make predictions about future earnings easier.
Trueman and Titman (1988) also show that managers smooth earnings to increase
stock prices. They argue that smooth earnings lower the assessment of the possibility
of bankruptcy and thus decrease the firm’s cost of borrowing. This will lead to an
increase in the attractiveness of the firm to investors. Another theoretical study by
Froot and Stein (1993) predict that smooth cash flows increase firm value by lowering
the firm’s reliance on costly external capital. Consistent with this prediction, Minton
and Schrand (1999) find evidence that higher cash flow volatility is associated with
higher costs of accessing external capital and a lower level of investment in capital
expenditures, R&D and advertising.
Albrecht and Richardson (1990) provide empirical evidence on whether income
smoothing exists and its distribution across different industries. Analyzing a sample
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of 128 core companies and 128 peripheral companies from 1974 to 1985, they find
that income smoothing exists and that it is fairly evenly distributed across industries.
Recently, using a comprehensive survey of top executives, Graham et al. (2005) find
that almost 97% of respondents prefer a smooth earnings path. The primary reasons
for working towards smooth earnings are that CFOs believe that investors perceive
firms with smoother earnings as less risky and thus demand a smaller risk premium.
Moreover, they find that CFOs believe that smoother earnings make it easier for
analysts and investors to project future earnings and that this leads to a higher stock
price. Francis et al. (2005) also find that firms with higher income smoothing have a
lower cost of capital, even after controlling for cash flow volatility.
Other motivations for income smoothing are related to managers’ compensation
and job security. Prior analytical literature on job security as an incentive for man-
agers to smooth earnings suggests that managers experiencing poor (good) perfor-
mance in the current (next) period have an incentive to use discretionary accruals to
increase current period earnings to avoid being dismissed in the current period. Con-
versely, managers experiencing good (bad) performance in the current (next) period,
have an incentive to use discretionary accruals to decrease current period earnings
to avoid being dismissed in the next period (Fudenberg and Tirole 1995). Consis-
tent with this theory, DeFond and Park (1997) find that managers experiencing good
(poor) performance in the current period and expecting poor (good) performance in
the next period make income-decreasing (income-increasing) discretionary accruals in
order to reduce the threat of being dismissed. The results thus suggest that managers
smooth earnings in consideration of both current and future relative performance.
Two studies that are closely related to my study are Singh (2004) and Zhang
(2009). Singh (2004) examines the influence of SFAS 133 on earnings and cash flow
volatility. Analyzing a sample of 305 non-financial, non-regulated Fortune 500 com-
panies from 2000 to 2001, he finds that SFAS 133 has no significant effect on earnings
and cash flow volatility. Similarly, Zhang (2009) examines changes in firms’ risk ex-
posure, cash flow volatility, and earnings volatility after the adoption of SFAS 133 for
effective hedgers and speculators or ineffective hedgers. He finds that neither effec-
tive hedgers nor speculators or ineffective hedgers experience a significant change in
earnings volatility after the adoption of SFAS 133.
Although prior studies provide useful insights, there are very few that examine the
impact of accounting for derivatives (i.e., SFAS 133) on earnings volatility and income
smoothing. Most importantly, there is no study, to the best of my knowledge, that
examines the influence of the degree of hedge ineffectiveness and market instability on
the impact of SFAS 133 on income smoothing. This study thus takes a first step to fill
the evident gap in the literature by examining the impact of accounting for derivatives
(i.e., SFAS 133) on earnings volatility and income smoothing and by investigating the
influence of the degree of hedge ineffectiveness and market instability on the impact
of SFAS 133 on income smoothing.
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4.3 Theory and hypotheses
4.3.1 SFAS 133 and income smoothing
Prior studies suggest that earnings volatility is not preferable to shareholders and
managers for several reasons (e.g., Trueman and Titman 1988; Defond and Park 1997).
Consistent with this view, several studies show that less volatile earnings (smooth
earnings) lower the actual or perceived riskiness of firms (Trueman and Titman 1988;
Michelson et al. 2000), increase analysts following and improve firm value (Lang
et al. 2003), give owners and creditors more confidence in management (Hepworth
1953), increase managerial compensation and wealth (Barton 2001), and attract more
institutional investors (Badrinath et al. 1989). Thus, managers have strong incentives
to report smooth earnings.
SFAS 133 requires companies to recognize all derivative instruments as either as-
sets or liabilities on the balance sheet at fair value and to adjust their earnings to
reflect changes in the market value. Much of the controversy surrounding SFAS 133
concerns the possibility that the standard increases earnings volatility. Under the pre-
vious standards, firms could hide ineffective hedges on the balance sheet by deferring
the effects on earnings. SFAS 133, however, exposes such hedges by requiring firms
to measure and record all ineffectiveness in the income statement. For a derivative
designated as a fair value hedge (i.e, hedging the exposure to changes in the fair value
of a recognized asset or liabilities), a firm can recognize the changes in the fair value
of the hedged item and derivative instruments in the income statement simultane-
ously (SFAS 133 paragraph 22). For a derivative designated as a cash flow hedge
(i.e., hedging the exposure to variable cash flows of a forecasted transaction), the
effective portion of the derivative instrument’s gains and losses is initially reported
as a component of other comprehensive income and subsequently reclassified to earn-
ings when the forecasted transaction affects earnings.2 The ineffective portion of the
gains and losses is reported in earnings immediately (SFAS 133 paragraph 30). Thus,
any speculative position or hedge ineffectiveness will affect current period earnings
because there is no offsetting adjustment from the hedged item. This hedge mismatch
will induce higher earnings volatility. Much of the anecdotal evidence confirms the
concern about the impact of SFAS 133 on earnings volatility: almost 62% of over 250
comment letters on the Exposure Draft noted that earnings volatility would increase
(Ronnie 2001). The following comment is typical:
Given the focus on earnings by analysts and shareholders, the earnings
volatility potential presented by fair value hedge accounting, as proposed
(by SFAS 133), may have a material impact on market valuation as well.
[Providian Bancrop]
2A hedge is highly effective if changes in fair value or cash flow of the hedged item and the
hedging derivative offset each other to a significant extent.
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Consequently, managers had huge pressure to smooth earnings after the adoption
of SFAS 133. Previous studies document that managers make discretionary account-
ing choices and/or use derivative instruments to reduce earnings volatility (Barton
2001; Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Myers and Skinner 1999). Barton (2001) shows,
for example, that managers view derivatives and discretionary accruals as substitutes
to smooth earnings. Because gains and losses on derivative instruments recognition
under SFAS 133 increases earnings volatility and the volatility in earnings volatil-
ity is costly for managers and shareholders, managers will likely engage in income
smoothing via discretionary accruals.
In this study, therefore, I posit that because SFAS 133 induces higher earnings
volatility, firms will engage in more income smoothing via discretionary accruals after
the adoption of SFAS 133. To assess the effect of SFAS 133 on income smoothing via
discretionary accruals, I test the following hypothesis:
H1: Income smoothing via discretionary accruals increases after the adoption of
SFAS 133.
4.3.2 SFAS 133, type of hedgers, and income smoothing
My second hypothesis tests whether the impact of SFAS 133 on income smoothing
via discretionary accruals depends on the effectiveness of the hedge. SFAS 133 allows
firms to use hedge accounting. The purpose of hedge accounting is to reduce earnings
volatility by allowing firms to report gains and losses on the derivative instruments in
the income statement in the same period as offsetting losses and gains on the hedged
items. However, to qualify for hedge accounting, formal documentation of the hedging
relationship and hedge effectiveness tests at the inception and throughout the term of
the hedge relationship must be met (SFAS 133).3 Because ineffective hedgers do not
meet hedge effectiveness criteria, they are more likely to report more gains and losses
on derivative instruments in earnings immediately but losses and gains of the hedge
item later than effective hedgers. This creates a significant mismatch in the timing of
gains and losses recognition and thus induces higher potential earnings volatility for
ineffective hedgers than effective hedgers. Susan Bies, former member of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve, notes that the degree of the earnings volatility
depends on the effectiveness of the hedge (Bies 2005).
Following the above discussion, I expect that ineffective hedgers are more likely
to be engaged in more income smoothing via discretionary accruals than effective
hedgers after the adoption of SFAS 133. To assess whether the effect of SFAS 133
on income smoothing via discretionary accruals varies between effective hedgers and
ineffective hedgers, I test the following hypothesis:
3For example, the ratio of change in the value of hedged item and its hedging instruments should
fall between 80% and 125% (SFAS 133).
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H2: Income smoothing via discretionary accruals is higher for ineffective hedgers
than effective hedgers after the adoption of SFAS 133.
4.3.3 SFAS 133, market instability, and income smoothing
My third hypothesis tests whether market instability affects the influence of SFAS
133 on income smoothing via discretionary accruals. As mentioned above, SFAS 133
requires proper documentation of the hedging relationship and hedge effectiveness
tests (e.g., a retrospective test and a prospective test) to apply hedge accounting.
Larger market volatility will make the documentation of the hedging relationship and
effectiveness tests more difficult because firms cannot easily anticipate the changes in
fair value of the derivative instruments and the changes in fair value of the hedged
items. Moreover, larger market volatility causes larger fluctuations in market values
of assets and liabilities. If firms do not apply hedge accounting, it will lead to a
significant increase in earnings volatility.
Hence, I posit that the higher the level of market instability, the higher income
smoothing via discretionary accruals after the adoption of SFAS 133. To assess the
effect of market instability on the influence of SFAS 133 on income smoothing via
discretionary accruals, I test the following hypothesis:
H3: The higher market instability, the stronger income smoothing via discretionary
accruals after the adoption of SFAS 133.
4.4 Research design
I argue that SFAS 133 influences firms’ income smoothing via discretionary accruals
decisions. From this perspective, I assume that income smoothing via discretionary
accruals can be presented in the following form:
Income smoothing = f(SFAS 133, control variables) (4.1)
4.4.1 Variable measurement
Dependent variable: income smoothing
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Grant et al. 2009),
I use the correlation between changes in managed earnings(∆ME) and changes in
unmanaged earnings(∆UME) as a measure of income smoothing. Based on the
modified Jones model, I estimate discretionary accruals. The model is:
TACC = β0 + β1(1/TAL) + β2(4Sale−4AR) + β3PPE + β4ROA+ ξ (4.2)
TACC is total accruals, which is defined as changes in non-cash current assets
minus changes in current labilities, excluding the current portion of long-term debt,
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minus depreciation and amortization4; change in sales (∆Sale); change in account
receivables (∆AR); and gross property, plant and equipment (PPE) are each deflated
by lagged total assets (TAL) to control for potential scaling biases. The (∆Sale -
∆AR) term controls for normal level of working capital accruals related to sales; the
PPE term controls for normal levels of depreciation expense and related deferred tax
accruals. I include ROA as an additional control variable because prior studies suggest
that the Jones model is misspecified for well-performing or poorly-performing firms
(Dechow et al. 1995; Kothari et al. 2005).
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Barton 2001), I estimate equation (4.2) cross-
sectionally for each sample fiscal year and two-digit SIC code using ordinary least
squares regression. I use the residual values of regression equation (4.2) as a measure
of discretionary accruals (DA). Like Tucker and Zarowin (2006), I determine the
unmanaged earnings (UME) as net income (NI) minus discretionary accruals (UME
= NI - DA). My measure of income smoothing is the correlation between changes in
discretionary accruals (managed earnings) and changes in pre-discretionary income
(unmanaged earnings): Corr(∆ME;∆UME), using three-year observations. A more
negative correlation indicates higher income smoothing (Tucker and Zarowin 2006).
Thus, a lower value SMOOTH indicates that managers exercise accounting discretion
to smooth reported earnings. In my analyses, I use the inverted sign of SMOOTH for
ease of interpretation, where larger coefficients indicate higher income smoothing.
Explanatory variables
My primary explanatory variables consist of two indicator variables and one con-
tinuous variable. The first indicator variable (POST) captures whether the fiscal year
falls after the adoption of SFAS 133, and takes the value of one for fiscal years ending
after the adoption of SFAS 133, and zero otherwise. The second indicator variable
(CLASS) captures whether a firm is classified as an ineffective hedger, and takes the
value of one if a firm is classified as an ineffective hedger, and zero otherwise. A
firm is classified as ineffective hedger if it reports derivative gains or losses due to
hedging ineffectiveness in the POST period. The third variable (VIX) measures mar-
ket volatility. It is based on the implied volatilities of options, where larger values
indicate higher market instability.
Control variables
I include a number of control variables in my regression analyses based on variables
identified in prior literature that are related to income smoothing. Prior research indi-
cates that factors such as managerial compensation and self-interest, pressure from the
capital market, corporate governance characteristics, debt covenants, macroeconomic
factors, and firm characteristics may influence managers’ income smoothing behavior
4I find similar results using earnings before extraordinary income minus operating cash flows as
a measure of TACC.
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(Carlson and Bathala 1997; Leuz et al. 2003; Tucker and Zarowin 2006). I control for
market volatility which is the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) volatility
index (VIX) measured at the end of the fiscal year. I control for a compensation
variable that may induce opportunistic behavior in managers. I use a dollar change
in the portfolio value of stock and option due to a percentage change in stock price
(STP) to control for managers’ compensations. Given the findings in prior studies
(e.g., Grant et al. 2009), I expect a positive association between income smoothing
and the compensation variable. I control for debt covenants (LEV) because prior
studies find that firms close to violating lending covenants increase income (rather
than smooth) in order to avoid such a violation (Dechow et al. 1996). Return on
assets (ROA) is used to control for firm profitability because managers’ ability to
smooth earnings is limited by the firm’s profit potential (Trueman and Titman 1988;
Carlson and Bathala 1997). Firms that experience poor performance tend to find
fewer instruments available with which to smooth earnings. This suggests that the
higher the firm’s profitability, the greater the potential for earnings smoothing. I mea-
sure ROA as the ratio of net income to total assets. Like Richardson et al. (2002),
I use the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. I control for growth opportunities
(BTM) because growth firms more likely smooth earnings than value firms because
growth firms usually have higher accruals (e.g., due to higher investment levels) which
provides them with more discretion for income smoothing. I define BTM as the ratio
of a firm’s book value to market value of equity. I control for firm size (SIZE) be-
cause large firms are more closely monitored than small firms and thus smooth less.
I measure SIZE as the natural logarithms of the market value of equity. I control for
time trend (TIMEY), measured as the rank of the financial reporting dates.
4.4.2 Hypotheses test
SFAS 133 and income smoothing
I use the following regression equation (4.3) to test whether income smoothing via
discretionary accruals experiences a significant change after the adoption of SFAS 133
(i.e., Hypothesis 1):
SMOOTH = α0 + α1POST + α2V IX + α3STP + α4LEV + α5ROA+ α6BTM
+ α7SIZE + α8TIMEY + ε (4.3)
All variables are defined as before.
SFAS 133, type of hedgers, and income smoothing
I estimate the following regression equation (4.4) for the post-SFAS 133 period
to test whether income smoothing via discretionary accruals is higher for ineffective
hedgers than for effective hedgers after the adoption of SFAS 133 (i.e., Hypothesis 2):
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SMOOTH = β0 + β1CLASS + β2V IX + β3STP + β4LEV + β5ROA+ β6BTM
+ β7SIZE + β8TIMEY + ξ (4.4)
All variables are defined as before.
SFAS 133, market volatility, and income smoothing
To test whether income smoothing via discretionary accruals increases with market
instability after the adoption of SFAS (i.e., Hypothesis 3), I estimate the following
regression equation (4.5):
SMOOTH = α0+α1POST+α2V IX+α3POST
∗V IX+α4STP+α5LEV+α6ROA+
α7BTM + α8SIZE + α9TIMEY + ω (4.5)
All variables are defined as before.
I employ two different regression models to test equation 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. The
first is an OLS regression. I also use a second regression model. This second model
is fixed-effects model, where I include firm dummies in the regressions. This allows
me to control for unobserved firm effects (fixed effects) on income smoothing that are
assumed to be constant through time but vary across firms (Wooldridge 2002).
4.5 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
4.5.1 Sample selection and data sources
My analyses are based on a sample of U.S. firms over the period of 1992 to 2006.
My sample begins in 1992 because this is the first year executive compensation data
became available on Compustat, and ends in 2006 because it enhances comparability
with prior studies.5 I obtained market security data from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) database. Financial accounting data along with the reporting
dates was collected from Compustat North America database. I obtained executive
compensation data from Execucomp. Market Volatility Index data was collected from
the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) website.
To mitigate the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 0.5 and 99.5
percentiles. I deleted observations with missing values and observations that are from
the transition period. The final sample consists of 215,874 firm-year observations over
the period of 1992 to 2006. Table 4.1 reports the sample composition by industry.
5In the sensitivity test, I extended the sample period from 2006 to 2009 and find results consistent
with my main findings.
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Table 4.1: Composition of Sample by Industry*
Industry-type No. of firm-year Percent Industry-type No. of firm-year Percent
BusSv 18931 8.77 Books 3566 1.65
Rtail 15388 7.13 ElcEq 2842 1.32
Chips 14573 6.75 Cnstr 2076 0.96
Enrgy 9875 4.57 Txtls 2055 0.95
Drugs 9562 4.43 Fun 2019 0.94
Mach 9498 4.40 PerSv 1915 0.89
Insur 8606 3.99 Misc 1601 0.74
Comps 8559 3.96 Toys 1538 0.71
Chems 8099 3.75 Aero 1516 0.70
Whlsl 8087 3.75 Rubber 1488 0.69
Trans 6543 3.03 Banks 1282 0.59
Steel 5934 2.75 Gold 1161 0.54
Paper 5908 2.74 Boxes 1126 0.52
MedEq 5497 2.55 Beer 1056 0.49
Food 5421 2.51 Mines 1038 0.48
BldMt 5230 2.42 Soda 620 0.29
Meals 5191 2.40 FabPr 616 0.29
Hshld 5190 2.40 Guns 612 0.28
Autos 5041 2.34 Agriculture 504 0.23
Telcm 4672 2.16 Smoke 466 0.22
Util 4643 2.15 Ships 413 0.19
LabEq 4140 1.92 Coal 145 0.07
Fin 4046 1.87 RlEst 20 0.01
Clths 3981 1.84 Total 215,984 100
Hlth 3584 1.66
*I use the Fama and French 48 industry classification.
4.5.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics of the key variables used in the regression
analyses for the whole sample. Of the total 215,985 firm-year observations, 49.5% of
my sample (106,794 firm-year observations) is from the pre-SFAS 133 period, while the
remaining 50.5% (109,080 firm-year observations) is from the post-SFAS 133 period.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Regression Analyses
Variables N Minimum Mean Median Std Maximum
SMOOTH 215,984 -1.000 0.010 -0.092 0.879 1.000
POST 215,984 0.000 0.506 1.000 0.500 1.000
VIX 215,984 11.250 19.747 20.920 5.923 28.620
CLASS 109,192 0 0.051 0 0.219 1
STP 215,984 0.000 5.370 5.404 1.555 8.161
LEV 215,984 0.000 0.217 0.210 0.164 0.559
ROA 215,984 -0.917 0.031 0.049 0.124 0.166
BTM 215,984 -2.689 0.454 0.419 0.383 1.207
SIZE 215,984 2.956 7.324 7.266 1.584 10.301
TIMEY 215,984 4.000 11.217 12.000 3.560 17.000
The full sample comprises of 215,984 firm-year observations from fi-
nancial and nonfinancial firms in the U.S. between 1992 and 2006
(excluding 2001) with financial data from Compustat, price/volume
data from CRSP, executive compensation data from Execucomp,
Market Volatility Index data from the Chicago Board Options Ex-
change (CBOE) website, and macroeconomic data are from the U.S.
Department of Labor and Commerce website. The table reports de-
scriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analyses.
All variables are defined as before.
Table 4.3 reports correlations of the key variables used in the regression analyses.
Pearson correlations are presented above the diagonal and Spearman rank correla-
tions are presented below the diagonal. There is a positive correlation between STP
and SMOOTH. The positive correlation suggests that firms engage in more income
smoothing activity as the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to stock price increases.
There is also a positive association between return on assets (ROA) and income
smoothing (SMOOTH). The positive and significant correlation indicates that higher
firm performance is related to more income smoothing. The positive association be-
tween SIZE and STP suggests that firm size is a driving force for stock and option
value sensitivity to stock price.
Although the correlations among some of the explanatory variables are generally
significant, the regression analyses in this study do not suffer from problems due to
multicollinearity, based on standard diagnostic checks (Belsley et al. 1980, Karuna
2007).
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Table 4.3: Correlations between Variables Used in Regression Analyses
VAR SMOOTH POST VIX CLASS STP LEV ROA BTM SIZE TIMEY
SMOOTH 0.015** -0.053† 0.005† -0.0082† -0.020† 0.035† -0.008† -0.023† -0.034†
POST 0.038† -0.256† 0.123† -0.058† -0.092† 0.032† 0.053† 0.869†
VIX -0.035† -0.256 -0.267† -0.000 0.064† -0.068† 0.044† -0.087† 0.055†
CLASS 0.002** -0.212† 0.048† 0.022† 0.022† -0.037† 0.103† 0.258†
STP 0.001 0113† 0.005** 0.051† -0.089† 0.266† -0.314† 0.587† -0.036†
LEV -0.019† -0,049† 0.062† 0.028† -0.086† -0.166† 0.076† 0.021† 0.033†
ROA 0.055† -0,082† -0.054† 0.041† 0.226† -0.309† -0.436† 0.309† 0.110†
BTM 0.004* -0.003† 0.035† -0.035† -0.165† -0.037† -0.019† -0.429† -0.064†
SIZE -0.000 0.046† -0.088† 0.105† 0.582† -0.008† 0.346† -0.241† -0.015†
TIMEY -0.063† 0.892† -0.267† 0.265† 0.140† -0.049† -0.015† 0.047† -0.368†
The table reports the values of the correlation between each variables used in the main analysis. Spear-
man (Pearson) correlations are above (below) the diagonal. All variables are defined as before. †, **,
and * denote two-tailed significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
4.5.3 SFAS 133 and earnings volatility
Before presenting the main results of this chapter, I provide some evidence on the
impact of SFAS 133 on unmanaged earnings volatility. To provide the evidence, I
regress the unmanaged earnings volatility measure (UNME-V) on POST and other
several control variables listed in equation 4.3. The results reported in Table 4.4 show
that unmanaged earnings volatility is significantly higher after the adoption of SFAS
133 than before. Specifically, the coefficient on POST is 0.2629 (t = 2.99). This
indicates that SFAS 133 indeed induces unmanaged earnings volatility by requiring
firms to report the gains and losses resulting from the changes in the fair value of
derivative instruments in the income statement immediately, but gains and losses of
the hedged items later. This implies that because earnings volatility is costly for
managers and shareholders, managers engage in earnings smoothing to reduce the
volatility induced by SFAS 133. This is consistent with Zhang’s (2009) empirical
finding that there is no significant change in managed earnings volatility after the
adoption of SFAS 133.
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Table 4.4: Accounting for Derivatives and unmanaged earnings volatility
Dependent variable
UNME-V
Variables Predicted sign I II
POST + 0.2629*** 0.4082***
(2.99) (4.42)
VIX + 0.0045 -0.0024
(1.29) (-0.65)
STP - 0.0031 0.1989***
(0.19) (7.57)
LEV ± 0.5533*** 1.3555***
(4.52) (5.16)
ROA ± -0.4561*** 2.0103***
(-2.63) (7.72)
BTM ± 0.4468*** 0.1658*
(8.43) (2.05)
SIZE ± -0.0766*** -0.5553***
(-4.70) (-11.93)
TIMEY ± 0.0236* 0.0311*
(1.93) (2.24)
Intercept ± 0.2956*
(1.75)
Firm-fixed-effects Yes
No. of observations 215,984 215,984
R2 0.1% 9%
The table reports regression coefficient estimates and (in parentheses)
t-statistics. Firm-fixed-effects are included in the regression reported
in columns II of the table. UNME-V is the standard deviation of un-
managed earnings (i.e., net income minus discretionary accruals) scaled
by total assets. All other variables are defined as before. ***, **, and
* denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respec-
tively.
4.6 Main results
4.6.1 SFAS 133 and income smoothing
Table 4.5 reports the regression results for equation (4.3), examining the changes in
income smoothing via discretionary accruals after the implementation of SFAS 133.
Column I of Table 4.5 presents the results without including firm dummies in the
regression. The estimated coefficient on POST, representing the change in income
smoothing via discretionary accruals between the pre-SFAS 133 and post-SFAS 133
period, is positive and significant (α1 = 0.3586; t = 42.76). After including firm
dummies in the regression, the results reported in Column II of Table 4.5 show that
the estimated coefficient on POST is also positive and significant (α1= 0.3942; t =
47.26). Consistent with my first hypothesis, the results reported in Table 4.5 show
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that the level of income smoothing via discretionary accruals is significantly higher
after the adoption of SFAS 133.
The estimated coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with
my predictions. Larger firms, firms with higher leverage, and firms with higher BTM
ratio tend to engage in less income smoothing via discretionary accruals activities.
Moreover, larger stock and option value sensitivity to a percentage change to stock
price and firms with better performance are likely to engage in more income smooth-
ing. I find a significant negative association between the time trend control variable
(TIMEY) and income smoothing (SMOOTH), suggesting that the increase in income
smoothing via discretionary accruals in the post-SFAS 133 period is not due to a
trend but to the adoption of SFAS 133.
Taken together, the results reported in Column I and II of Table 4.5 generally
support my first hypothesis that after the adoption of SFAS 133, firms engaged in
more income smoothing via discretionary accruals to mitigate the potential cost of
higher earnings volatility imposed by SFAS 133.
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Table 4.5: Accounting for Derivatives and Income Smoothing
Dependent variable: SMOOTH
Variables Predicted sign I II
POST + 0.3586*** 0.3942***
(42.76) (47.44)
VIX ± -0.0062*** -0.0054***
(-18.61) (-16.64)
STP + 0.0106*** 0.0135***
(7.02) (5.72)
LEV - -0.0364*** 0.0225
(-3.12) (0.96)
ROA + 0.4428*** 0.3676***
(26.71) (15.69)
BTM - -0.0047 0.0075
(-0.92) (1.04)
SIZE - -0.0192*** 0.0192***
(-12.34) (4.54)
TIMEY ± -0.0624*** -0.0803***
(-53.22) (-64.44)
INTERCEPT ± 0.7106***
(44.09)
Firm-fixed-effects Yes
Observations 215,984 215,984
R2 2% 20%
The table reports regression coefficient estimates and (in
parentheses) t-statistics. All variables are defined as before.
Firm-fixed-effects are included in in the regression reported
in Column II of the table. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed
significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
4.6.2 SFAS 133, type of hedgers, and income smoothing
Table 4.6 presents the regression results for equation (4.4) based on only the post-
SFAS 133 period sample, which consists of 109,192 firm-year observations. The esti-
mated coefficient on CLASS, representing the difference between income smoothing
via discretionary accruals for ineffective hedgers and income smoothing via discre-
tionary accruals for effective hedgers after the adoption of SFAS 133, is positive and
significant (β1 = 0.0680; t = 5.84). After including firm dummies in the regression,
the results reported in Column II of Table 4.6 show that the estimated coefficient
on CLASS is still positive and significant (β1 = 0.0413; t = 3.13). This finding in-
dicates that ineffective hedgers engage in more earnings smoothing via discretionary
accruals than effective hedgers after the implementation of SFAS 133. The estimated
coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with my predictions.
In sum, consistent with my second hypothesis, I find that income smoothing via
discretionary accruals is higher for ineffective hedgers than effective hedgers after the
adoption of SFAS 133. This implies that SFAS 133 has a larger influence on ineffective
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hedgers than on effective hedgers.
Table 4.6: Hedge Effectiveness and Income Smoothing
Dependent variable: SMOOTH
Variables Predicted sign I II
CLASS + 0.0680*** 0.0413***
(5.84) (3.13)
VIX ± -0.0100*** -0.0077***
(-11.05) (-9.31)
STP + 0.0185** 0.0577***
(8.15) (14.05)
LEV - -0.0289* -0.2188***
(-1.80) (-5.45)
ROA + 0.4103*** 0.1694***
(19.35) (5.60)
BTM - -0.0350*** -0.0827***
(-5.27) (-7.00)
SIZE - -0.0145*** 0.0300***
(-6.25) (3.85)
TIMEY ± -0.0100*** -0.1012***
(-11.05) (-25.88)
INTERCEPT ± 4.4301***
(3.88)
Firm-fixed-effects Yes
Observations 109,192 109,192
R2 1% 32%
The table reports regression coefficient estimates and (in
parentheses) t-statistics. All variables are defined as before.
Firm-fixed-effects are included in the regression reported in
column II of the table. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
4.6.3 SFAS 133, market volatility, and income smoothing
Table 4.7, reports the regression results for equation (4.5). The estimated coefficient
on VIX is negative and significant (α2 = -0.0097; t = -9.71). When I interact the
market instability measure (VIX) with POST, estimating the impact of market in-
stability on the effect of SAFS 133 on income smoothing via discretionary accruals,
the coefficient on the interaction term (VIX*POST) is positive and significant (α3 =
0.0057; t = 3.77). After including firm dummies in the regression, the coefficient on
the interaction term (VIX*POST) is still positive and significant (α3 = 0.0058; t =
4.04). The results in Table 4.7 therefore support my third hypothesis that the higher
market instability, the higher income smoothing via discretionary accruals after the
adoption of SFAS 133.
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Table 4.7: SFAS 133, Income Smoothing and Market Instability
Dependent variable: SMOOTH
Variables Predicted sign I II
POST + 0.1884*** 0.2204***
(4.10) (5.03)
VIX ± -0.0097*** -0.0091***
(-9.71) (-9.45)
VIX*POST + 0.0057*** 0.0058***
(3.77) (4.04)
STP + 0.0105*** 0.0133***
(6.97) (5.65)
LEV - -0.0364*** 0.0210
(-3.12) (0.89)
ROA + 0.4431*** 0.3674***
(26.73) (15.69)
BTM - -0.0057 0.0055
(-1.12) (0.75)
SIZE - -0.0191*** 0.0021***
(-12.29) (4.94)
TIMEY ± -0.0537*** -0.0714***
(-20.71) (-28.32)
INTERCEPT ± 0.7170***
(44.24)
Fixed-fixed-effects Yes
Observations 215,984 215,984
R2 2% 20%
The table reports regression coefficient estimates and (in
parentheses) t-statistics. All variables are defined as before.
Fixed-fixed-effects are included in the regression reported in
Column II of the table. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
4.6.4 Sensitivity tests
I performed additional tests to examine the robustness of my results. First, because
non-financial firms use derivative instruments more for hedging rather than for spec-
ulation, I examined whether my results are robust after excluding financial firms from
my sample. The results reported in Columns I, II and III of Table 4.8 show that the
coefficients on POST, CLASS and POST*VIX are positive and significant, specifically
on POST (α1 = 0.3619; t = 41.69 ), CLASS (β1 = 0.0546; t = 4.19) and POST*VIX
(α3 = 0.0078; t = 4.98). After including firm dummies in the regression, the results
reported in Columns I, II and III of Table 4.8, the coefficients on POST, CLASS
and POST*VIX are still positive and significant, specifically POST (α1 = 0.4047;
t = 47.14 ), CLASS (β1 = 0.0686; t = 5.24) and POST*VIX (α3 = 0.0083; t =
5.60). Thus, the results continue to show that there is a significant increase in income
smoothing after the adoption of SFAS 133, and that ineffective hedgers engage in
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more income smoothing than effective hedgers. Moreover, the findings indicate that
the higher market instability, the higher income smoothing via discretionary accruals
after the adoption of SFAS 133.
Table 4.8: Accounting for Derivatives and Income Smoothing - only for Non-financial
Firms
Dependent variable: SMOOTH
Variables Predicted sign I II III
POST + 0.3619*** 0.1291***
(41.69) (2.72)
VIX ± -0.0057*** -0.0090*** -0.0105***
(-16.47) (-9.60) (-10.15)
POST*VIX + 0.0078***
(4.98)
CLASS + 0.0546***
(4.19)
STP + 0.0085*** 0.0134** 0.0084***
(5.32) (5.63) (5.26)
LEV - -0.0354*** -0.0632 -0.0354***
(-2.89) (3.74) (-2.88)
ROA + 0.4489*** 0.3966** 0.4495***
(26.72) (18.53) (26.75)
BTM - 0.0005 -0.0223*** -0.0008
(0.10) (-3.25) (-0.16)
SIZE - -0.0201*** -0.0116*** -0.0199***
(-12.34) (-4.76) (-12.29)
TIMEY ± -0.0614*** -0.0849*** -0.0495***
(-50.62) (–19.77) (-18.47)
INTERCEPT ± 0.6984*** 1.3841*** 0.7073***
(41.78) (17.48) (42.07)
No. of observations 201,939 101,831 201,939
R2 2% 1% 2%
The sample comprises observations from only nonfinancial firms in the
U.S. between 1992 and 2006. The table reports the estimates from a
model examining the effect of SFAS 133 on income smoothing in Column
I, whether income smoothing after the adoption of SFAS 133 varies be-
tween effective hedgers and ineffective hedgers in Column II, and the im-
pact of market instability on the effect of SFAS 133 on income smoothing
in Column III. The table reports regression coefficient estimates and (in
parentheses) t-statistics. All variables are as defined before. ***, **, and *
denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.9: Accounting for Derivatives and Income Smoothing - only for Non-financial
Firms
Dependent variable: SMOOTH
Variables Predicted sign I II III
POST + 0.4047*** 0.1562***
(47.64) (3.45)
VIX ± -0.0049*** -0.0980*** -0.0101***
(-14.51) (-24.23) (-10.20)
POST*VIX + 0.0083***
(5.60)
CLASS + 0.0686***
(5.24)
STP + 0.0149*** 0.0511*** 0.0146***
(6.06) (11.88) (5.95)
LEV - 0.0098 -0.2576*** 0.0073
(0.41) (-6.25) (0.31)
ROA + 0.3859*** 0.1901*** 0.3859***
(16.35) (6.25) (16.35)
BTM - 0.0090 -0.0740*** 0.0063
(1.22) (-6.29) (0.84)
SIZE - 0.0151*** -0.0238*** 0.0174***
(3.50) (3.00) (4.00)
TIMEY ± -0.0807*** -0.0980*** -0.0680***
(-62.84) (-24.23) (-26.12)
Firm-fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 201,939 101,831 201,939
R2 20% 32% 20%
The sample comprises observations from only nonfinancial firms in the
U.S. between 1992 and 2006. The table reports the estimates from a
model examining the effect of SFAS 133 on income smoothing in Column
I, whether income smoothing after the adoption of SFAS 133 varies be-
tween effective hedgers and ineffective hedgers in Column II, and the im-
pact of market instability on the effect of SFAS 133 on income smoothing
in Column III. The table reports regression coefficient estimates and (in
parentheses) t-statistics. Firm-fixed-effects are included in the regression
reported in the table. All variables are as defined before. ***, **, and *
denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Secondly, I examined whether my results are sensitive for changes in the transition
period. Using a fiscal year between 1999 and 2001 as a new transition period, I find
consistent results with my main findings. Specifically, the results reported in Column
I of Table 4.10 show that the coefficient on POST is positive and significant (γ1
= 0.4039; t = 46.23). After including firm dummies in the regression, the results
reported in Column II of Table 4.10 show that the estimated coefficient on POST is
still positive and significant (γ1 = 0.4412; t = 51.30).
The results reported in Column III of Table 4.10 show that the estimated coeffi-
cient on VIX*POST is positive and significant (Θ3 = 0.0021; t = 1.73). After including
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firm dummies in the regression, the results reported in Column IV of Table 4.10 show
that the estimated coefficient on VIX*POST is still positive and significant (Θ3 =
0.0028; t = 1.93). Overall, the results shown in Table 4.10 are similar to those shown
in Table 4.5 and Table 4.7.
Table 4.10: SFAS 133, Hedge Effectiveness, Earnings Volatility, and Income Smooth-
ing: 1999 to 2001 as a transition period
Dependent variable: SMOOTH
Variables Pred.sign I II III IV
POST + 0.4039*** 0.4412*** 0.3410*** 0.3576***
(46.23) (51.30) (7.30) (8.07)
VIX ± -0.0071*** -0.0065*** -0.0084*** -0.0083***
(-21.12) (-19.72) (-8.33) (-8.60)
VIX*POST + 0.0021* 0.0028*
(1.73) (1.93)
STP + 0.0109*** 0.0129*** 0.0109** 0.0128***
(7.18) (5.38) (7.16) (5.35)
LEV - -0.0348*** 0.0226 -0.0349*** 0.0219
(-2.96) (0.95) (-2.95) (0.92)
ROA + 0.4386*** 0.3485*** 0.4386*** 0.3486***
(21.16) (14.70) (26.16) (14.70)
BTM - 0.0026 0.0223*** -0.0030 0.0213***
(0.51) (2.99) (-0.58) (2.84)
SIZE - -0.0181*** 0.0188*** -0.0181*** 0.0233***
(-11.51) (5.26) (-11.50) (5.42)
TIMEY ± -0.0684*** -0.0862*** -0.0651*** -0.0818***
(-56.23) (-67.31) (-24.42) (-31.85)
INTERCEPT ± 0.7568*** 0.7586
(45.96) (45.92)
Firm-fixed-effects Yes Yes
Observations 211,831 211,831 211,831 211,831
R2 2% 21% 2% 25%
The table reports regression coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-
statistics. Between 1999 and 2001 is used as a transition period. Firm-fixed-
effects are included in the regression reported in columns II nd VI of the table.
All variables are defined as before. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Thirdly, to rule out the possibility of my results being affected by macro-economic
and corporate governance factors, I included real GDP growth rate and CEOs par-
ticipation in compensation committee variables in the models. My findings are not
affected by these factors (untabulated). To reduce the influence of other events (e.g.,
the introduction of SOX) on managers’ income smoothing behavior, I use shorter time
window (i.e., between 1998 and 2002) to examine the sensitivity of my results. I find
results consistent with my main findings.
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Fourthly, to ascertain the sensitivity of my results with respect to the proxy for
hedge effectiveness, I use an alternative measure for hedge effectiveness. Specifically,
I replace CLASS with CLASS-L which is computed as the absolute value of gains and
losses due to hedge ineffectiveness scaled by total assets.6
Table 4.11 presents the sensitivity test using CLASS-L as an alternative proxy for
the level of hedge effectiveness. The results provided in Table 4.11 are still consis-
tent with my main findings. Specifically, the coefficient on CLASS-L is positive and
significant. After including firm dummies in the regression, the results presented in
II of Table 4.11 show that the coefficient on CLASS-L is still positive. Thus, the
results reported in Table 4.11 continue to show that the higher the degree of hedge
ineffectiveness, the higher income smoothing after the adoption of SFAS 133.
Fifthly, to ascertain the sensitivity of my results with respect to the income
smoothing measure, I employed an alternative measure of income smoothing. Like
prior studies (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003; Tucker and Zarowin 2006 and Grant et al.
2009), I used the ratio of the variability of earnings to the variability of cash flows
as an alternative measure of income smoothing (hereafter, SMOOTH2). I measure
the variability of earnings by the standard deviation of income before extraordinary
items deflated by total assets. Similarly, I measure the variability of cash flows by the
standard deviation of quarterly operating cash flows deflated by total assets. Ratios
in excess of one indicate more earnings variability relative to the variability of cash
flows. The more income smoothing, the less variability of earnings with respect to
the variability in cash flows. Like Grant et al. (2009), I calculate SMOOTH2 over
a period of three years (12 quarters). In my analyses, I use the inverted sign of
SMOOTH2 for ease of interpretation, where larger coefficients indicate higher income
smoothing. I find similar results to my main findings (untabulated).
Sixthly, I extended the sample period from 2006 to 2009 to test whether my
findings are sensitive to a longer sample period. My results are robust after extending
the sample period from 2006 to 2009. The results reported in Table 4.12 show that the
coefficients on POST, CLASS and POST*VIX are positive and significant, specifically
on POST (α1 = 0.1814; t = 21.89), CLASS (β1 = 0.0603; t = 5.79) and VIX*POST
(α3 = 0.0849; t = 90.75). After including firm dummies in the regression, the results
reported in columns II, IV and VI of Table 4.12 show that the coefficients on POST,
CLASS and POST*VIX are still positive and significant, specifically, on POST (α1
= 0.2081; t = 25.40), CLASS (β1 = 0.0199; t = 1.80) and VIX*POST (α3 = 0.0797;
t = 85.26). Thus, the results continue to show that there is a significant increase in
income smoothing after the adoption of SFAS 133, and that ineffective hedgers engage
in more income smoothing than effective hedgers. Moreover, the findings indicate that
the higher market instability, the higher income smoothing via discretionary accruals
after the adoption of SFAS 133.
6I use the absolute value of gains or losses due to hedge ineffectiveness because I expect both
positive and negative movements of a given magnitude to generate similar level of earnings volatility
and thus income smoothing.
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Table 4.11: Hedge Effectiveness and Income Smoothing
Dependent variable: SMOOTH
Variables Predicted sign I II
CLASS-L + 7.8964** 0.3287
(2.16) (0.07)
VIX ± -0.0098*** -0.0079***
(-10.08) (-9.61)
STP + 0.0184*** 0.0573***
(8.09) (13.96)
LEV - -0.0253 -0.2178***
(-1.57) (-5.43)
ROA + 0.4106*** 0.1706***
(19.35) (5.64)
BTM - -0.0346*** -0.0825***
(-5.19) (-6.99)
SIZE - -0.0136*** 0.0290***
(-5.89) (3.72)
TIMEY ± -0.0846*** -0.1037***
(-20.63) (-27.16)
INTERCEPT ± 1.3813***
(18.24)
Firm-fixed-effects Yes
Observations 109,190 109,190
R2 1% 32%
The sample comprises of 109,192 (i.e., only post-SFAS 133
period) firm-year observations from financial and nonfinan-
cial firms in the U.S. between 2002 and 2006. The table
reports results for the impact of hedge effectiveness on in-
come smoothing using post-SFAS 133 sample. The table
reports regression coefficient estimates and (in parentheses)
t-statistics. Firm-fixed-effects are included in the regression
reported in Column II of the table. All variables are defined
as before. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.12: SFAS 133, Hedge Effectiveness, Earnings Volatility, and Income Smooth-
ing
Dependent variable: SMOOTH
Variables Pred.sign I II III IV V VI
POST + 0.1814*** 0.2081*** 2.270*** 2.0969***
(21.89) (25.40) (80.00) (74.83)
CLASS + 0.0603*** 0.0199*
(5.79) (1.80)
VIX ± 0.0059*** 0.0061*** 0.0323*** 0.0320*** -0.0562*** -0.0525***
(19.70) (21.10) (82.11) (85.59) (-75.06) (-70.41)
VIX*POST + 0.0848*** 0.0797***
(90.20) (85.26)
STP + -0.0013 -0.0134*** 0.0085*** 0.0005 0.0039** -0.0058***
(-0.92) (-5.94) (4.05) (0.17) (2.73) (-2.60)
LEV - 0.0406*** 0.0274*** 0.0304*** 0.0009 0.0363*** 0.0216***
(11.71) (7.68) (8.56) (0.26) (10.68) (6.17)
ROA + 0.3204*** 0.1702*** 0.2289*** -0.0038 0.3118*** 0.1656***
(22.84) (9.77) (14.33) (-0.20) (22.62) (9.66)
BTM - 0.0000* 0.0149*** 0.0000 -0.0061** 0.0000 -0.0007
(1.79) (4.73) (1.26) (-1.99) (1.26) (-0.26)
SIZE - -0.0143*** 0.0188*** -0.0042** 0.0787*** -0.0133*** 0.0473***
(-9.52) (4.89) (-1.97) (12.90) (-9.00) (12.42)
TIMEY ± -0.0150*** -0.0322*** -0.1093*** -0.1223*** -0.0902*** -0.0665***
(-13.50) (-27.38) (-66.52) (-57.60) (-56.38) (-40.68)
INTERCEPT ± 4.4301*** -2.4092*** 0.0536***
(3.88) (35.92) (-69.07)
Firm-fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 226,208 226,208 119,414 119,414 226,208 226,208
R2 1% 18.5% 6% 33% 4% 21%
The table reports regression coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics. The sample period is
extended to 2009. All variables are defined as before. Firm-fixed-effects are included in the regression
reported in columns II, IV, and VI of the table. Columns I and II are based on equation 4.3 (i.e, to test
hypothesis 1), columns III and IV are based on equation 4.4 (i.e, to test hypothesis 2) and columns V
and VI are based on equation 4.5 (i.e, to test hypothesis 3). ***, **, and * denote two-tailed signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Finally, prior studies (e.g., Petersen 2009) suggest that in regression analyses with
panel data, the residuals may be correlated across firms and across time, and OLS
standard errors can be biased. To adjust the standard errors for residual correlation
(both within firms over time, and across firms each time period), Petersen (2009)
suggests to estimate the standard errors with clustering along multiple dimensions
(firm and year). As my sample comprises panel data, I test whether my results are
sensitive for residual correlation. Using the approach discussed by Petersen 2009,
I estimate the standard errors with clustering along multiple dimensions (firm and
year). Untabulated results generally support the findings of this study.
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4.7 Summary and conclusion
SFAS 133 requires firms to report all derivative instruments on the balance sheet at
fair value, and the gains or losses resulting from the changes in fair value must be
recorded in earnings and/or as a component of other comprehensive income. SFAS 133
is a widely debated and controversial accounting standard for derivative instruments.
This study investigates whether the implementation of SFAS 133 influences income
smoothing. First, I hypothesize that income smoothing via discretionary accruals
increases after the adoption of SFAS 133. Second, I predict that ineffective hedgers
engage in more income smoothing than effective hedgers after the adoption of SFAS
133. Third, I expect that income smoothing via discretionary accruals after the
adoption of SFAS 133 increases more with market instability. Like prior studies
(e.g., Leuz et al. 2003; Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Grant et al. 2009), I used the
correlation between changes in managed earnings and changes in unmanaged earnings
as a measure of income smoothing. Consistent with my predictions, I find that income
smoothing via discretionary accruals increases significantly after the adoption of SFAS
133, suggesting that SFAS 133 unintentionally leads firms to engage in more income
smoothing via discretionary accruals activity. I also show that ineffective hedgers
engage in more income smoothing via discretionary accruals than effective hedgers
after the adoption of SFAS 133. Lastly, I find that the higher market volatility, the
stronger income smoothing via discretionary accruals after the adoption of SFAS 133,
suggesting that larger fluctuations in the fair value of derivative instruments causes
higher earnings volatility and thus higher income smoothing.
My findings contribute not only to the accounting literature by empirically showing
that SFAS 133 affects income smoothing, but also to the general debate about whether
SFAS 133 affects earnings volatility. Taken together, my findings indicate that firms
smooth earnings via discretionary accruals to mitigate the earnings volatility imposed
by SFAS 133. Thus, the empirical evidence of this study confirms the claims of
critics and managerial concerns about the effect of SFAS 133 on earnings volatility
and income smoothing. Therefore, standard setters and regulators should take into
account the trade-off between increasing transparency and income smoothing.
5
Conclusion
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 133 (SFAS 133), Accounting for Deriva-
tive Instruments and Hedging Activities, deals with controversial and critical issues,
such as fair value accounting, hedge accounting, hedge effectiveness testing and mea-
surement, documentation and disclosure. Although SFAS 133 is a comprehensive
accounting standard for derivatives, it is one of the most controversial standards ever
issued by the FASB. This dissertation examined the economic consequences of the
implementation of SFAS 133.
The three studies in this dissertation contribute towards a better understand-
ing of the various consequences of the adoption of SFAS 133. More specifically, it
contributes to the literature on the costs and benefits of mandatory accounting recog-
nition and disclosure regulations, by addressing the consequences of SFAS 133 from
both investors’ and managers’ perspectives. The findings not only contribute to the
academic literature, but also have important implications for standard setters and
regulators in the US, as well as for standard setters and regulators in other countries
who are concerned with recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedg-
ing activities (e.g., IASB). This chapter provides a summary of the findings of each
study, their implications for standard setters and regulators, and their limitations.
The dissertation concludes by considering potential areas for future research.
5.1 Summary of results and limitations
The first study, presented in chapter two, empirically examined the impact of deriva-
tive instruments recognition and disclosure under SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty
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about the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency exchange rates. More-
over, this chapter investigated the influence of product market competition on the
impact of SFAS 133 on investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of
changes in foreign currency exchange rates. The findings of chapter two indicate that
the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities under
SFAS 133 increases transparency about the risks associated with derivative instru-
ments and hedging activities and thus helps investors to better predict the cash flow
implications of changes in foreign currency exchange rates. More specifically, the re-
sults show that investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow implications of changes in
foreign currency exchange rates is lower after the implementation of SFAS 133. Al-
though SFAS 133 is a controversial accounting standard for derivatives and hedging
instruments, the empirical evidence of this chapter confirms that SFAS 133 increases
the visibility and comparability of the risks associated with derivatives, reduces off-
balance-sheet transactions and gives a more detailed picture of the risk situations by
requiring firms to report all derivative instruments on the balance sheet at fair value.
Chapter two further shows that the proprietary costs associated with derivatives and
hedging activities affect firms’ recognition and disclosure decisions and thus reduces
the usefulness of SFAS 133 to investors. More specifically, I find that when the level
of product market competition increases, the decrease in investors’ uncertainty about
the cash flow implications of changes in foreign currency exchange rates after the
implementation of SFAS 133 is weaker. This confirms anecdotal evidence that some
firms strategically recognize and/or disclose their derivative instruments and hedging
activities to protect their proprietary information.
The second study, presented in chapter three, analyzes the role of the quality
of accounting recognition and disclosure on investors’ responses to macro-economic
news. Specifically, I investigated whether the adoption of SFAS 133 affects investors’
reaction to good and bad interest rate news. The results of chapter three show that
investors respond asymmetrically to good and bad interest rates news. However, the
asymmetry is less pronounced after the implementation of SFAS 133. Specifically, I
find that investors respond asymmetrically to good and bad interest rate news in both
the pre and post-SFAS 133 period, but the asymmetry significantly decreases after
the implementation of SFAS 133. This is consistent with idea that when investors
receive an ambiguous signal which conveys good or bad news, investors take bad
news more seriously, while discounting good news. However, investors discount good
news less heavily when the quality of accounting recognition and disclosure is higher.
I also find that the asymmetry of responses to good and bad interest rate news
before the adoption of SFAS 133 are greater for firms with higher earnings volatility
than for firms with lower earnings volatility. This implies that uncertainty about the
precision of information for firms with higher earnings volatility is higher than for
firms with lower earnings volatility. Chapter three further shows that the decrease in
the asymmetric responses to good and bad interest rates after the adoption of SFAS
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1333 is significantly higher for firms with higher earnings volatility than for firms with
lower earnings volatility. This indicates that information quality is more relevant for
firms with higher earnings volatility than for firms with lower earnings volatility.
Whereas chapters two and three study the usefulness of SFAS 133 from investors’
perspective, chapter four considers the effect of SFAS 133 on managers’ income
smoothing behaviour. More specifically, the third study investigates whether the
recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities under SFAS
133 have an impact on income smoothing. Moreover, the study examines whether the
degree of hedge ineffectiveness and market instability affect the impact of SFAS 133
on income smoothing. Prior to the adoption of SFAS 133, derivative instruments’
gains and losses were incorporated in the carrying value of the assets or liabilities, or
deferred and recorded at the time earnings were recognized on the assets or liabilities.
However, under SFAS 133, derivative instruments’ gains and losses are recognized in
earnings in the period that they occur, but gains and losses on the hedged item are
recognized later. This hedge mismatch has induced higher earnings volatility in the
post-SFAS 133 period. Because earnings volatility is costly to managers and investors,
I expect income smoothing to be higher in the post-SFAS 133 period. Moreover, be-
cause ineffective hedgers are less likely to qualify for hedge accounting, I predict that
ineffective hedgers will engage more in income smoothing than effective hedgers. I
also predict that the higher the market instability, the stronger the income smooth-
ing via discretionary accruals after the adoption of SFAS 133 because larger market
instability makes it more difficult for firms to apply hedge accounting. In line with
the predictions, the results indicate that income smoothing via discretionary accru-
als is higher after the implementation of SFAS 133. Additionally, ineffective hedgers
engage in more income smoothing via discretionary accruals than effective hedgers.
Finally, the results indicate that the higher the market instability, the stronger the
income smoothing via discretionary accruals after the implementation of SFAS 133.
The results in this chapter thus confirm the claims of critics and managerial concerns
about the impact of SFAS 133 on earnings volatility and income smoothing.
Although sensitivity tests indicate that the results reported in this dissertation
are robust to different specifications of tests, a number of caveats need to be noted
regarding the present studies. The most important limitation of the results presented
in chapter two is that the proxy for investors’ uncertainty about the cash flow impli-
cations of changes in foreign currency exchange rates is noisy. Researchers use several
proxies for information asymmetry, including trading volume (e.g., Linsmeier et al.
2002) and metrics based on analysts’ forecast (e.g., Barron et al. 1998). However,
each approach has its limitations. Bid-ask spreads used in this study have been widely
adopted in prior studies.
In chapter three, I used the application of SFAS 133 as a proxy for quality of
accounting recognition and disclosure because expanded disclosures and mandatory
recognition of derivative instruments as assets or liabilities at fair values after SFAS
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No. 133 provide greater transparency. However, I cannot rule out the possibility that
other factors may have influenced my results. I therefore included several control
variables (including macro-economic factors) to mitigate this problem. The difficulty
in accurately measuring good and bad interest rate news is another limitation of this
study.
One of the limitations of the findings in chapter four is to precisely classify firms
into either effective hedgers or ineffective hedgers. I employed the amount of gains or
losses due to derivative ineffectiveness as an alternative proxy for the degree of hedge
ineffectiveness to mitigate the classification problem. This proxy left me with a small
percentage of ineffective hedgers. Non-hedgers could also be considered as effective
hedgers. So, I cannot rule out the possibility that this may have influenced my results.
Another limitation of chapter four is the difficulty to directly measure the extent or
amount of income smoothing in firms, which is common to all empirical research on
the topic. Since it is difficult to precisely measure income smoothing using publicly
available data, measurement error is unavoidable.
Despite the above stated limitations, the findings of the three studies provide useful
insights about the benefits and costs of derivative instruments and hedging activities
recognition and disclosure of under SFAS 133. The following section describes a few
avenues for future research that follow directly from this dissertation.
5.2 Implications and recommendations for future
research
The Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (SFAS 133), intended to
improve transparency with respect to derivatives instruments by requiring all firms
to report their derivative instruments as assets and liabilities and to measure them
at fair value, has both potential costs and benefits.
One of the most important benefits of derivative instruments recognition and dis-
closure under SFAS 133 is that it provides additional useful information to investors
to better predict the future cash flows. This confirms the claims of proponents of the
benefits of SFAS 133. For example, it confirms that the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board has achieved the objective of promoting the visibility, comparability, and
understandability of the risks associated with derivative instruments. However, this
benefit is mitigated by market forces such as product market competition. Specifi-
cally, the proprietary costs associated with derivative instruments are higher for firms
operating in competitive industries than for operating in less competitive industries.
Considering these costs, these firms could have incentives to not fully comply with
SFAS 133.
Although derivative instruments recognition and disclosure under SFAS 133 in-
creases transparency, it also induces earnings volatility because it unintentionally in-
duces earnings volatility. Consequently, managers engage in more income smoothing
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activities to avoid the costs of earnings volatility.
The findings of these studies have a number of important implications for future
practice. Parties that would benefit from these insights include not only academic
scholars but also standard setters and regulators.
The study in chapter two stressed that the standard improves transparency about
the risks associated with derivative instruments and hedging activities and reduces
information asymmetry among investors due to changes in foreign currency exchange
rates. However, the proprietary costs associated with derivative instruments and
hedging activities reduce the effectiveness of SFAS 133. Hence, standard setters should
take product market competition into consideration before making derivative instru-
ments and hedging activities recognition and disclosure mandatory for all firms. By
taking product market competition into account, standard setters can get a better
view of the costs and benefits, which should help them in making more informed
trade-offs.
The study presented in chapter three shows that investors’ responses to good and
bad interest rate news is less asymmetric after the implementation of SFAS 133. More-
over, it shows that earnings volatility affects the impact of the quality of accounting
recognition and disclosure on investors’ responses to good and bad macro-economic
news. Specifically, the higher the level of earnings volatility, the higher the decrease
in the asymmetric investors’ responses to good and bad interest rate news. One of the
implications of these findings is that managers can influence investors’ responses not
only to firm-specific news but also to macro-economic news via accounting recognition
and disclosure. Another implication is that managers need to consider the level of
firms’ earnings volatility in order to influence investors’ responses to macro-economic
news via firms’ reporting practices. The findings of this study also help standard set-
ters and regulators to better understand the incentives of firms derivative and hedging
activities recognition and disclosure practices.
Chapter four of this dissertation documents the unintended consequences of SFAS
133 adoption. More specifically, firms engage in more income smoothing to reduce the
cost of earnings volatility imposed by SFAS 133. This finding underlines that stan-
dard setters and regulators should consider the trade-off between increasing trans-
parency and income smoothing. An understanding of this trade-off helps standard
setters in setting an optimal derivative instruments and hedging activities recognition
and disclosure standard. Another important practical implication of these studies is
that factors such as economic, political, and cultural settings should be taken into
consideration before implementing the convergence of U.S GAAP and international
accounting standards. As the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) con-
tinues its convergence activities with the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB), addressing country specific factors that play important role in the applica-
tion of derivative instruments and hedging activities recognition and disclosure may
be useful in deliberations for improved standards, and to mitigate concerns about the
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increased time and effort necessary for the application of IFRS.
This dissertation has thus thrown up a number of interesting questions in need of
further investigation. The findings of the three studies presented in this dissertation
indicate that the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging ac-
tivities under SFAS 133 appear successful in improving transparency and monitoring
of the risk implications of derivative instruments and hedging activities. In addition
they provide the following suggestions for future research. First, it would be interest-
ing to assess the effectiveness of other countries’ accounting standards for derivative
instruments and hedging activities (e.g., IAS 39) that include different features. For
example, the FASB and the International Accounting Standards (IASB) are working
hard to converge U.S GAAP and international accounting standards. In this context,
it is worth examining how investors and firms operating in varying economic, political
and cultural settings would respond to a single set of accounting standards for deriva-
tives and hedging activities. Second, prior studies indicate that more complete and
transparent accounting information increases analysts’ information acquisition and
use (e.g., Hirst et al. 2004). Thus, further research might explore whether the recog-
nition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities under SFAS 133
affects analysts’ judgments of firm risk and value. Third, future research may exam-
ine how analysts use and evaluate the unrealized gains and losses reported in income
statements after the implementation of SFAS 133 in order to get insights about the
impact of SFAS 133 from the analysts’ perspective.
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Appendix: Derivatives
recognition and disclosure
from 10-K reports
From the 1995 Annual Report of General Motors,
Inc.:
The primary classes of derivatives used by General Motors are foreign exchange-
forward contracts and options, interest rate forward contracts and options, and for-
ward contracts to purchase or sell mortgages or mortgage-backed securities. General
Motors uses foreign exchange-forward contracts as well as purchased and written for-
eign exchange options.
At December 31, 1995 and 1994, General Motors held foreign exchange-forward
contracts of approximately $11,602 million and $9,030 million (including cross-currency
swaps of $1,290 million and $1,161 million), respectively. At December 31, 1995 and
1994, General Motors had entered into foreign exchange options of approximately
$3,833 million and $2,637 million, respectively.
At December 31, 1995 and 1994, the total notional amount of interest rate forward
contracts with off-balance-sheet risk was approximately $15,942 million and $14,080
million, respectively. Gains and losses on terminated interest rate forward contracts
are deferred and recognized as a yield adjustment on the underlying debt. Unamor-
tized net losses on interest rate forward contracts totaled approximately $36 million
and $24 million at December 31, 1995 and 1994, respectively.
From the 2008 Annual Report of Eurobankshares,
Inc.:
The company’s objective in using derivatives is to manage interest rate exposure
of the variable commercial loan portfolio and other identified risks. To accomplish
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this objective, the company primarily uses interest rate swaps as part of its fair value
hedging strategy. As of December 31, 2008 and 2007, the company had the following
derivative instruments outstanding:
Eurobankshares, Inc. and Subsidiaries
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements
December 31, 2008 and 2007
2008 2007
Notional amount Fair value Notional amount Fair value
Labour-rate interest rate swaps 14,0000,000 12,959 30,800,000 (415,176)
Purchased Options 25,000,000 110,000 25,000,000 3,950,000
Written Options 25,000,000 110,000 25,000,000 (3,950,000)
During the years ended December 31, 2008 and 2007, the net loss from fair value
hedging ineffectiveness was considered inconsequential and reported within other non-
interest income. Derivatives instruments were recorded on the balance sheet at their
respective fair value......Follwing are the carrying amount and fair value of financial
instruments as of December 31:
Eurobankshares, Inc. and Subsidiaries
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements
December 31, 2008 and 2007
2008 2009
Carrying amount Fair value Carrying amount Fair value
Financial assets:
Derivatives-Purchased Options 110,000 110,000 3,950,000 3,950,000
Financial liabilities:
Derivatives-Interest rate Swaps 12,959 12,959 415,176 415,176
Derivatives-Written Options 100,000 110,000 3,950,000 3,950,000
From the 2007 Annual Report of Citigroup, Inc.:
In the ordinary course of business, Citigroup enters into various types of derivative
transactions. These derivative transactions include: futures and forward contracts,
swap contracts, and option contracts.
The following table provides data on the notional amount and market values of
various types of derivative instruments.
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Notional Amount (in millions of dollar) Trading derivatives Assets/Liability hedges
As of December 31 2007 2007
Interest rate contracts
Swaps 16,433,117 521,783
Future and forwards 1,811,599 176,146
Written options 3,479,071 16,741
Purchase options 3,639,075 167,080
Total interest rate contract notions 25,362,862 881,750
Foreign exchange contracts
Swaps 1,062,267 75,622
Future and forwards 2,795,180 46,732
Written options 653,535 292
Purchase options 644,744 686
Total foreign exchange contract notions 5,155,726 123,332
Total derivative notions 35,708,587 1,005,082
Mark-to-Market(In millions of dollar) Der.receivables Der.payables
As of December 31 2007 2007
Trading Derivatives
Interest rate contacts 269,400 257,329
Foreign exchange contracts 77,942 71,991
Total 467,209 489,417
Asset/Liablity Management Hedges
Interest rate contracts 8,529 7,176
Foreign exchange contracts 1,634 972
Total 10,163 8,148
The following table summarizes certain information related to the Company’s
hedging activities for the years ended December 31, 2007, 2006, and 2005.
In millions of dollar 2007 2006 2005
Fair value hedges
Hedge ineffectiveness recognized in earnings 91 245 38
Net gains(loss) excluded from assessment of effectiveness 420 302 (32)
Cash flow hedges
Hedge ineffectiveness recognized in earnings - (18) (18)
Net gains(loss) excluded from assessment of effectiveness - - 1
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From the 2003 Annual Report of Keycorp, Inc.:
The primary derivatives that Key uses are interest rate swaps, caps and futures,
and foreign exchange forward contracts. All foreign exchange forward contracts and
interest rate swaps and caps held are over-the-counter instruments. At September
30, 2003, Key had $788 million of derivative assets and $146 million of derivative
liabilities on its balance sheet that arose from derivatives that were being used for
hedging purposes. As of the same date, derivative assets and liabilities classified
as trading derivatives totaled $1.4 billion and $1.3 billion, respectively. Derivative
assets and liabilities are recorded at fair value in accrued income and other assets and
accrued expense and other liabilities, respectively, on the balance sheet.
Key uses a fair value hedging strategy to modify its exposure to interest rate risk
and a cash flow hedging strategy to reduce the potential adverse impact of interest
rate increases on future interest expense. For more information about these asset and
liability management strategies used to modify Key’s exposure to interest rate risk,
Key expects to reclassify an estimated $26 million of net gains on derivative instru-
ments from ”accumulated other comprehensive income (loss)to earnings during the
next twelve months. The following table shows trading income recognized on interest
rate swaps and foreign exchange forward contracts.
In millions of dollar 2003 2002
Interest rate swap contracts 6 8
Foreign exchange forward contracts 25 26
From the 2011 Annual Report of Appel, Inc.:
Apple Inc. has used derivative instruments, such as foreign currency forward and
option contracts, to hedge certain exposures to fluctuations in foreign currency ex-
change rates. The Company may enter into foreign currency forward and option
contracts with financial institutions to protect against foreign exchange risks associ-
ated with certain existing assets and liabilities, certain firmly committed transactions,
forecasted future cash flows, and net investments in foreign subsidiaries.
The Company recognized in other income and expense a net loss of $158 million,
$123 million and $133 million on foreign currency forward and option contracts not
designated as hedging instruments during 2011, 2010 and 2009, respectively. These
amounts represent the net gain or loss on the derivative contracts and do not include
changes in the related exposures, which generally offset a portion of the gain or loss
on the derivative contracts.
The following tables summarize the gross fair value of the Company’s derivative
instruments as reflected in the Consolidated Balance Sheets as of September 24, 2011
and September 25, 2010 (in millions):
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2011
Fair Value: Hedge Inst. Fair Value: Not-Hedge Inst.
Derivative assets:
Foreign exchange contracts 460 56
Derivative liabilities:
Foreign exchange contracts 72 37
The following tables summarize the gross fair value of the Company’s derivative
instruments as reflected in the Consolidated Balance Sheets as of September 24, 2011
and September 25, 2010 (in millions):
Gains/(Losses) Recognized in OCI Ineffective Portion
2011 2011
Cash flow hedges:
Foreign exchange contracts 153 (213)
Net investment hedges:
Foreign exchange contracts (43) 1
Total 110 (212)
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